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ABSTRACT
Sandra Stephens
THE I?:
DECOLONIZING THE I THROUGH ART AND EMDISEMBODIMENT.

Stephens through decolonizing the I, problematizes its universality throughout Western
philosophy and aesthetics. She argues for bringing the messiness of the body to philosophical
discussions through EmDisEmbodiment, an existential, phenomenological, and psychoanalytic
method of not only embodiment or disembodiment but a relation between embodiment and
disembodiment. An EmDisEmbodied I appreciates statements from another’s universal at odds
with one's own realizing both the deconstructive and reconstructive potentials of identity
formation. She believes this approach will enrich philosophical conversations concerning the I
and its relationship to others. She further argues that the conversation between aesthetics,
philosophy, and politics can do exactly this. Taking an intersectional approach, she draws
connections amongst what she refers to as Irigaray's Fluid I, Fanon’s Universal-Particular I, and
Jean Luc Nancy’s Absolute-Fragmented I. She sees the understanding of the nuances of the
Universal-Particular questioning body that is reconstructing itself with a keen self-realization
that it will never be complete; the Absolute-Fragmented relational body with frayed edges tying
and untying knots; and the Fluid body that thinks in terms of proximities and dualities; as key to
expanding the conversation surrounding the various isms. Looking at ideas from these theorists,
along with Lewis Gordon, Jacques Derrida, and Sylvia Wynter in conversation with the work of
various artists she shows how the intercourse between conceptions of art, philosophy and “the I”
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get to the very needed connections amongst the universal, its drives, emotions, embodiment,
disembodiment and her term EmDisEmbodiment. In turn she suggests a new understanding of the
form vs. content, abstraction vs. figuration contemporary art debates. An understanding that does
not set up a dichotomy that hierarchizes but instead complicates the divisions between
form/content, figuration/abstraction, the body/the formless, and the universal I/the particular I.
She concludes by looking at Nancy's “wandering labor of sense” as it relates to Édouard
Glissant's errantry.

Keywords: Decolonization, I, self, EmDisEmbodiment, transimmanence
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1
INTRODUCTION
Abstraction is flying. Abstracting is ascending to higher and higher levels of conceptual
generalization; soaring back and forth, reflectively circling around above the specificity
and immediacy of things and events in space and time … freedom from the immediate
boundaries of concrete subjectivity, freedom to … detach the realized object from oneself
more and more fully as a self-contained entity… Abstraction is a solitary journey through
the conceptual universe, with no anchors, no cues, no signposts, no maps, no foundations
to cling to … Swooping and swerving crazily through the uncharted sky… I plummeted
back to earth where I landed with a jolt.
(Piper, Out of Order, Out of Sight, Volume 1, 224)

There is a zone of nonbeing, an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an incline stripped
bare of every essential from which a genuine new departure can emerge. In most cases,
the black man cannot take advantage of this descent into a veritable hell.
(Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, Kin Loc 83)

Much can be gleaned from these two passages about the black man/woman, white man/woman,
and the various many others that fall outside of, in between, next to or within the interstices of
these racial and gendered categories. Artist-philosopher Adrian Piper has used her oeuvre to
deeply address otherness and racism while Frantz Fanon is a major contributor to the trajectory
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Fig. 0-1. Piper, Adrian, Food for The Spirit. 1971. The Artist.
Gelatin Silver Print, Printed 1997. 14 9/16 X 14 13/16”.

of continental philosophy that finds important a reckoning with the body for debates surrounding
the I, the mind, consciousness, truth, knowledge, etc.. From Jean Paul Sartre’s work with bad
faith and nausea to Lewis Gordon’s work on how bad faith relates to Anti-black racism, theorists
have taken an interest in phenomenological, existential and/or psychoanalytic approaches to
address the concerns, imaginations and freedoms of the body in time and space. Other noted
work includes, Merleau-Ponty’s on the phenomenology of perception; Julia Kristeva’s on
abjection; Jean Luc Nancy's on Absolute Fragments and sense perception; Luce Irigaray’s on
fluids and lips, Audre Lorde’s on eroticism; Sylvia Wynter’s on the human; and Linda Alcoff's
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Fig. 0-2. Schneemann, Carolee, Eye Body #5. 1963/1985. the artist.
Black and White photography, 20 3/4 x 16 3/4”.

highlighting of visible identities. All in their own way, counter Plato’s early thought to expunge
the messiness of the body and its contradictory, unexplainable emotions and drives from a
properly functioning Republic.
However, although all do set an important context for the project, I will argue that we
need to bring the messiness of the body back into conversation with philosophical discussions
concerning “the I” through a method of what I will refer to as EmDisEmbodiment, a term and
methodology that when theorizing thinks in terms of not only embodiment and disembodiment
but both in relation. I will further argue that the conversation between aesthetics and philosophy
can do exactly that. Looking at key ideas from Frantz Fanon, Fanon interpreted by Lewis
Gordon, Luce Irigaray, Jacques Derrida, Derrida interpreted by Gayatri Spivak, Jean Luc Nancy
in conversation with artists like Adrian Piper, Charles Gaines, Carrie Mae Weems, Wendy Red
Star, Salvador Dali, Agnes Martin, Zachary Fabri, Mark Bradford and Lorenza Böttner, I will
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show how this intercourse between these various conceptions of art, philosophy and “the I” get
to the very needed connections amongst the universal, its drives, emotions, embodiment,
disembodiment and EmDisEmbodiment. In turn this will suggest a new understanding of the
form vs. content, abstraction vs. figuration contemporary art debates. An understanding that does
not set up a dichotomy that hierarchizes one over the other but instead creates a conversation and
complicates the divisions between form/content, figuration/abstraction, the body/the formless,
and the universal I/the particular I.
As opposed to “an I”, “the I” asserts a certain universality to the statement. A certain
feeling that what I am saying about “the I” remains true across all Is. The theorists mentioned are
uncomfortable with the move to do just that. In taking Fanon's lead, I will situate their ideas in
terms of a Universal-Particular I; an Absolute Fragmented I (to use Jean Luc Nancy’s term of
Absolute Fragments in Sense of the World); and a Fluid I (Luce Irigaray). I will look further at
their concepts, terminology, and the relation of what I see as their Is to the messiness of the
body. Through their thoughts I will elucidate the ways that the particular experience of the body
and desire connect to the ways we theorize. Furthermore, I will argue that the nuanced
differences between these various formulations of “the I” are key for the space of
communicability within the sense of the world that Jean Luc Nancy refers to and that is further
discussed below.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LANGUAGE
To further delve into the argument, it is important to consider the key terms and language. The
EmDisEmbodiment methodology of connecting disembodiment with embodiment, brings an
awareness of how power dynamics come into play in the ways we theorize, and the language and
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lenses we use when trying to reach universal concepts related to self/other and relationality.
EmDisEmbodiment argues for the intercourse between aesthetics and philosophical theorizing to
bring greater visibility to the constructs of these lenses and languages we use. This
EmDisEmbodied approach, is an existential, phenomenological, and psychoanalytic approach
that will allow for various readings that include embodied, disembodied, and this oscillating or
connected state of embodiment/disembodiment. An EmDisEmbodied I is one that appreciates
statements from another’s universal that may be at odds with one's own. This approach is able to
realize both the deconstructive and reconstructive potentials of identity formation. Each of the
theorists below thicken the stew of this EmDisEmbodiment in their various ways.

EmDisEmbodiment through Fanon's Universal-Particular:
One key way to consider EmDisEmbodiment is through Fanon’s oeuvre. He relates his I to a
Universal-Particular that problematizes the term universal and expands Western philosophy and
theorizing to the 'universal' experience of previously unheard voices both inside and outside of
the field. My defining, through Fanon, of a Universal-Particular I, is of a confused universal, a
shifting universal, a questioning universal that intimately connects to the body in space and time.
The various theorists and artists discussed, play with their imaginary worlds to present the
universal through the particular in challenging the mind/body/drives split.

EmDisEmbodiment through Derrida's Play and Différ(a)nce:
Play is another important word to consider for conceptualizing EmDisEmbodiment. I am taking
the word play from Derrida's thoughts concerning différ(a)nce. In his essay “Différ(a)nce” from
the Margins of Philosophy, Derrida replaces the letter ‘e’ with ‘a’ in the word differ(e)nce to
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speak to the possibilities within that word. Through his play with linguistics and language he
attempts to break down these structures of concealment,1 revealing the either/or way they are
used to construct the world. Through différance, he calls for “a kind of insistent intensification of
its play” (3). He further defines différance as “neither a word or a concept” (3) and by doing this,
locates it between speech and writing. He uses it to problematize and question the familiar
dualism and division between the intelligible and sensible within Western philosophy and to
represent a continuous process of presencing or deferring rather than to present something,
“[s]uch a play, différance, is thus no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of
conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in general” (11). EmDisEmbodiment relates to
this “possibility of conceptuality” and this play between the sensible and intelligible through
notions connected to language, philosophy, and aesthetics.

EmDisEmbodiment through Nancy's Absolute Fragments and Communicability:
Nancy, influenced by Derrida and Martin Heidegger, follows Derrida’s thoughts on
conceptuality to speak of the space of communicability more so than what is communicated. He
finds the relational process of the tying and untying of knots more important than the knots
themselves. He sees this gesture of tying not as a tie that binds/encloses/enchains but rather a tie
that reties and makes a network. This network is not made through consensus but rather is the
very space for communication, “‘each communication is, above all, communication not of
something held in common but of a communicability,’ … sense is not what is communicated but
that there is communication” (114). Nancy calls for not a “search for meaning” but instead for a
“wandering labor of sense” (115 – 116). I would like to explore his use of Absolute Fragments to
suggest a body within that network of communication that is only a fragment of a shifting
equation, of an indecipherable, unfinished whole. In approaching his ideas on sense perception
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and reaching out to the world, although Jean Luc Nancy has other conceptions of “world”, one
can envision absolute relational fragments within the Symbolic.2

Fig. 0-3. Martin, Agnes, Summer. 1964. Archival Pigment Print, 20” x 16”.
Synthesizing both Abstract Expressionism and minimalism.

Through an EmDisEmbodiment methodology influenced by Nancy and Derrida, I will provide a
framework for presenting ideas on how we as Absolute Fragments play with and self-analyze our
conceptualities to lead to a better communicability.
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EmDisEmbodiment through Irigaray's Fluidity and Proximities:
Luce Irigaray takes on the Symbolic by imagining the fluids and lips in the make-up of some (my
addition) feminine bodies to show us new models of thinking, relating, being, and touching in the
world. Using the metaphor and visual of two lips, she suggests dualities in proximity to each
other that move beyond the phallic and monological ways we can construct the world - ways
then to move beyond Symbolic structures. Irigaray argues for a new language to incorporate the
‘reality’ of fluidity, or what escapes symbolic articulation and thus include a fuller connection to
the remainder3 beyond signification. For Irigaray the feminine is directly connected to this
remainder.

EMDISEMBODIMENT THROUGH AESTHETICS:
The artists addressed are universal-particulars, fluids, absolute fragments, enmeshed in this
“wandering labor of sense” (116). Adrian Piper, Carolee Schneemann, Agnes Martin, Salvador
Dali, Zachary Fabri, the Yes Men, Mark Bradford, Carrie Mae Weems, Willem de Kooning,
Lorraine O’ Grady, Oneika Russell, Firelei Báez, Kara Walker, William Kentridge, Christian
Boltanski, Kerry James Marshall, Renee Green complicate (on a tactile, sensual, and conceptual
level) notions of the body, its history, and its relationship to the mind, thought, memory,
discourse, and the Real.4 The artists reveal the problematics of the universal I as it has been
presented through theories and theorists that universalize without considering the body.
Referring to these artists along with the ideas and theories presented, I will trace the
developments of notions related to “the I”. This exploration will allow for more visceral
theorizations of the self and its relations with its others - including the self’s psychological others
within. These artists also keenly reveal the trace of the other within the self. Their work
intimately connects and highlights this EmDisEmbodied way of theorizing about “the I”. I will
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frame these theorists and artists work as both a deconstruction of the body and a wrestling with
the messiness of the body.

RELATIONALITY THROUGH THE EMDISEMBODIED UNIVERSAL-PARTICULAR I, THE
EMDISEMBODIED FLUID I, AND THE EMDISEMBODIED ABSOLUTE FRAGMENTED I:
My project highlights the problem with trying to universalize being and Being. Within cultures
that have historical issues with power dynamics concerning the body, the situation of certain
bodies that have been historically repressed are forgotten. I will argue that the contradictions,
antinomies, and messiness of the experience within bodies needs to be wrestled with to make
true connections with the other. This wrestling with, will create a richer space of
communicability, a space that will deconstruct the cultural rationality embedded within our
societies and minds that have been colonized. This richer space of communicability will allow us
to understand different aspects of being and Being; appreciate various forms of universal
theorizing; the ways we use our different languages, and the very different paths various bodies
take to approach Being. By theorizing the I in an EmDisEmbodied way, with always a keen
attention to various Is of difference (Is of the trace), one can create places for conversations
amongst the multiple Is within Western philosophy.
Appreciating these multiple Is, will allow me to argue both for the relational aspects of
being as well as the space for those beings to be able to tell their own imaginary fragmented
stories. I will further argue that a dialogue between the body, its others, and its environment,
from these various perspectives, will allow for a richer experience for connecting to others. It
provides the space to think through how the perception of the body changes based not only on
the position of the body in space but the history of that body in time. I delve deeply into these
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universal-particular bodies that are reconstructing with a keen self-realization that they never
will be complete; absolute fragmented bodies with frayed edges that are continuously tying and
untying knots i.e. in processes of deconstructing and reconstructing their ways of being; and fluid
bodies that view the knots in proximity to each other while realizing the different ways these
knots can relate through our conception of ourselves and others. My framing of the Is in these
ways, allows us to understand (without prioritizing) how one body may be more on the side of
reconstruction than deconstruction and how this shifts the ways language is used. I will further
explore how different words, mean very different things, to different kind of subjects with
different histories? And how each of the bodies reach out to each other in different ways.
The artists, theorists and their visual and written languages will provide the stew for me
to argue for these different Is. The EmDisEmbodied Universal-Particular I is related to
colonized bodies that are trying to reconstruct their ways of being, the EmDisEmbodied Absolute
Fragments, are bodies deconstructing, breaking down a fixed universal Cartesian self while also
reaching out, “touching”5 and considering the other, and the EmDisEmbodied Fluid I is
reclaiming and reconceptualizing the abjected feminine body, all are trying to avow their
discourses that have tried to set up intrinsic hierarchies.
Thus, some strategic essentializing6 will be used along with at times falling back into
dichotomous language. A bricolaging7 method that uses the tools at hand to show the limitations
of those tools, suggesting then a move beyond separations and limitations. However, this
approach will not be fully dichotomous, it will hold the embodied in proximity with the
disembodied, the universal right next to the particular, and the existential along with the
phenomenological.
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In addition, it is important to investigate certain key questions centered around whether or
not the universal I (“the I”) can be seen philosophically in the multiple ways it is lived? How do
universal concepts like the trace8 work differently for a woman as opposed to a man, a black
person as opposed to a white person? Why do some beings tear down subjectivity while others
reconstruct it? And how does one contradictorily see the particularities and singularities of the I
in a universal light? Furthermore, what do what seem to be warring ideals, actually become
spaces for polyphonic conversations between others? And what are ways to theorize the body
and being that allows for such conversations? However, although I am highlighting questions
concerning these three Is, my argument by no means intends to be exclusive as my framework
also argues for the many other Is that I have left out.

Universal Is:
Is it still important to think in terms of universal Is? The questioning of the term universal also
concerns the field of Western philosophy as a whole that has historically dichotomized
universals and particulars and has foundationally analyzed universal existence from a
‘disembodied’ position. Influenced by ideas concerning Pure-form and the Platonic,
metaphysical, and transcendental Ideal, Western philosophy while professing to keep the focus
away from a particular existence in time and space has instead constructed a very certain
particular and normative universal body. Some contemporary debates have been also concerned
with a movement away from existentialism and more lived experience towards post-structuralist
approaches. By holding on to the universal, and using the lens of the universal, I hope to
complicate the term by not separating the universal from the messiness of the body and the I.
This complicating of the space of the universal I, highlights the ‘neutral’ ground that has
been used to forget various identities. I will demonstrate that this method is important because
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this highlighting and complicating of this 'neutral' ground allows for deeper conversations
concerning the I, race, gender, sexuality, and class as well as an expanding of the field of
Western philosophy. I will further argue that wrestling with the contradictions, antinomies, and
messiness of the experience within bodies is a needed step to make true connections with the
other. This dialogue between the body, its others and its environment from a particular towards a
shifting and unstable universal perspective as opposed to a universal perspective, will allow for a
richer experience for connecting to others. A tracing of the I is necessary for the exploration and
I will be doing it from a position connected to “Western” philosophy whose scholarship around
the I, the body, being and existence, usually begins with Plato and has understood it in terms of a
movement first towards and then away from a universal Cartesian subject.
I engage with Plato here and elsewhere as I reformulate a questioning I that understands
an interconnected relationship between philosophy, art, and politics that aims to not hierarchize
one over the other. This interrelationship recasts Plato’s notion of the psyche with its tripartite
soul that separates the logos from the thymos and eros, and that has also disconnected the mind,
intellect, and reason from the heart, spirit, body and its desires. These separations that can be
traced back to Plato’s early constructions of what a Republic should look like and how the
citizens should act and be, further point to the underlying structures of this Republic where the
body, its desires, and the soul’s high uncontrollable spirits were synonymous with women and
certain others which were seen as having degraded souls. These rules for the Republic that are
also embedded within our epistemologies have further reinforced forms of misogyny, racism,
and the like that we see today.
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Plato and then Descartes Cartesian I:
In Plato’s Republic, a conversation between Socrates and his followers, they move from
discussions on justice to what subjects in the Republic should be exposed to. Socrates’ disavows
the poetic and the artistic in order to form a well-functioning Republic. Dividing the soul into
four elements he presents the ratio between each to truth on a line. Understanding through logic
is shown as the highest subsection with the most connection to truth. He worries about the power
of the arts and their ability to cater to the imaging subsection feeling it will lead to a corruption
of the soul. When Socrates discusses the truth, he draws a correlation between the good and the
Sun (that beyond the republic). The divine essence, sublimity is one truth and thus the arts and
poetry and their relation to the body and its desires are seen as imitations – much removed from
that truth. Socrates prefers bodies that presuppose truth as being rather than becoming. Believing
everything should be tempered, he issues prescriptions on the body, critiquing from the
enjoyment of sexuality to the enjoyment of the arts, poetry, and the like.
Plato further limits the soul and man with his arguments for pure subjects that do one job
and are not confused by outside interests and further repudiates any form of difference and
contradictions within the soul. His issues with the body and difference are a key part of his
philosophy. He believes that emotions should be kept quiet and mastered in order that one does
not appear womanly (just one of many instances of him abjecting the female body). He instead
argues for training in gymnastics, philosophy, and mathematics to enhance the understanding
subsection and fixed truths of the soul thus leading it towards a higher truth beyond emotions.
Plato’s citizens within the Republic are the precursors for the Cartesian I developed from
Descartes belief “I think therefore I am” (144) and his separation of the mind from the body in
his meditations. Descartes, similarly to Plato, abjects the body, difference, and the other.
Furthermore, the Cartesian I has operated within a body/mind split that is similar to Plato’s
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placing of the understanding as hierarchical above the imaging section of the soul. Descartes
privileges understanding, cognition and the mind over the body, its desire, its context and its
history. This in turn, it has been argued, has led to a rational thought that categorizes, divides
between an us vs them, abjects others, sets up repressed traces, and hierarchizes. This further
leads to a Kantian aesthetics that Tracey Warr critiques in some depth discussed below and a
Western contemporary art trajectory that has privileged abstraction over art that relates to the
body and the figure.

The Deconstruction of the Cartesian I and Reconstitution of New Subjectivities:
These mind/body separations, rational thoughts tendency to categorize, and universalizing within
philosophical theory, (without being self-reflective while theorizing) can create many oversights
in the process of universalizing being and Being.9 These forms of theorizing within Western
philosophy have tended to ignore subjectivities that have not been historically based on this
fixed, monological Cartesian self. Subjectivities for example of the abjected woman, the
American Negro with his more unfixed double consciousness 10 (W.E.B. DuBois’ terminology),
colonized subjects, and more.
I will explore the advantages of the breakdown of ‘subjectivity’ more specifically a
Cartesian ‘subjectivity’ while also keeping a keen eye on the advantages of the reconstitution of
new contradictory ‘subjectivities’ with their connections to humanism and posthumanism and a
need to explore different, repressed or hidden discourses. How does simultaneously trying to
grasp this breakdown and reconstitution of different ‘subjects’ help to open up thinking and ways
of being with the other?
I am interested in the breakdown and reconstitution of subjectivities that are keenly aware
of what is lost when one tries to leave behind and erase the messiness of the body. Thus, I am
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interested in those ‘subjectivities’ and Is that are at odds with themselves, seeing their
frameworks crumbling around them, anxious about their existences but still remaining open
towards others. And new ‘subjectivities’ that are reconstituting and owning themselves while
still speaking to a certain responsibility necessary for being for and with others that move away
from myths associated with a fixed, pure and certain ‘subjectivity’. I am interested in how these
notions of ‘subjectivity’ and the I can be seen in different ways and how artists and theorists help
to inform the complexities around ‘subjectivities’ and the I.
Both the breakdown and reconstitution of ‘subjectivities’ add much to the story of ‘man’
and his ‘others’ within Western philosophy. Thus, I will argue against the dialectic tendency for
thought and discourses to feel the need to better the other and chronologically subsume and thus
disregard the thought before. An argument for a thinking method of bricolage through
proximities rather than a dialectical method of usurping what comes before. A method of
thinking that Luce Irigaray in This Sex Which is Not One, proposes.

KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THREE EMDISEMBODIED IS:
The EmDisEmbodied Fluid I and Eroticism:
Irigaray disrupts the Symbolic rule of the father by using the biological body as a starting point
to create metaphors, believing sexual difference can be used as a model to enrich thinking and
our discourses. For Irigaray, there is something very valuable in the difference of woman for
through difference there is always then going to be something that is bigger than ourselves,
giving us that space for expansion. In contrast to the representational phallocentric ways we have
constructed our beings from the Classical age, she wants us to focus on the feminine and touch
and the ways this eroticism can inflect our epistemologies. Irigaray exposes the illusiveness of
female desire that has not been able to be captured by the phallocentric and heteronormative
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world but instead has been fragmented and repressed. Irigaray wants us to appreciate the many
ways of feeling pleasure, feeling unity within the multiplicity rather than needing one goal, one
means, one methodology, one way of thinking. For Irigaray, sexual pleasure does not involve
one type of activity and in a similar fashion our discourses need to be open to difference and
multiplicity.

Fig. 0-4. Schneemann, Carolee. Eye Body: 36 Transformative Actions for Camera. 1963/2005.
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In counter to Sigmund Freud’s one sex model she sees the self-caressing of woman who,
““touches herself” all the time, and moreover no one can forbid her to do so, for her genitals are
formed of two lips in continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she is already two --but not
divisible into one(s)-that caress each other” (24). These lips, continuously touching each other,
are ways towards a being that is more self-reflexive, more at ease with being with the other,
realizing and accepting the abjected psychological other within. Irigaray's concepts concerning
fluidity and proximity also move us away from closing and fixing our Is in such modes as
representation, grids, and tables.
Luce Irigaray argues against this gridding as well as Sigmund Freud’s ideas concerning
the hysterical woman. She contends that women should not be excluded from the subject
position. She sees how Western discourse and logic rather than being universal are set up to
maintain male interests. Pointing to what she refers to as the speculum of the other woman, also
the title of one of her many books, she defines this specularization as a process whereby man
projects himself on to the world which is then reflected back to him. Woman then becomes this
reflected image repressing her own very different way of being. Woman is erased while also
being a key foundation of the image man creates for himself. Irigaray shows how this erasure has
happened throughout the ages and in various discourses from the philosophical to the
psychoanalytic. These moves towards a grasping of the fluidity, dualities, and multiplicities
within one’s self as well as the disavowing of the reflected image given to woman by man have
interesting correlations and differences to the next I discussed, the EmDisEmbodied UniversalParticular I and its forms of double consciousness.

The EmDisEmbodied Universal-Particular I and Double Consciousness:
In the Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. Du Bois defines the term double consciousness, elucidating
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what he sees as the unique situation of American Negroes whose voices have been disregarded,
and histories made invisible. Du Bois states, in a much-cited passage on race relations in
America that the American Negro lives with:
… a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s
self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks
on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness, an American, a Negro; two
souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body,
whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (2)
Within this condition of two-ness Du Bois looks out from behind a veil that shuts him out from
what he refers to as “their world” and leaves him no desire to in his words, “tear down that veil,
to creep through; I held all beyond it in common contempt, and lived above it in a region of blue
sky and great wandering shadows” (2).11
Both Du Bois's and Frantz Fanon’s autobiographical and psychoanalytic approaches that
theorize from the perspective of their conflicted beings cannot be fitted so easily into Cartesian
subjectivity master narratives. Besides illuminating Du Bois’ theory of double consciousness
through lived experience, Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, is a key work in complicating ideas
concerning self/other, universal/particular, black/white, identity/dis-identity, and the monological
perspective of a Cartesian self.

The EmDisEmbodied Universal-Particular I vs. the Yes Identity:
Fanon shows us that his ‘universal’, his battles, demons, and gods in certain key ways are unlike
theorist that come from more privilege. According to Fanon, these identities of privilege take on
a positive or yes identity. “Man is a “yes” resonating from cosmic harmonies. Uprooted,
dispersed, dazed, and doomed to watch as the truths he has elaborated vanish one by one, he
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must stop projecting his antinomy into the world” (2). He also hopes for the man of privilege to,
“admit he is nothing, absolutely nothing and get him to eradicate this narcissism whereby he
thinks he is different from the other ‘animals’” (6). This very process it will be argued below that
Derrida is attempting with his deconstructive approach. Fanon, through his uncertainties, is both
keenly self-aware of himself and being in a social world of the other that does not recognize or
integrate him. An other that makes him invisible, “Jean-Paul Sartre forgets that the black man
suffers in his body quite differently from the white man” (24).
Fanon further differentiates his struggle when he refers to the Oedipus complex as “far
from being a black complex” (130) and wonders about the civilized white man’s, “irrational
nostalgia for the extraordinary times of sexual licentiousness, orgies, unpunished rapes, and
unrepressed incest” (142). He also considers the biological phobia of the white man as opposed
to the intimate relationship of the black man with the biological. When speaking of the conflict
between his own hating of the black man while also realizing he is a black man he states:
In order to put an end to this neurotic situation where I am forced to choose an unhealthy,
conflictual solution, nurtured with fantasies, that is antagonistic— inhuman, in short—
there is but one answer: skim over this absurd drama that others have staged around me;
rule out these two elements that are equally unacceptable; and through the particular,
reach out for the universal. (174)
Language and ideas within the trajectory of Western philosophy such as inhuman, irrational,
being, nonbeing, nothing, primordial, particular, universal, and the world mean something very
different to Fanon than “yes” men theorists.
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Fig. 0-5. The Yes Men, from The Yes Men Fix the World a 2009 English language documentary film
about the culture jamming exploits of The Yes Men.

Lewis Gordon, in “Through the Zone of Nonbeing: A Reading of Black Skin, White
Masks in Celebration of Fanon’s Eightieth Birthday”, breaks down some of the ways Fanon
separates himself from what Fanon referred to as these “yes” men. Gordon critiques Europe and
European theorizing for seeking to become ontological; and conceptualizing an Absolute Being
that Gordon feels “stood in the way of human being or a human way of being” (1). Gordon’s
Africana existential phenomenological approach relates to notions of being in time and
concentrates on looking at the epistemological ways we have separated and constructed our
identities. Gordon elucidates the false separation created in much of Western Philosophy
between Europe and Africa and states: “[t]he human world is not, in my view, reducible to a
single element but is instead capable of multiple elements manifested in complex, interweaving
relationships of meaning” (“Black Aesthetics, Black Value” 24).
In Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, Gordon offers a critique of subjects embodying bad
faith. Gordon contends that Sartre's original idea of bad faith is a flight from a “displeasing truth”
to a “pleasing falsehood” (8). He sees political problematics at play and a tendency toward a
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subsumption of others, when one denies having a point of view and theorizes one’s being as the
being of the world. Gordon argues these subjects attempt to deny human reality and freedom and
are moving away from their responsibilities as social beings. He rejects notions of disembodied
consciousness as well as authenticity discourses, seeing these as elevating abstract humanities
over real people with flesh and blood. He instead calls for “critical good faith,” which he argues
requires a regard for accountability through intersubjectivity. Gordon sees bad faith as another
form of desiring mastery and a hegemonic push away from humanity. In other words, he sees the
racist as imagining himself as God while also devaluing the other by trying to stifle their human
status.
Fanon’s psychoanalytical and autobiographical work is anything but god-like. His writing
style differs from many other theorists, although he makes his own proclamations, he also tends
to use “I”, “I believe” (138) and “I think” (142) more frequently. However, these I’s also change
throughout the reading of the book. Black Skin, White Masks, reveals an identity intrinsically
connected to multiplicities. His conflicts become apparent as he, works to free himself from, “the
springboard embodying the resistance of others,” by “digging into his flesh in order to find selfmeaning” (3). Fanon’s work is vulnerable in his writing, opening himself up, spilling out his
insides and being/becoming human. At times angry, sad, thinking, biased but questioning he
provides key insights into his experience and the “universals” related to that experience.
Fanon calls for communication and similarly to Irigaray and Nancy, appeals to touching
the other at the end of his self-reflective analysis on the effects of colonialism on Black people:
Why not simply try to touch the other, feel the other, discover each other?
Was my freedom not given me to build the world of you, man?
… O my body, always make me a man who questions! (Kindle Locations 2579-2581).
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In Gordon’s analysis of this final passage he reveals how Fanon’s informal use of the “You” as
unformulated, nebulous and unmediated brings back up the status of the other to the plane of the
self:
In existential thought, this You is familiar; it is the You of the unmediated world of
Martin Buber, where I and You leave no room for “it” formulations. When I speak to
You, I am addressing you in your humanity… another human being devoid of
overdetermined presumptions… (What Fanon Said 70)

The EmDisEmbodied Absolute Fragmented I, Absence and Sous Rapture:
Derrida too wants us to question our presuppositions and presumptions through his method of
deconstruction. The word differ(a)nce reveals Derrida’s keen interest in prioritizing time and
movement in language, breaking down binary modes of thinking and the spatial ways we use
English to divide. “A” in French also relates to the present participle and thus speaks to the
possibilities within the word that can open up our beings and allow for connections with other
beings. Furthermore, through the concept of “the trace” Derrida reveals just how much the
presence of the other is within the self. This illumination of the traces12 within Western
philosophy as well as how its relation to logocentrism and phallocentrism connects to the
repression of those traces. According to Richard Kearney in Dialogues with Contemporary
Continental Thinkers, “Derrida contrives to dismantle our preconceived notions of identity and
expose us to the challenge of hitherto suppressed or concealed ‘otherness’—the other side of
experience, which has been ignored in order to preserve the illusion of truth as a perfectly selfcontained and self-sufficient presence” (106). Derrida looks further at this concealed “otherness”
in such essays as “Tympan” in Margins of Philosophy, where he explores philosophy's aversion
to difference: “It may be about this multiplicity that philosophy, being situated, inscribed, and
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included within it, has never been able to reason” (27). Derrida also explores key concepts such
as Aufhebung and chiasmus. Aufhebung is a German word used repeatedly by Hegel that calls on
thought where two contradictory elements are held together, uplifting while also canceling out
the other but without completely destroying the other. Chiasmus involves a use of doubling in
language to break out of the hierarchical and create different meanings. This is not unlike
Irigaray’s ideas connected to dualities, proximities, and fluidity within thinking and how the
woman holds onto these dualities. This is also similar to Fanon and Du Boisian ideas connected
to double consciousness and the hybrid post-colonial subject. Derrida laments the use of his
ideas related to these terms toward, according to Kearney, “nihilism, an orgy of non-sense, a
relapse into the free play of the arbitrary” (124). In an interview with Kearney he further states:
I regret that I have been misinterpreted in this way… People … present deconstruction as
a sort of gratuitous chess game with a combination of signs … closed up in language as
in a cave…I totally refuse the label of nihilism ... Deconstruction is not an enclosure in
nothingness, but an openness towards the other… (Ibid)
Derrida argues for embracing difference. Seeing language as unstable he understands how
language and the text have a trace of the abject that should be brought to the foreground.
Gayatri Spivak's analysis of her own preface to Derrida’s Of Grammatology, further
shows the possibilities created through the trace and repetitions where readings, re-readings, and
various interpretations of the text will shift it. The preface of a text for Spivak is abstract
generality but not that of the fixed universals of a Platonic ideal but one that changes based on
individual readings and interpretations. She states, “and even as I write, I project the moment,
when you, reading, will find in my preface the provisional origin of your reading of Of
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Grammatology. There can be an indefinite number of variations on that theme” (Kindle Loc.
152). Thus, Spivak’s own preface of Derrida’s text reveals the trace to Derrida’s work and ideas.
Spivak calls for a philosophy that rather than being a fixed universal considers Derrida’s
“sous rapture” which she defines as, “under erasure.” This is to write a word, cross it out, and
then print both word and deletion” (Kindle Loc. 177). She contrasts Derrida with Martin
Heidegger showing that while Heidegger’s philosophy and notions of Being points to “an
inarticulable presence, Derrida’s is the mark of the absence of a presence, an always already
absent present, of the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and experience” (Kindle
Loc. 268). Spivak sees how Derrida is calling for a use of the available language we have but
while questioning and “not subscribing to its premises” (Kindle Loc. 249). Derrida argues for
bricolage and rather than prioritizing art, poetry, or metaphors over the text he sees neither as
possessing the greater truth as there will always be an absence to that truth. All knowledge he
sees as this form of bricolage. Derrida’s suspicion of truth, always putting methods of being and
understanding being in sous rapture provides a path for relationality amongst the
EmDisEmbodied Universal-Particular, Absolute Fragmented, Fluid Is, and various other Is.

The EmDisEmbodied Is and Bricolage:
Certain key moments in contemporary philosophy try to complexly grapple with the need to
understand Western philosophy’s relationship with the other. Derrida critiques forms of
presencing and foregrounds the need for bricolage that will break down the logocentrism and
phallocentrism of the text of the father. Bricolage as opposed to engineering can suggest
becoming as opposed to presence and difference/différance as opposed to fixed being. In my
own attempt here to EmDisEmbody, I bricolage by putting a variety of theorists and artists
together. As I have an ambivalence toward categories, I have not only picked artists solely from
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the United States or the Caribbean—although those areas are salient. Most work chosen
coalesce around the twentieth and twenty first centuries where there is some focus on modern art
and reactions to modern art. Some of the choices come directly from my lived experience. I have
worked with or been exhibited in proximity to a few of the artists. I also see it as connected
somewhat to a New York East Coast perspective. However, I attempted to go against my own
limits and interests by weaving artists, theorists, and ideas that others and Lewis Gordon
presented. Furthermore, the images are presented here not as illustrations but, instead, as
essential to the argument I will make about the co-constitutive relationship of theory and art and
the appreciation of art toward decolonization. Given the argument, a few images will be
reiterated or repeated in the main text.
Within the trajectory from Plato to Descartes presented above, because of time
constraints, I could not address critiques of the Kantian bourgeois enlightened subject. These
critiques will be addressed in the larger project, however to conclude, it is important to briefly
take a look at the thoughts of Tracey Warr as she explores artistic critiques of Cartesian and
Kantian subjectivity and aesthetics. Her work is key to me in pointing to how the artists
presented here use the method of EmDisEmbodiment to critique the single model universalizing
of the I.

THE EMDISEMBODIED “IS” AND AESTHETICS:
Tracey Warr in her exploration of various artists works in The Artist’s Body, argues against the
Kantian aesthetic. She further argues that Kantian ideas have been used to fortify the Modernist
art historical agenda with its call for art for art's sake and its need to create boundaries to protect
this pure agenda from the intrusion by the artist’s body. An art historical position similar to that
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of the philosophical position with the Cartesian universal disembodied I. Warr states that NonWestern cultures are not as focused on a notion of the individual as “a central, cumulative point,
but rather on an understanding of self as part of a continuum in time, a community, an
environment, a cosmos” (11).
Warr’s focus is on the recent art historical shift in the artist’s perception of the body. She
reveals how the body for artists is no longer simply content (the nude) but canvas, brush, frame,
and platform. She further shows the body as one of agency with her focus on performance art
and how the physical and mental state of the body is revealed as eroded and no longer stable.
The book reveals a cross-fertilization of ideas psychoanalytic, philosophical, anthropological,
and scientific. For example, bodies are seen as forms of somatic knowledge – where artists are
also concerned with different traditions of self from ‘exotic’ colonial cultures. Warr takes a look
at the lived experience of artists and how that lived experience affects art history. Thus, she sees
a correlation with the scale of death brought on by the two world wars and artist’s newfound
focus on corporeality. She also examines artists who have used their bodies to “dismantle the
parameters of social norms and disrupt accepted signifiers of identity to represent the body as a
fluid signifying system” (13).
In a key introductory essay by Amelia Jones, for Warr’s book, she poses the question as
to why the body was repressed in the modernist art world. She looks back to Kantian aesthetics
that felt the artist and the critic must remain transcendent (disembodied) rather than immanent
(embodied). She now sees a contemporary moment where the Cartesian subject is no longer
“simply accepted” and argues that the body as a means of expression is an attempt to deal with
something repressed - a suppression of the particular embodied, desiring erotic subject. She sees

27
the body as “the ‘phobic object’ of artistic modernism – threatening to undermine or even
feminize the transcendent Cartesian subject” (10).
Both Warr and Jones lay out an art historical trajectory that relates to the path of
philosophical ideas concerning subjectivity and the I. Another key art historical text that shows
this trajectory is David Lomas’, The Haunted Self: Surrealism, Psychoanalysis, Subjectivity.
However, in contrast to the previous trajectory showing the Western white male's connection to
the stable Cartesian I, what Lomas’ reveals is the exploration of dreams and the unconscious by
surrealists that reveal them rejecting the unified self and grappling with and haunted by otherness
and instability. I will also explore ideas Lomas’ illuminates as well as connect artistic projects
such as Dali’s surrealistic and paranoiac-critical approaches and more contemporary practices to
various chapters and theorists as I work through ideas concerning “the I”.

THE CHAPTERS OF “THE I?”:
CH 1: The EmDisEmbodied Erotic, Abject, Rhythmic I ≠ + > ~ The Cartesian, Formal, Rational,
Platonic Subject:

≠+>~
The EmDisEmbodied Erotic,
Abject, Rhythmic I

The Cartesian Formal,
Rational, Platonic Subject

Fig. 0-6. Prince’ symbol when he no longer wanted to be referred to as Prince and the male/female
symbols used in many countries.
music.laptopsticker.org/oracal-prince-symbol-vinyl-decal-sticker-logo-music.html
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Gender_symbols_side_by_side_solid.svg
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Chapter One establishes the framework for discussing the three Is by focusing on certain
characteristics that EmDisEmbodied Is should embrace that set them apart from rational
Cartesian subjects. These characteristics then thread into the following chapters that more
specifically break apart the varying Is into Irigaray’s Fluid I, Fanon’s Universal-Particular I, and
Nancy’s Absolute-Fragmented I. I use Audre Lorde’s thoughts on the erotic as a space of love
and cultural support for others in contradistinction to Plato and his theory of forms to distinguish
between the EmDisEmbodied I and the Cartesian subject. The chapter also complicates the
relationship between abstraction and formalism and examines the form vs anti-form debates. It
also considers modern formalist art's other or what modern art abjects and leads to an exploration
of Julia Kristeva’s work on the breakdown of fixed meanings. I end the chapter by looking at
Fred Moten’s further exploration of abjection and thoughts on the rhythmic as he examines
Adrian Piper’s work including her Catalysis series. Adrian Piper and her work is featured

Fig. 0-7. Piper, Adrian, Adrian Moves to Berlin.
2007 [Performance]/ 2017 [Video Wall
Projection].01:02:33

Fig. 0-8. Piper, Adrian, Funk Lessons. 1983.
00:15:17 (Teaching how to listen and dance to
funk)
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throughout this first chapter with briefer explorations of the work of such artists as Prince,
Charles Gaines and Gina Osterloh. Ultimately the chapter argues that abjection, eroticism, and
rhythm are essential components for unstable EmDisEmbodied Is.
CH 2: I = I
Chapter Two looks at the genesis of I = I and explores the danger of the I understood in
an absolutist, essentialist, and universal monolithic sense. I harken back to German Idealism
from the point of view of Slavoj Žižek, through his exploration of Johann Gottlieb Fichte.
Questions that animate this chapter are: What did Fichte mean by I = I? How is it related to
invisibility? I also explore Žižek's larger work as it relates to class and the ways capitalism and
neoliberalism feed off of divisions related to bodies and labels. His thinking on ideology and the
critique of patriarchy allows him to appreciate the fallacy and dynamics at work when some
bodies are presented as natural and others as cultural thus presuming the constrictions of both.
He specifically relates this to “Native American” bodies where this term is used to set these
bodies apart from the cultural.

Fig. 0-9. Star, Wendy, 'Four Seasons Series (Winter),'. 2006. Performance
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I read Zizek’s work intertextually with Caribbean philosopher Sylvia Wynter’s thoughts
on the human and her critique of the cultural rationality of the United States that sets bodies apart
from that rationality - including Black, Red and Chicano/a bodies. I look in some detail at
Wynter’s work Do Not Call Us Negroes. I also look at the post-human, as seen in the writings of
Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, the transhuman work of Jayna Brown, Joseph Winter’s research placing
Mircea Eliade in conversation with Frantz Fanon and Sylvia Wynter, and Lewis Gordon’s ideas
concerning Black Consciousness. In order to flesh out ideas connected to the Fluid I that I delve
deeply into in the next chapter, I take a look at Luce Irigaray’s Speculum of the Other Woman,
and explore Carrie Mae Weems work related to eroticism, abjection and rhythm. Weems
embrace of her agency within invisibility I connect to bell hooks’ notions concerning an
oppositional gaze. This chapter considers the cultural rationality that has been used to frame
different Is and how artists and theorists move beyond and extend that cultural rationality
through techniques like critique, pastiche, irony, humor that then tap into the erotic, abject, and
rhythmic characteristics of an EmDisEmbodied I.

Fig. 0-10. Appropriation by the author from www.pinterest.com/pin/362399101269955500/ and
sophia.smith.edu/afr111-f19/carrie-mae-weems-portrait-of-a-woman-who-has-fallen-from-grace-into-thehands-of-evil/
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CH 3: I ≠ I: the EmDisEmbodied Fluid I
In chapter 3 I fully speak to the EmDisEmbodied Fluid I. Key questions are: How does
abjection relate to hysteria and the EmDisEmbodied Fluid I? How does theorizing from the point
of view of an abjected EmDisEmbodied Fluid I enrich discussions related to the Universal I? A
deeper exploration of Luce Irigaray's thoughts, and bodily metaphors such as fluids and lips,
provide the basis for my sketching out of this I. I look further at André Breton’s and other
European surrealists’ connections to hysteria and how that opens them up to decolonial thinking
and the writings of Suzanne Césaire, Aimé Césaire and others. Salvador Dali and Caribbean
artists such as Oneika Russell and Firelei Báez (based in the United States) are featured in this
chapter along with a further exploration of Afrofuturism and Afrosurrealism. Ultimate the aim of
the chapter is to flesh out notions of the EmDisEmbodied Fluid I.

Fig. 0-11. Russell, Oneika, On Paradise. 2017. Drawing.
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Fig. 0-12. Báez, Firelei, Memory Board Listening (June 7th), 2015. Acrylic and Ink on Yupo Paper.

CH 4: I + I: the EmDisEmbodied Universal-Particular I
In Chapter Four I explore the EmDisEmbodied Universal-Particular I and how
conceptions of this I and notions concerning double consciousness confuse and enrich thoughts
about “the I?”. The artist Kara Walker is included in this chapter – her work with double
consciousness, her thoughts on her contradictory relationship to the Other, and her new ways of
thinking about the Hegelian master/slave dialectic are all considered. An interesting conversation
occurs between her work and that of William Kentridge, including his visual questioning of the
single, central, fixed one-point perspective and an opening towards different viewpoints. I use
this chapter to introduce my theorizing on the EmDisEmbodied Universal-Particular I as
influenced by Frantz Fanon and his key texts Black Skin, White Masks and The Wretched of the
Earth as well as selections from W.E.B. DuBois’, The Souls of Black Folk. In these discussions I
reflect on what may be missing when filtering out the ontological in the research.
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CH 5: I and I > We: Rastafari and I
Chapter Five explores post-colonialism, decolonialism, and the Rastafari “I and I”
locution, the latter understood as a methodology used to “Chant down Babylon,” that is, to
decolonize the mind from oppressive systems of Judeo-Christian and capitalist thought. Rastafari
philosophy is key to an experiential exploration of both the EmDisEmbodied UniversalParticular I and the EmDisEmbodied Fluid I, identified and theorized in previous chapters.
Questions organizing the chapter include, how does Rastafari try to de-colonize existence? How
do they practice forms of a different kind of double consciousness from its original conception
by actively looking back at and embracing Afrocentric ideas and ways of being while
simultaneously holding on to tenets from Judeo-Christianity? How is this creolized identity
different from ideas connected to the Cartesian I? Are there different battles that people with
various histories and experiences have to fight and different modes/methodologies one has to use
when trying to expand their Is? I look at the writings and performances of Mutabaruka as well as
other Rastafari philosophers. I examine the ways Rastafari thought reclaims the abject in order to
decolonialize the I. The theory is also informed by interviews with Ras Yannick and Ras Tony in
Jamaica and the sensitivities of
performance artist Zachary Fabri with his
views on Rastafari, the body, consumption,
subsumption, and spirituality. This chapter
also allows me to delve more deeply into
Derrida’s work and to look at sous rapture
and play as it relates to the
EmDisEmbodied I.

Fig. 0-13. Fabri, Zachary, Forget me not, as my
tether is clipped (video still). 2012.
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Conclusion: I ~ I: the EmDisEmbodied Absolute-Fragmented I, the Sense of the World,
Errantry, and Opacity
In the conclusion I look in some depth at the work of Jean Luc-Nancy including his
thoughts on sense perception, aisthesis, and concepts concerning relationality, wandering, and
touching to explore what I refer to as the EmDisEmbodied Absolute-Fragmented I. Jacques
Derrida’s On Touching, his first book published in English after his death, is key to Nancy's
philosophy where he explores touch and Derrida’s term différance. The tactility through the
abstraction of the body in the artwork of Mark Bradford and the figurative portraits of Ebony
Patterson are featured as I relate their aesthetics to “a sense of the world”.

Fig. 0-14. Bradford, Mark, 'The Next Hot Line,'. 2015. Canvas. 84 x 108 in. Framed

This chapter also circles back to reservations surrounding an essentialist and absolute I. It
addresses the question of how pushing content too far and not addressing form and substance
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limit our philosophical understanding and aesthetic expressions of “the I”. The interrelation
between substance as subject, subject as substance, and body as world are of key concern here. It
argues that some focus on the interconnection of subject with substance allows us to more deeply
conceptualize the relation between different EmDisEmbodied Is. An exploration of the work of
Édouard Glissant, including his thoughts on the poetics of relation and his ideas concerning
errantry (as opposed to wandering) where one knows where one is within every moment of
relation is also underscored in the chapter. I conclude by looking at the need to conceive of
spaces for the relationality amongst the EmDisEmbodied Universal-Particular I, the
EmDisEmbodied Fluid I, and the EmDisEmbodied Absolute-Fragmented I, as each have been
developed in previous chapters. The project as a whole argues for the need to strive to be
EmDisEmbodied Is, appreciating statements from another’s universal that may be at odds with
one's own and realizing both the deconstructive and reconstructive potentials of identity
formation. As opposed to an ontological overarching view of Being or an I that tries to set being
on one right path, an EmDisEmbodied I realizes that there are multiple paths to beings and
multiple ways of thinking, constructing, deconstructing, re-constructing, seeing. In this
concluding chapter I further explore the artwork of Lorenza Böttner and her understanding of
haptic visuality a term coined by Laura U. Marks. In an age where touch is now a luxury that we
only give to a select few, EmDisEmbodiment reveals ways artists and theorists have created
avenues to touch the other through theoretical and visual languages.
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Fig. 0-15. Böttner, Lorenza, “Untitled”, 1982. Black and white photography

Throughout this introduction I have affectively (perhaps through a kind of visual sous
rature) put the images and artists in conversation with the theory, suggesting a reading that art
can give that is beyond this text. Similarly, to Spivak's thoughts on prefaces and abstract
generality discussed earlier, it allows for a movement away from the text towards a larger world
of communicability. Due to lack of space and a desire to let the images do some of the speaking
for themselves I have not gone into detail with the connections and differences I see between the
images and my formulations of the different Is I am presenting. For example, it would be good to
consider how Agnes Martin's Summer, (Fig 0-3) both represents and breaks apart my necessary
essentialisms in speaking about my Is? How does her work EmDisEmbody the Fluid I, the
Universal-Particular I along with the Absolute-Fragmented I? How does it reach out differently
towards the remainder? What does the contradiction and antinomy between her use of abstract
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expressionism and minimalism mean as it relates to my thoughts on EmDisEmbodiment? How
does Martin's introduction of the noisy world of abstract expressionism within the silence of
minimalism thicken the stew and relate to my move to wrestle with the body within
philosophical debates through my method of EmDisEmbodiment? However, I hope not to
privilege the images over the text or vice versa as I find the important move is the conversation
that happens in mine and the viewer's mind between the two. A conscious and subconscious
viewer's reading that I hope to elicit. A reading that the image gives beyond the text but also that
my philosophical text can bring beyond the languages surrounding art criticism and art.
I hope I have created a complex conversation about I from the perspectives of multiple
artists, theorists, and the addition of thoughts from other fields to enrich philosophical discussion
and include the lived experience of the body. I thank, for their contribution to this reasoning
session, the various artists who concentrate on the body in time and space, and philosophers who
take psychoanalytic, phenomenological and existential approaches to investigate the self and its
relations with its others (including those within). A reasoning session is not through the more
logical world of rational thought as it has been understood but instead is a Rastafari form of
reasoning where a key aspect is to listen in order to discuss for advancing a better social
polemics. How does slowing down and fully stepping in (plummeting – Piper) and out (flying –
Piper) of the present situation and one's own situation, allow for one to explore the tricky worlds
of race, gender, and sexuality?
My framing above does bring forth its own limitations. For example, there are definitely
some colonized bodies with their own forms of fixed Cartesian selves or that are trying to move
towards a fixing of the self; there are also more privileged bodies that were never at comfort with
their discourses, wanting perhaps to elect otherness; others that intrinsically connect to the idea
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of bodies that change in time (trans bodies that are time); there is also a remainder of the self that
can and should never be defined. These limitations I believe get somewhat filled in through the
conversation with the aesthetic.
My conceptual Is will not be framed as Is only from various particular point of views.
Instead it will not fully give up on the universal and will be influenced by Fanon, Irigaray, and
Nancy who see the universal as a necessary notion to problematize but keep as their universal Is
establish a foundation for the relationality between selves. The nuances within their Is also bring
further clarity to the situation of racism, homophobia, sexism, and other isms. I believe that by
bringing their very rich work, that approaches the magic remainder of being/Being that we are
never able to fully conceptualize, into the conversation concerning these isms is key. By
conceptualizing their multiple universals Is, it provides the space to put “you” on the plain of I
(Lewis Gordon) to create a world of I and Is13 and reveals the ways that philosophy and such
concepts as the remainder can be used for the body politic.14
The framing of the argument is not to however create its own universal, it is rather to
express a moment in my mind at play. A play between these different theorists where my I and
words here, become in all their vulnerabilities and deficiencies actors in the play. Although this
lack with language, self-perception, sense perception may seem at times like I am subsuming
others thoughts and ideas, umbrellaing them under my own universals and categorizations,
forgetting many others. I apologize in advance as I engage in this play, hoping that it will enrich
the conversation as I go through my own forms of self-mastery while simultaneously trying to
reach out to the sense of the world. A journey that I now have realized is providing me a space to
continue the process of decolonizing my I.
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CHAPTER ONE :
THE EMDISEMBODIED EROTIC, RHYTHMIC, ABJECT I
≠+>~
THE CARTESIAN FORMAL, RATIONAL, PLATONIC SUBJECT

…therefore we shall be right in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because
he awakens and nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason… so in the
soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil constitution, for he
indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of greater and less, but thinks the
same thing at one time great and at another small—he is a manufacturer of images and is
very far removed from the truth. (Plato, The Republic. Acheron Press. Kindle Edition)

… when we live away from those erotic guides from within ourselves, then our lives are
limited by external and alien forms, and we conform to the needs of a structure that is not
based on human need, let alone an individual's…When we look away from the
importance of the erotic in the development and sustenance of our power, or when we
look away from ourselves as we satisfy our erotic needs in concert with others, we use
each other as objects of satisfaction rather than share our joy in the satisfying, rather than
make connection with our similarities and our differences. (Audre Lorde, Poet and
Scholar, “Uses of the Erotic,” 58–9)
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THE CARTESIAN, FORMAL, RATIONAL, PLATONIC SUBJECT ≠ + > ~ THE EROTIC:
In contrast to Audre Lorde, Plato, influenced by his mentor Socrates, felt the need to keep
the poets, artists, musicians, women, and others who cultivated senses of the erotic away from
the polis or Greek city-state. In The Republic, Plato prioritizes the mind and knowledge over the
base drives of the body arguing through Socrates that, “to be gentle toward his own and those he
knows, [a subject] must be a lover of learning and wisdom” (51). This was a wisdom that would
discern and differentiate, define and place, objects, subjects and the like into different and
unequal camps – male/female, rational/irrational, mind/body, good/evil, stately/unstately, etc.
Plato wanted Manichean subjects that instead of being able to connect through difference, as
Lorde calls for in the above quote, prioritize one side of a dualism over the other. These
Manichean subjects saw certain people as objects having negative characteristics that placed
them then on the wrong and more inferior side of the dualism. These people/objects were to
remain stable in their lesser roles across time. Women were seen as irrational, an irrationality
that was ontological and not only behavioral. Furthermore, it was the male Greek Manichean
rational subject that would set the terms for what was irrational. For Plato, any privileging of the
body and the erotic was seen as separate from truth and the rational, he states, “But to see the
soul as it is in truth, we must not study it as it is while it is maimed by its association with the
body and other evils … but as it is in its pure state... thoroughly and by means of logical
reasoning” (282). What was it in the erotic that Plato so feared and why did he see it as so
separate from his truth?
In “Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power,” Lorde provides us with a glimpse into the
power of the erotic that was of such concern to Plato. This eroticism as Lorde identifies is not
only a sexual eroticism but a connection to the network of feelings within our larger
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communities. This eroticism is intrinsic within what I am naming the EmDisEmbodied I. Plato
however, felt it necessary to repress this power in order to control subjects and thus construct and
maintain a well-ordered state. Subjects not knowing how to tap into the power of the erotic were
much more compliant as they were also not able to fully connect to their drives that would signal
to them that they should expect more from the state. These non-erotic subjects also did not
deeply associate with others that were similarly controlled within said state. Furthermore, the
actions of non-erotic Is were much more predictable as they followed a certain logic that all
should prescribe to. Thus, this rational I that becomes a Cartesian, stable, and fixed I is more
easily contained than relational erotic EmDisEmbodied Is. Furthermore, keeping these detached
subjects in their place, where they ascribe to distinctive prescribed forms is much easier to
manipulate than multiple relational beings. This rational I, that is one who thinks therefore he is,
is a much easier I to mold than one who feels while she thinks and thinks while she feels.

Fig. 1-1. Schneeman, Carolee. Eye Body #2. 1963. Courtesy of Hales London & PPOW, New York,
© Carolee Schneemann, photograph by Erró, www.halesgallery.com/news/322/

Lorde does much in her short essay to critique the Cartesian I, with its distinct split
between the mind and body which has been equated to a division between the masculine and the
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feminine and our thoughts and feelings. In Lorde’s aim to identify the force within the erotic,
she associates it with a deeply spiritual and feminine plane that is “firmly rooted in the power of
our unexpressed or unrecognized feeling” (53). She further states that, “We have been taught to
suspect this resource, vilified, abused, and devalued within western society” (53). The erotic
associated and unassociated with sex, the body, desire, all get disparaged by Plato in favor of
pure thought that connects to mathematics and form. In the “Erotic as Power” a paper given for
the Fourth Berkshire Conference, Lorde states, “We have been raised to fear the yes within
ourselves, our deepest cravings. For the demands of our released expectations lead us inevitably
into actions which will help bring our lives into accordance with our needs, our knowledge, our
desires. And the fear of our deepest cravings keeps them suspect, keeps us docile and loyal and
obedient, and leads us to settle for or accept many facets of our oppression as women” (57 – 58).
Nikki Young in ““Uses of the Erotic” for Teaching Queer Studies”, looks to Lorde’s
essay to counter Platonic notions of pure thought and to consider a new episteme that reconnects
us back to our bodies. She argues:
Audre Lorde challenged the Western masculinist characterization of the erotic as an
element of human debasement, as well as its use as a tool of oppression. She argued that
this framing of the erotic had ghettoized women’s sensuality a means by which we know
and orient ourselves to the world—thereby erasing a significant form of our liberating
power. To confront this erasure, Lorde offered a view of the erotic as an episteme, a
critical mode through which we may attain excellence… Lorde’s erotic innovation has
established itself as a political, social, and academic tool of deconstruction, subversion,
and imagination. (302)
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Young wants queer students and subjects to see the self as a sensual entity and to realize that
connecting to the power of the erotic not only frees one’s sensuality but also provides a greater
awareness of oppressive forces making it easier to deconstruct and combat said forces. Lorde
brings our attention to how this agency within the self can then lead us to the power within
relational forces that can move towards liberational possibilities.
Inspired by Lorde and Young, an EmDisEmbodied I embraces the Imaginary15; does not
abject the worlds of our drives; and sees the erotic not as a narrow view of the pornographic but
as emphasizing the body, mind, soul, emotions, relation, and being within sensations. This
happens through a deep connection to the self and sense. I further discuss sense when exploring
the thoughts of Jean Luc Nancy in the concluding chapter. Lorde worries however, about the
men that see the power of the erotic from a distance and keep women around but in an inferior
position to tap into it, rather than connecting to the depth of the erotic within themselves, “[s]o
women are maintained at a distant/inferior position to be psychically milked, much the same way
ants maintain colonies of aphids to provide a life-giving substance for their masters” (54).

Fig. 1-2. Dali, Salvador. The Ants (Las Hormigas). 1929. Sotheby’s,
www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ecatalogue/2013/impressionist-modern-art-day-sale-n09036/lot.184.html
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For Lorde, the misnaming of the erotic to the pornographic denies it its power and suppresses
true feeling by emphasizing sensation without feeling. The true erotic for Lorde is, “a measure
between the beginnings of our sense of self and the chaos of our strongest feelings” (54). A
chaos that makes us demand more of ourselves as we connect to the power of feelings we do not
recognize or express.
In Chapter 3, I explore how men within the Surrealist movement such as Salvador Dali
tap into this power within the erotic through their art. Their critique of the status quo and need to
advance a reclamation of their imaginations are important aspects to the surrealist project. This
includes their experimentation with automatism or the paranoiac critical method to move them
away from the stability of the Symbolic16 into the world of the Imaginary. These surrealists and
other artists like Carolee Schneemann pictured above, use their Imaginary worlds to infiltrate the
Symbolic and the more stable and power inhabiting realms of thinking and being to instead focus
on desire. They focus not only on what we desire but on how to expand the field of what we are
allowed to desire as well as how that then impacts our fields of vision and our drive towards
revolution.
Young further understands this drive and does not want us to fear this deeper connection
to ourselves and the field of desire or as she states “one’s body knowledges” (303). This richer
awareness of knowing through being, feeling, and the body, allows us to tap into the power and
passion to move away from the constrictions of culture and to become subjects with agency
guiding our own destinies. Similarly, to Young’s read of Lorde, I see the power within the erotic
to also influence our epistemes, through acquiring knowledge with feeling and sensations
providing spaces for us to connect with those of difference. This erotic power will also infiltrate
our constructed systems, many of which continue to oppress.
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Lorde wants us to build new systems that allow us to associate more profoundly with the
agency, love, and connection we can cultivate through the erotic. She sees this as paving the way
to allow us to question systems like capitalism that feed off of deficient and abused notions such
as profit and the feel-good sensations that we get from consumerism, pornography or these
falsified shadows of the deeper emotions we could connect to under social systems that have
social justice and true relations with others as primary concerns. Lorde poignantly states:
The principal horror of any system which defines the good in terms of profit rather than
in terms of human need, or which defines human need to the exclusion of the psychic and
emotional components, of that need - the principal horror of such a system is that it robs
our work of its erotic value, its erotic power and life appeal and fulfillment. Such a
system reduces work to a travesty of necessities, a duty by which we earn bread or
oblivion for ourselves and those we love. But this is tantamount to blinding a painter and
then telling her to improve her work, and to enjoy the act of painting. It is not only next
to impossible, it is also profoundly cruel. (55)
As I EmDisEmbody, I fully support these ideas by Lorde that counter the Platonic rational
I, however I want to place a different light on Lorde’s thoughts above about blindness, painting,
and the agency of those who may seem invisible. Lorde poetically aims to make a point for those
of us that are not blind. She uses such phrases as “next to impossible” and “profoundly cruel” to
help us imagine how hard it would be to paint while blind. Lorde sees this as providing a good
analogy to systems that repress the erotic. This does hit close to home for Lorde. In “Feeling Her
Way: Audre Lorde and the Power of Touch”, Sarah E. Chinn relays the early life of Lorde who
was legally blind for the first five years and so organized her life around touch, sound, taste, and
smell. Lorde actually learnt how to read and speak at the same time. As Chinn states, “In her first
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encounter with the written word, her eyes, rather than subordinating the other senses, must
depend on them to make sense of it” (188). Chinn quotes Lorde, “More tellingly, in her first
encounter with a book, Audre boldly “traced the large black letters with my fingers,” absorbing
written language as much through touch as through sight (in contrast, she could only “peer” at
the ‘beautiful bright colors of the pictures’)” (188).
Chinn advances that we need to get back to the sensory and quotes Lorde in her embrace
of the body where she maintains that “the sharing of joy, whether physical, emotional, psychic,
or intellectual… flows through and colors . . . life with a kind of energy that heightens and
sensitizes and strengthens all” (Lorde 57). Chinn continues, “The erotic infuses and intensifies
the experience of the body, linking the sensory with the spiritual” (188). This linking of all our
senses with spirituality will help us to move away from the ways we prioritize the visual. This
also will provide us with a stronger connection to our other senses and how they work in tandem
with the visual. The understanding of other sensual modes we filter out is just one of many
reasons I am intrigued by the invisible and how we both negotiate worlds of invisibility and use
that negotiation to coopt the term. Here I appreciate invisibility as those realms we can never
fully grasp. A person with sight can never fully understand how a blind person paints. However,
a non-blind EmDisEmbodied I is fully intrigued as to the world of the blind and uses an
understanding of the difference of that world to attempt to expand their own.
Conceptions of the EmDisEmbodied I, expand on what Lorde presents for us in her
powerful essay by looking more deeply at “able-bodied” conceptions of the blind artist and how
the blind artist can expand our notions of visibility and invisibility as it relates to the erotic. This
expansion can be felt through sensations that are not distinctively categorized as sight, hearing,

47
touch, smell, taste but instead may sinuously overlap. I would like to develop Lorde’s notions of
the erotic to also consider these overlaps for the EmDisEmbodied I.
These sensual interminglings are evident in painters like John Bramblitt who went fully
blind as a result of his epilepsy medication in 2001. He uses textured paint to feel his way
through his process of painting, relating directly to haptic visuality which will also be discussed
in my later chapter on Jean Luc Nancy, touch, and aisthesis. Bramblitt on his website states,
“Basically what I do is replace everything that the eyes would do for a sighted artist with the
sense of touch…”. He refers to the process of baking a cake to reflect how he measures out his
colors. In his artist statement he speaks to the ways his new invisible world of being blind and
his invisibility in that world gave him a certain newfound insight, saying it was like a veil was
lifted. He continues:
I see the world differently now than when I was sighted, both in a physical way but also
emotionally, these paintings are my most earnest and sincere means of trying to
understand what true perception is. When I lost my sight I thought I would be cast into a
world of darkness; to my surprise this is not what happened. Being an artist this gave me
a way to explore this new perceptual world that I found myself in, and more importantly
a way to reach out and connect with those around me.
Color has more meaning for me since having lost my vision, and in truth the world is a far more
colorful place now than when I was sighted. I am no longer limited to the arbitrary colors of
objects, in other words the color that is seen when light reflects off of something. Color of this
kind has more to do with the type and quality of light being reflected than of any essential quality
about the object itself. Color is so much more than this – it is emotion and feeling; for me it is the
expression of the inner unseen nature of the object or person being observed. (Bramblitt)
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Fig. 1-3. “In 2001 John Bramblitt Went Blind. A Year Later, He Began Painting.” Twisted Sifter, March
27, 2015, twistedsifter.com/2015/03/art-by-blind-painter-john-bramblitt/

Fig. 1-4. “In 2001 John Bramblitt Went Blind. A Year Later, He Began Painting.” Twisted Sifter, March
27, 2015, twistedsifter.com/2015/03/art-by-blind-painter-john-bramblitt/
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Fig. 1-5. “In 2001 John Bramblitt Went Blind. A Year Later, He Began Painting.” Twisted Sifter, March
27, 2015, twistedsifter.com/2015/03/art-by-blind-painter-john-bramblitt/

Bramblitt provides non-blind people with insight into the ways that emotion can come
more fully into play when non-blind people look. By exploring the way color creates rhythms
within a painting he elucidates how the rhythmic vitality of color can open us up to having a
more EmDisEmbodied connection to the world and a spiritual connection to rhythms of the
world. Here spirituality for me is beyond what we get through religion, it is the spiritual in the
power of laughter, pleasure, desire, helping others, loving others, relating to others, and the many
ways we are able to gain a deep sense of joy and satisfaction in a life that can be so short.
Spiritual can also relate to an acceptance of pain and struggle, but this acceptance should not be
one that handicaps us from contributing to the world and to others through a spirit of eroticism, a
deep connection to platonic and non-platonic loving emotions within our ever-shifting worlds.
How can we then use these notions of the erotic, connected to emotions like love in a
wider communal sense, to advance our ways of looking? How can we see those before us or
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artworks presented to us in a more spiritual manner, understanding the dynamism inherent
between oneself and the other? How can the erotic through feeling, along with sensation
continue to become a key component of our epistemes and perceptual systems that then enrich
EmDisEmbodied Is? A movement toward EmDisEmbodiment is key to allow for the emotions of
love and connection through difference and to dispel emotions like fear. This fear has led to
hatred and limited experiences of our worlds and those around us. In our categorical separation
of our senses - an off shoot of the mind/body split of a Cartesian, Formal, Rational, and Platonic
Subject - we are missing out on the ways we can look by touching, feeling and affectively
connecting to the other.
I would like to more deeply explore what I am constructing as this Cartesian, Formal,
Rational, and Platonic Subject through EmDisEmbodiment. What if I were to look at this subject
by seeing the ways it is related to me. What are the entanglements of what I will call the CFRP
subject (Cartesian, Formal, Rational, and Platonic Subject) with the EmDisEmbodied I? As a
necessary component of theory, relationality allows for ways to connect to another. However, as
highlighted in Lorde’s quote that began this chapter, this relationality should be through an
understanding of the other as not an object of satisfaction but as a subject and through an
appreciation of ways to connect to this subject’s similarities and more importantly, the harder
task of connecting to their differences as well. Thus, I will not simply argue against the imagined
CFRP subject as a way to make my case for the EmDisEmbodied I but rather I would like to also
see the CFRP subject as an I and the similarities and differences between these two constructed
Is. I do not want to try to show what I believe defines EmDisEmbodiment through only an a ≠ b
matrix of meaning, for that would force me to construct the other form only through naming,
placing, categorizing and pinpointing and would disregard sous rature17—that these
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words/concepts before you are dependent on the ones that they try to erase, that absence is
entangled within presence.
As Derrida and others have revealed it is what we think of as the opposite to us that can
help in our continuous process of defining ourselves: man has defined woman, black has defined
white, gay has defined straight, disabled has defined enabled and vice versa. Meaning is derived
from difference and the EmDisEmbodied I is defined through looking at its relation to the
nuances of and influences from a CFRP subject. Thus, I return now to the Cartesian I, Plato’s
theory of forms and how this theory departs from Lorde’s erotic. I investigate the borders and
beyond of EmDisEmbodiment to begin to understand what this word could mean to our Is. I will
begin by looking at this theory of forms in relation to formalism and the ways this has
established a non-erotic I as seen through the eyes of an EmDisEmbodied I.
To learn a bit more about Plato’s theory of forms
one needs to investigate Parmenides, one of his most
mysterious dialogues, where a monist speaks to a
youthful Socrates. In this examination of forms there is a
critique that automatically leads to support for the
theory—as is usually done in the language-games within
many of his dialogues. Plato's forms are seen as eternal
and are not a part of the sensible world even though they
still determine every predicate and property within that
sensible world. For example, beautiful things are
determined by the form or concept of beauty that does
not actually exist in space and time. Forms thus are

Fig. 1-6. Dicko, Saidou, from PHOTO
Folies 2018 à La Menuiserie exposition
de Saïdou Dicko
lamenuiserie.net/photo-folies-2018saidou-dicko/
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separate from the things that supposedly represent those very forms and thus man has to detach
from and transcend himself to move to a higher more spiritual realm to access them. Man, thus
has to think in terms of abstraction, rationality and the like in order to be. He has to transcend his
body and drives in order to, as Rene Descartes states in his meditations, distinguish the soul of
Man from, “that of the brutes” (65).
This Cartesian I, is intimately connected to Plato's theory of forms which was also seen
as the classical solution to the problem of universals. For Plato, the universal could have so many
particulars because what we think of as universals are merely shadow representations of the true
universal that would be limited by our experiences related to space and time. In other words, our
conceptions of a physical, changing and imperfect realm are shadow representations of a spiritual
unchanging realm of ideals. Our mind would be the only thing that could come close to
conceiving of abstract forms that do not exist in time and space, are not repeatable, and not
dependent on the body. Our ultimate reality then would exist beyond this physical world where
we then could perceive true knowledge.
Plato saw phenomena or what we experienced through our
senses as merely a shadow that mimicked the true form. This
relates not only to all objects we experience but also to
perceptions of color and I will argue the perception of the other.
Consider, for example, Fig. 1-7, it would be for Plato simply an
instance of an imperfect particular of the form of purpleness.18
The representation of this purple and the very unique and erotic
ways we absorb this purple would be inferior to our disembodied
notions of the concept purple. Furthermore, while the purple

Fig. 1-7. Prince's name, as of
1993, Wikimedia Commons with
purple color added,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Princ
e_logo.svg
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would mean something quite different for me than what I can imagine as experienced by John
Bramblitt, it was important for Plato that we disconnect from all our particular experiences to get
to a more divine truth. Thus, I should not and perhaps more accurately would not have been able
to appreciate Bramblitt’s more emotional experience of purple.
Certain formalist aesthetics, influenced by Plato’s theory of forms, would also strive for
this divine truth, privileging form over context, content, and representation. Formalism was set
up in a constrictive way where the theorists below are understood as evaluative critics, using
their theories to not only decide what was good or bad art but what was art. Through their lenses,
formalist art rather than being another form of representation/expression was seen as the best and
true way to do art. The work was to be a window into the special divine and truer world of forms.
For many formalists the signifier (artwork) should relate directly back to these forms and thus
should be created for its own sake. It was not to represent anything beyond itself, as theorist
Michael Fried would say, it should be “wholly manifest” not concerned with meaning,
interpretation and semiology as the artwork or form before a viewer would become a spiritual
phenomenon, a divine presence.
I will argue that these theorists and their notions about the right way to do art influenced
the direction of our Is by abjecting and making invisible other ways of relating to form that
moved beyond a CFRP subject and more fully connected to EmDisEmbodied Is. However, as we
delve deeper into the nuances of the formalist project, as mentioned above, we find there is not a
complete division between the CFRP subject and a more emotional, erotic, rhythmic, and abject
EmDisEmbodied I. Clive Bell’s understanding of formalism is key as it reveals some of the
connections. He connects formalism to an aesthetic sense related to one’s entire being, not to the
limitations of a segregated mind. The nuances of formalism as defined by these men is worth
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understanding, attending to how they speak to the CFRP subjects and how though the
EmDisEmbodied I counters, it also connects to aspects of these modern-day interpretations of
formalism that depart from Plato’s original notion of the theory of forms. What is shown below
is that formalism, with its influence on CFRP subjects, is not a monolithic whole. It gets shifted
and changed and reinterpreted through the eyes of these men and then through the work of
Adrian Piper, who moves modernist formalism beyond the confines of disembodiment and into
the world of an EmDisEmbodied I.
Let’s begin by exploring the interpretation of formalism by Clive Bell, a British painter
and art critic and a member of the Bloomsbury group of English artists, philosophers, writers,
and intellectuals at the forefront of modernism. This group also included writer Virginia Woolf
and her sister, painter Vanessa, who married Clive Bell in 1907. They turned towards formalism
and abstraction to reject Victorian narrative painting and discourses surrounding ideal and
aberrant notions of femininity. Bell developed an aesthetic theory spelling out in depth what
qualified as a work of art. He separated significant form from beauty believing instead that it
should provoke what he called aesthetic emotion. For Bell, it did not matter whether an object
was beautiful or not, what mattered was the emotion the object elicited. Kantian connections are
implicit within Bell’s aesthetics. The subject is seen as the key determinant of the aesthetic
experience. However, Bell departs from Immanuel Kant’s disinterestedness as he believes
strongly in the emotions the aesthetic object elicits. Kant completely avoided emotion through
his focus on the cognitive free play between understanding and imagination.
Bell’s theory of significant form was developed within his books Art (1914) and Since
Cézanne (1922). He felt the relationships between lines, colors and other formal elements were
the most important elements in a work of art. These formal relationships were the keys to
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evoking an aesthetic emotional response which emerges from an apprehension of the artwork's
significant form. Bell eschewed others' preoccupation with the narrative, and the morally
instructive functions of realistic painters who wanted to frame the world in their eyes and instead
championed the movement towards Post-Impressionism. He promoted the work of Cézanne
admiring his inner emotional connection to form and the ways he related nature to geometric
shapes. He was not interested in what Cézanne painted but instead in how he tried to apprehend
the formal elements of the Mont Sainte-Victoire or various still life works. This would be
something Cézanne would be in a constant state of attempting to do until his death, forever
deferring the representation of that perfect form. Similarly, to Plato’s theory of forms, content
would be just a mere shadow of this more important pure form.
Bell felt that the formal properties in painting of the time were expressed most purely
through Cézanne’s work and he was interested in drawing a relationship between mathematics,
the rational and how he saw them relating to true artistic beauty. The appreciation of the objects
in front of someone was seen as separate from time and space and representative of an “aesthetic
emotion” common to all humans across cultures and different periods of time. In his essay, “The
Aesthetic Hypothesis” of 1914 he writes, “Art transports us from the world of man's activity to a
world of aesthetic exaltation. For a moment we are shut off from human interests; our
anticipations and memories are arrested; we are lifted above the stream of life [ ...]” (109). The
use of the word above is telling as it reveals the transcendental and hierarchical notions
embedded in Bell's thought. Bell was interested in a universal representation that he felt Cézanne
was striving for. A representation that would attempt to connect to the paintings pure and divine
form that only existed in worlds beyond experience.
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Fig. 1-8. Cezanne, Montagne Sainte-Victoire (1887), oil on canvas, 26 x 35 3/8 inches. Given by the
artist to Joachim Gasquet and bought by Samuel Courtauld in 1925; Courtauld Institute of Art, London.
courtauld.ac.uk/highlights/montagne-sainte-victoire-with-large-pine/

According to Semir Zeki in “Clive Bell’s 'Significant Form' and the Neurobiology of
Aesthetics,” Bell felt it necessary to create a theory of aesthetic experience that prioritized art
objects that would in Zeki's words, “activate similar neural configurations common to the
organization of our nervous systems and hence independent of culture and education.” Zeki
further brings our attention to a key section of a paragraph in Bell's Art:
Imperfect lovers [of art] bring to art and take away the ideas and emotions of their own age
and civilization… But the perfect lover [of art], he who can feel the profound significance
of form, is raised above the accidents of time and place. To him the problems of
archeology, history, and hagiography are impertinent. If the forms of a work are significant
its provenance is irrelevant. Before the grandeur of those Sumerian figures in the Louvre
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he is carried on the same flood of emotion to the same aesthetic ecstasy as, more than 4000
years ago, the Chaldean lover was carried. It is the mark of great art that its appeal is
universal and eternal. (www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00730/full)
Zeki elucidates the ways Bell applies mathematical thinking and Kantian ideas of the ahistorical
to the appreciation of art, revealing the connections to Kant's sensus communis as it also unites
artist and viewer regardless of cultural background and experience even if it does not take on
Kant’s moralistic approach. Bell links his aesthetic emotion not to intellectual learning but
something more “primitive” that is common to all humankind. According to Bell, “Only artists
and educated people of extraordinary sensibility and some savages and children feel the
significance of form so acutely that they know not how things look. These see, because they see
emotionally.” Furthermore, Bell believed that any associations with other specialties or fields
like theory, science or literature would lessen that appreciation. Bell also believed that primitives
understood this aesthetic emotion since they, “neither create illusions, nor make display of
extravagant accomplishments, but concentrate their energies on the one thing needful – the
creation of form. They thus have created the finest works of art that we possess…” (Bell, 1922).
It was through form that Bell collapsed divisions between what he saw as the primitive, the artist,
and people who had an extraordinary ability to see emotionally.
Roger Fry a compatriot of Bell’s was also a strong advocate of Cézanne and other artists
they grouped under the term “Post-Impressionism”. Fry in emphasizing the formal properties of
paintings over what he referred to as “associated ideas” greatly influenced artistic taste in
England and then in North America through his impact on Clement Greenberg and Michael
Fried. Fry classified artists into two distinct categories, those where the contemplation of formal
relations is key and those mainly concerned with a fantasy-world, Freudian and psychoanalytic
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wish-fulfillments. For Fry the psychological experiences or motivations and their impacts on the
artist were not important and he states as much in “The Artist and Psycho-Analysis” (1924),
where he returns the importance of art making to the domain of art makers. Being an artist
himself, he states that he will welcome the psychoanalyst on terms that, “are very simple, they
consist of one clause, namely, that before you tell us what we are doing and why we do it, we
think you should take the trouble to understand what we think we are doing and why we do it”
(2). Privileging the thinking artist over the artist motivated by his drives, he critiques the way
psychoanalysts have objectified artists and these motives and desires.
It is not surprising that this essay is written at the very moment of the emergence of
surrealism which Fry rebukes. He advocates for an art and language that moves away from origin
through man's base desires and, I would add, away from erotic guides, like those mentioned in
Lorde's quote at the beginning of this chapter. Instead he advocates for Bell’s notion of
“significant form”. In referencing Freud, Fry speaks to our use of language stating that even if it
had come from the initial grunts of men at work that had a sexual significance, to say that,
“…language is a function of the sex instinct would be grotesque. Since it has come to be the
vehicle for the whole discursive intellectual life of man – it has come to serve most of all
precisely those activities which are most completely removed from the instinctive life” (3). Fry
and Bell both reinforce Cartesianism, the mind/body split and the dualism associated with that
split, understanding truth as something beyond man's base desires and experiences. Fry
continues,
To understand the scientific activity, you must note that its essence is precisely this
complete detachment from the instinctive life, its complete uselessness, its abiological
nature, since it exists not to serve life but truth, and this is precisely why those who devote
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themselves to this activity are constantly in conflict with the mass of mankind which is
deeply concerned with life and completely indifferent to truth. (4)
Fry’s truth is associated to the divine truth of Plato's theory of forms and Kantian notions of
disinterestedness. Thus, the love of abstract truth is related to an emotion about forms which he
calls the “passion for pure beauty” and further says that this, “love of beauty implies an almost
complete detachment from personality and from the wishes made by our unsatisfied libido” (21).
He argues that art may bring forth, “residual traces left on the spirit by the different emotions of
life, without however recalling the actual experiences, so that we get an echo of the emotion
without the limitation and particular direction which it had in experience” (22). So, while the
aesthetic emotion for Bell should be experienced the same across time, Fry also attempts to pull
that emotion away from any kind of connection to difference and the relational other through
one’s individual experience and individual desires.
Fry’s prioritizing of an emotion that is removed from content, the contextual, and the
relational are reasons he is then critical of Cinema and its integration into the fine arts. He
believes that Cinema and the theater allow wish-fulfillment to reign supreme. Techniques are
used to make audience members fully identify with the hero and his narrative and move us into
the world of associations as we aim to satisfy our base instincts and wish-fulfillments. Fry
believes the artists’ conscience and their strong connection to formalism allow them to create
artwork that does not cater to these base instincts. He sees the conflict between the artists and the
general public, in this regard, as indicative of the fact that a true artist has other aims than wishfulfillment and, “that the pleasure which he feels is not thus directly connected with the libido”
(14). These Post-Impressionist see the importance of pure esthetic emotion and, by Fry’s
standards, are on a higher plane than the art viewer and the surrealist. He is opposed to the
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surrealists’ deep connection and exploration of the dream world as well as the worlds of symbols
stating:
I have elsewhere expressed the belief that in a world of symbolists only two kinds of
people are entirely opposed to symbolism, and they are the man of science and the artist,
since they alone are seeking to make constructions which are completely self-consistent,
self-supporting and self-contained – constructions which do not stand for something else,
but appear to have ultimate value and in that sense to be real. (17)
For Fry, symbolism, connections to dreams, wish-fulfillments will all fade quickly but feelings
based on formal relations remain and their connection to Plato's theory of forms makes them
more real. In pulling the art object away from symbolization, Fry attempts to detach it from its
visuality19 and all the associated ideas related to the object’s visuality. He wants to move the
object from beyond what Fry understands as the confines of life and into the spiritual realm of
the divine. He also wants to move the artwork beyond being a signifier and instead into the
divine mysterious world of the signified. In Roger Fry A Reader, one further sees how he is
considering an art beyond associations or connections to the erotic, desire, and the dream
world—all major themes within surrealism.
… while there is an art which corresponds to the dream life, an art in which the phantasy
making power of the libido is at work to produce a wish-fulfilment, there is also an art
which has withdrawn itself from the dream, which is concerned with reality, an art
therefore which is preeminently objective and dis-interested, and which therefore proceeds
in the opposite direction from the other kind of art. (364)
However, what Fry misses are the ways that motivations within a relational life are in fact truth,
if one thinks of truth beyond the limitations of a disembodied CFRP subject. By trying to
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become God-like, the artist separates from the knowledge gained through relation with very
different others. A knowledge gained from desire is also repressed. A further point missed is the
incapability for man to strip away all of his desires, drives and motivations by attempting to
become God-like. This aim establishes a universal aesthetics based on a very particular form of
man. Within Fry’s interpretations of the most post-impressionist paintings is a deep desire rooted
in a certain Western and white historical body that now wants to expunge itself from the stability
of the Cartesian ego.
This desire by Bell and Fry to purge the self, could be benevolently read as a need to move
away from past modes of thinking, experiencing, looking and being that created an embodied
and destructive ego. Perhaps this is also why both want to relate art to the mathematical and
scientific, away from a dependence on the biological and the psychological of certain forms of
man that have taken cultures towards very challenging conditions especially for various “others”
who did not fall under these “universal” notions of man. This then could be a driving force to
why Fry envisions a move to an art beyond men’s urges, base origins and from any, “accessory
accompaniments which surround and, perhaps, cloak it in its earlier stages” (4)? Early stages that
have had continual expressions of patriarchy, colonialism, misogyny, homophobia, ablebodiedness and the like that we unfortunately still experience today. The problem arises when
these men set this aim to expunge this particular ego as a universal need and hierarchize the
artists that they see are able to do that. Artist who tend to fit a certain standard of the same ego
they are trying to expunge. A further problematic is their lack of self-consciousness in regards to
their writings, thoughts, and the artists they highlight, stemming in part from not relating to or
considering a variety of different others.
Most illuminating is when Fry attempts to expunge this ego and tries to, through form,
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detach a painting connected to an orgy from these base instincts and associated ideas. In Cézanne
he discusses the artist’s use of color in the The Banquet also referred to as The Orgy:
The modulations are rich and exquisitely varied. The blue of the sky combines luminosity
with a surprising intensity. The velum which hangs across it is an unforgettable discovery.
Its rose-violet is tinged with all the colours of the sky, it is bathed in light, shimmering with
reflections, and yet it flaunts itself sumptuously against the blue atmosphere. A negro
bringing in a huge silver vase in the foreground is another astonishing chromatic invention,
bringing as it does into the orgy of brilliant colour a cool greyness as unexpected as it is
delicious. (12)

Fig. 1-9. “The Orgy.” File:Cezanne - Die Orgie.jpg, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cezanne__Die_Orgie.jpg.
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Fry, a man so set on moving away from the instinctual, gives us a lot to unpack in this quote. His
very choice of picking Cezanne’s painting entitled, The Orgy, is quite revealing. The one use of
the word Negro in his book objectifies the figure that becomes an astonishing and delicious grey.
Fry’s description of a “sumptuously… delicious… orgy of brilliant color” (12) and his belief that
this would not lead to associations to base drives is puzzling. By attempting to filter out the other
and his desire of that other, Fry instead consumes them. In his strive for an appreciation of pure
form there is also a need for Fry to contain the erotic as it relates to sexual drives, connections
and communications. This repression of eroticism instead of then being about community, love,
and caring, as Lorde identifies becomes for Fry a need to make up for a certain lack through
consumption. Furthermore, through this attempt to expel the faulty over-thinking and
presumptuous ego, desire and not solely the spiritually divine is very much caught up in the
artworks Fry promotes.
Adrianne Rubin however identifies through Fry, what could become the possibility for a
fuller form of embodiment when looking at post-impressionist artworks. In “From
Impressionism to Post-Impressionism: Continuities in Roger Fry’s Concept of Aesthetic
Perception”, Adrianne Rubin states, “Crucial to Fry’s theory of art is the idea that perception is
not based on elements being emitted from the work of art to a passive recipient; instead, the
spectator plays an active role in seeking sensations from the composition” (61). In exploring
Fry’s admiration of Cézanne, Rubin continues, “Cézanne made manifest the shift from
Impressionist to Post-Impressionist art, a move not merely stylistic in nature, but one which
represented changing modes of perception. No longer was vision centered on the sometimespassive physiological reception of retinal sensations; it now incorporated active psychological
aspects of visual apprehension and interpretation” (63). Here Rubin connects this psychological
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neurobiological aesthetic emotion to visuality and an aesthetic apperception, drawing
connections to the perceiving subject within a scopic drive. Although Rubin makes some
excellent points in her essay, which I will explore further below, we should simultaneously be
aware of the fact that Rubin is referring to the vision of certain particular and historical subjects.
The scopic drive as developed by Lacanian theory, emphasizes the ways the looker is both
seeing and the seen. The subject by attributing more importance to the other’s gaze begins to
understand itself as also seen. By constructing the self that is seen as its own signifier the seer
splits its gaze from the eye, as Rubin above also highlights and as Lacan goes further into in his
Chapter, “The Split Between the Eye and the Gaze”. This look of the eye returns one’s self back
to the self, seeing their I now within the purview of the scopic field an I that is being looked back
at. Rubin brings our attention to the ways formalists could escape from understanding themselves
only as disembodied CFRP subjects and see themselves also through their context and histories,
not as neutral beings but as embedded and constitutive bodies within a scopic field and as
interconnected erotic bodies in Lorde’s sense of the word. Some viewers are already quite aware
of this scopic field when gazing at a Post-Impressionist painting where aims to have the viewer

Fig. 1-10. Manet, Édouard. Un bar aux FoliesBergère. 1832-1883. Sotheby’s,
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Un_bar_aux_Foli
esBergère_d%27E._Manet_(Fondation_Vuitton,_Paris
)_(33539037428).jpg

Fig. 1-11. Detail of still taking from the film
Coming to America,
preview.redd.it/vavvk37jq8b51.jpg?width=2048&
format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=565d11b1e45784d4f
5da0aae8364f457548671a3
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connect to a certain form of divinity, happens with less effort for some but not others because of
the kinds of subjects that were usually represented within formalism. Viewers with very different
conceptions of their I could not that easily erase away the content of the painting whether it be of
a particular woman in a bar or a landscape of a mountain and country they are unfamiliar with.

Fig. 1-12. Toor, Salman. The Bar on East 13th Street. 2019. Oil on Panel.
https://www.itsnicethat.com/articles/salman-toor-art-071119

Thus, contemporary formalist artists more deeply connected to EmDisEmbodied notions of
the self, create art experiences where the viewers are aware of this scopic field and their
signification within it, being more self-conscious as they look, understanding the visuality within
the ways of seeing and the limitations of that visuality. These viewers EmDisEmbody by holding
onto the notions of embodiment and disembodiment simultaneously, shifting between the two,
confusing the division and doing this through relationality, all leading to richer Is.
Adrian Piper, unappreciated for her early work connecting the body with the mind through
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performance within the scopic field is one such formalist that provides us with a better
understanding of new ways of perceiving the other through EmDisEmbodiment.

Fig. 1-13. Adrian Piper, My Calling (Card) #1 (for Dinners and Cocktail Parties), 1986-1990.
Performance prop: business card with printed text on cardboard. 3.5” x 2” (9,0 cm x 5,1 cm). Collection
Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin. © APRA Foundation Berlin.

The disregarding of Piper’s early work is yet another instance of the denigration of the
body in favor of the mind. Recent scholarship now highlights the intimate connection between
the two. Maurice Merleau-Ponty through phenomenology, developed in his thinking the
importance of the body as it relates to philosophy and epistemologies. Merleau-Ponty was key in
understanding perception and how it influenced the ways we thought about and appreciated the
other. Additionally, he saw this perception as intimately interconnected with our bodies. He
developed his concept of the body-subject as an alternative to the Cartesian cogito that
prioritized the thinking man. Merleau-Ponty saw the ways we perceive as influencing how we
understood and engaged with the world. He saw these new ways of perceiving
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phenomenologically as allowing us to become an object among others in the world where we
could then build more meaningful relations. This being in the world or as Martin Heidegger and
Édouard Glissant would highlight a being-with this world also led to a humbler way of
perceiving and an understanding that we are not only seen by many others but also our
perspectives have an impact on those around us and these perspectives are particular and not
universal.
However, what happens to Merleau-Ponty’s understandings when one is already an object
in fact where one has been mainly seen as object and not subject. Piper’s makes use of this
phenomenological approach to provoke various viewers to bracket away their assumptions that
construct her as object and to further rethink the ways they consume the other by constructing
themselves as the universal purveyor. Piper stopped using the more feminine name Adrianne,
that she had taken on in College, and purposefully changed it back to Adrian to be mistaken as a
white male in order to get respect for the formalist work she is now known for. Piper’s poem
“My Slave Name” states “Adrian was… useful for cloaking my gender, useful for enhancing the
credibility of my work, work inconceivable from a cute young thing like me …” (38).
Referenced in Adrian Piper: Race, Gender, And Embodiment, John P. Bowles states that Piper
remembered when first exhibiting that people who had not met her automatically assumed she
was a white man due to her name and because they expected a white man to be the artist doing
abstract, formal and/or conceptual work. Piper’s story is one among many revealing inherent
within the CFRP subject’s constitution is not only the need to connect to the divine but a belief
that it is certain bodies that are better able to make this connection, that is the white male body
and the list continues to include heterosexual, middle to upper class, and other categories.
Embedded within these power dynamics is a belief about what serves as the “normal” and
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universal body that becomes the epitome of a CFRP subject and thus the perfect formalist artist.
Bowles further brings our attention to the need to critique these universalist bodies assumed by
art movements, “… it is important to acknowledge how the insistent anonymity of both artist and
viewer hid the ways in which prejudices regarding race and gender determined who could be a
Minimalist” (24).
Piper’s art continuously highlights the subject within the artwork, the viewer who sees it,
and the relationship between the two. By highlighting the whiteness of the expected viewer, she
breaks down this hidden constitution of who a formalist artist and viewer should be. Piper brings
attention to visuality and the scopic field by having us think about the racial and gender
constructions of the seen; the process of seeing; and the use of our understandings to categorize
what and who we see. Kobena Mercer in “Contrapositional Becomings: Adrian Piper Performs
Questions of Identity”, notes the way that Minimalist, Conceptual and I would add formalist
practices have been separated from performance to reinforce the Cartesian mind/body split. He
sees Adrian Piper at the intersection between Modernism and its critiques, occupying a unique
perspective with her formalist performative practices that present identity in terms of process and
relationality understanding relation in terms of time and space. Mercer points to the fact that
black artists were cut off from larger conversations and the post war critique of modernism
whereby critics reductively would read their work as autobiographical. Piper’s work was not at
the time appreciated for the ways it impacted and shifted modernism and art historically and
contributed to our contemporary moment.
Piper provides us the space to interrogate the self/other divide where an interested,
embodied looker becomes intimately intertwined with the subject in the artwork they see. Mercer
argues that Piper presents us with a discrepant embodiment that breaks down normal conceptions
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connected to recognition between self and other. The authorial subjectivity of the artist and
notions of a separate and autonomous art object gets replaced as viewers of the piece co-produce
the work. However, these art objects that Piper presents through videos that address the audience
causes viewers to question their pre-established categories in order to conceptualize what are the
subjects and the expected viewers of the piece. Piper makes the white audience visible and brings
attention to the neutral conception of whiteness that has happened throughout Western art history
and beyond, where white people are automatically assumed to be the main protagonist, subjects,
and authors. According to Mercer with Piper turning the script and producing a “threat of
interestedness” the viewer of the artwork cannot
… rise to a universal position of access to eternal truths about the nature of art and
aesthetic value. Further, the unpredictability of other people’s behavior [Piper and the
subjects of her artwork] also means the “I” is not at the center of things and can never bring
the otherness of all that is “not I” under its control, although for an artist such as Piper,
instead of being a threat, this is in fact a condition of freedom that opens the way to
unforeseeable possibilities. (115)
What I further see in Piper’s work is a connection to an EmDisEmbodied I. The viewing
experience for a Piper piece allows us to see the importance of the other as someone beyond the
horizon of the self, the other as someone to not be consumed by that self and to be perceived in
all their visibilities and invisibilities. Piper brings our attention to our processes of apperception,
provoking us to question the ways we conceptualize our perceptions of others and challenging us
to be self-aware of the limitations of this act. She wants us to see the other both in terms of their
particularities and their singularities and the antinomy of the other within this light. As John P.
Bowles states, “Piper aimed to find the universal in the particular. Procedures of objectivity
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enabled her to conceive of herself within a utopian realm of her own creation while remaining
grounded in the historical particularity of her experiences” (118). Bowles understands how
Piper’s work “points to a universalist project that embraces contingency” (119).
In Ur-Mutter Piper uses the iconic image of a Somalian woman holding her emaciated
young child by Peter Tumley to present a new representation of the universal mother. By
presenting the singularity of this woman and her child, Piper aims for us to have a connection to
the image that does not see the subjects within the photograph as objects but as key relational,
embodied subjects worthy of love. Our position as viewers should not be one of disinterest but as
relational beings aware of the circumstances of this mother. Piper states:
an African Ur-Mutter did make us, but she is more than just our mother. She’s also an
undernourished and politically oppressed woman, now, who must ““Fight or die” (UrMutter #3, #8, # 10, and # 11). But even that's not all there is to say, because what she's
fighting for is not the guilty gluttony and self-cannibalism that characterize Western culture
and that we strive so hard to defend. (95)
Piper presents the viewer with multiple instances of this image to:
flood the viewer’s perceptual field with enough variations on that image to force the
recognition that it is not possible to apprehend the singularity of that person through any
simple act of categorization. I’m actually using a number of different images of black
people this way, varying the conceptual interpretation of their visual singularity20 as a way
of exposing their individuality and personhood. (96)
This photograph further references Africa as motherland, bringing our attention to its
importance, considering that it was there that the first humans are known to have appeared five
to seven million years ago.
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Fig. 1-14. Piper, Adrian. Ur Mutter #4: Relax. We don’t want what you have. 1989. Gelatin silver print,
screen print text. LACMA Collection, Los Angeles. collections.lacma.org/node/194572

Piper uncovers the conceptual and ideological underpinnings of the representation of a CFRP
subject in order to move to new forms of representation. The singular narrative of the
representation of white CFRP subjects and their attempt to get away fully from the ego and body
is challenged by Piper who highlights the contradictions within her embodiment and
disembodiment, at times emphasizing one over the other and also not always fully demarcating
either. In some pieces she has emphasized her African features while in others she sarcastically
emphasizes the nonsensical ways we make racial classifications.
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Fig. 1-15. Piper, Adrian. Self-Portrait Exaggerating My Negroid Features. 1981. Pencil on paper. The
Eileen Harris Norton Collection, via Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin.
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:AdrianPiper1981Self-Portrait_Exaggerating.png
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For “Cornered” Piper positions herself on the video screen, defensively in a corner behind
an upturned table. She speaks directly to viewers, informing them about the history of
miscegenation in America. Chairs are set up in front of the monitor inviting viewers to enter the
purview of Piper’s imaginary gaze. To be seen by Piper but also more importantly to understand
that they are being seen. For Piper, the stability and separation of viewer, artist and art object are
deconstructed. In the video she states,
I’m black.
Now, let’s deal with this social fact, and the fact of my stating it, together. Maybe you
don’t see why we have to deal with it together. Maybe you think this is just my problem,
and that I should deal with it by myself.
But it’s not just my problem. It’s our problem.
(https://sistinaswilde.tumblr.com/post/39131631750/illethegal-cornered-a-videoinstallation)
Assuming a white audience, Piper provokes viewers by stating that most Americans are of mixed
racial blood and further asks these viewers what they will do since they now know they are
black. Using the same cultural rationality of hypodescent that believes everyone with a minimal
amount of blood from black ancestry to be black, she challenges white viewers to honestly
address their possible black ancestry and through this, relates the black body to the universal.
She further provokes viewers by asking what they will do since they now know they are black as
most Americans are of mixed blood. As Maurice Berger posits in Adrian Piper: a Retrospective,
Piper in this and other pieces wants us to phenomenologically see the black other by pushing the
concept of blackness beyond what whiteness allows. In my writings, I look further at the concept
of blackness and understand that this act will push the boundaries of whiteness and vice versa,
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Piper continues to do the same in her work. By setting this antinomy in the white viewers minds
that their body AND the black body can both be universal-particulars she nuances racial
categorizations and allows for a greater conception of the universal as relational and
contradictory.

Fig. 1-16. Piper, Adrian. Cornered. 1988. Video installation with birth certificates; single-channel video,
color, sound; monitor; table; chairs. Collection Museum of Contemporary Art Chicago.
hammer.ucla.edu/take-it-or-leave-it/art/cornered

In 2012 Piper named herself, “The Artist Formerly Known as African-American”, in a
piece she did titled, “Thwarted Projects, Dashed Hopes, A Moment of Embarrassment”. In the
image that is also posted in the cosmological space of the internet, Piper states as a side note:
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Fig. 1-17. Piper, Adrian. Thwarted Projects, Dashed Hopes, A Moment of Embarrassment. 2012. Digital
self-portrait. Collection and © APRA Foundation Berlin.
Dear Friends,

For my 64th birthday, I have decided to change my racial and nationality designations.
Henceforth, my new racial designation will be neither black nor white but rather 6.25%
grey, honoring my 1/16th African heritage. And my new nationality designation will be
not African American but rather Anglo-German American, reflecting my preponderantly
English and German ancestry. Please join me in celebrating this exciting new adventure
in pointless administrative precision and futile institutional control!
Piper’s sarcastic prompt has us join her in the societal calculative way of classifying people
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through an irrational rationality, depending on how you define the terms, based on blood lines.
This and her work “Cornered” harkens back to the “one drop rule”, also known as hypodescent
as mentioned earlier, which dates back to a 1662 Virginia Law where anyone with even one
black ancestor in North America was considered black. This rule has been upheld as recently as
1985 in Louisiana where a woman with a black great-great-great-great-grandmother was ordered
not to identify herself as “white” on her passport.
Through this separation of the form of her body from what it culturally represents, there
is a mystery Piper reveals inherent in her form and thus her body. In showing the cultural
constructions behind this form, she reveals the, “construction that regularly conceals its genesis”
(522). Here I borrow a phrase that has been used by Judith Butler in regards to Gender in,
“Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist
Theory.” Piper shows the contradictions and limitations related to these constructions.
Limitations that are hidden when one faithfully accepts the prescripts of certain cultural forms as
they relate to identity.
Although many of Piper’s pieces highlight the white audience, they also speak to many
races, through the questioning of whiteness as neutrality and the universal. They prompt viewers
to consider their relationship to blackness, whether they see it from a distance or through their
own embodied experience. In this piece she also pushes her white audience beyond the horizon
line of what it is to be, provoking either anxiety21 or a phenomenological acceptance of this
space outside one’s comfort zone. A black person, Asian person, or other viewers have their own
very different experiences as they come to terms with the centrality of the White-American's role
- that Piper assumes is the viewer of the piece. It allows for those other audiences to consider
whiteness and the establishment of meaning through forms of whiteness. Thus, by situating
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whiteness it no longer is an ontological given but can be seen as something that shifts, changes,
is always unstable and can expand in both violent and non-violent ways.
(https://newrepublic.com/article/148298/outside-comfort-zone-adrian-piper).
In the use of the word “formerly” in Piper's adopted moniker she brings our attention to the
temporal way identity is constructed. One can think of identity then in a past (formerly), present
and future sense. Piper perhaps here, underscores the contemporary Black Optimists ways of
thinking of black identity where they do not connect it to whiteness viewing it beyond
victimization and oppression. Her own subject becomes an indefinable singularity as she uses
performance to move beyond the ways people might expect her to be escaping the ways she and
black bodies have been positioned through her work, writing, and research. She further addresses
the tension along with the connection between embodiment and disembodiment.

Fig. 1-18. Piper, Adrian. Mokshaudra Progressions. 2012. Print, edition of 20 copies, signed and
numbered by the artist.

Piper’s name change may have taken inspiration from the
musician “the Artist Formerly Known As Prince”. The name developed
from Prince’s non-moniker that he takes on in 1993, a “Love Symbol”
which was an intertwining of the gender symbols for man and woman.
Fig. 1-19. Prince's name, Prince writes, “[i]t is an unpronounceable symbol whose meaning has not
as of 1993, Wikimedia
Commons with purple
been identified. It's all about thinking in new ways, tuning in 2 a new
color added,
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fi
free-quency,” (https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36107590). This
le:Prince_logo.svg
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new form of symbolic representation moved away from binaries as it relates to gender. As the
symbol was unpronounceable and it was difficult for the media to refer to him in written
language, the symbol began to be referred to as, the “Artist Formerly Known As Prince”. Prince
like Piper finds ways to depart from the forms in which we have been limited and framed. It has
been suggested by Emily VanDerWerff that this change to the symbol was an explicit reaction
by Prince against his record company. (https://www.vox.com/2016/4/21/11481686/prince-namechange-symbol-why) A reaction because Prince didn’t want to be caught up in the formalities of
what a record label did, namely to label or brand the artist. To critique his labelling, he marked
himself as a slave to reveal what the loss of his name and voice felt like. For both to be coopted
made him feel like he was being silenced with the added expectations that he should follow a
particular mode of being. Furthermore, he disregarded the name “Prince” as it was automatically
associated

Fig. 1-20. Rasic, Brian/Rex Features. The artist formerly known as … Prince v Warner. 2015. The
Guardian. www.theguardian.com/music/2015/aug/10/history-prince-contractual-controversy-warnerpaisley-park.

with masculinity and nobility. Instead, his “love symbol” could represent different things to
different people as it was purposefully ambiguous and a better way he would be “marked”. The
androgyny of the symbol was a perfect representation of Prince’s ability to create music that
centered us and made us reconnect with our bodies through the undefinable, the erotic, and the
sensual.
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The “Artist Formerly Known As Prince” took these symbols we use to separate and
differentiate gender and that hierarchized mind over body to create a new symbol long before
nonbinary became culturally established in the United States. “They” just recently in 2019 was
included in the Merriam-Webster dictionary as a nonbinary pronoun more than a decade after
Prince first used his symbol. He thus created a new form for viewing the body and by conjoining
the symbols for male and female, through his music and the visuals associated to his persona, he
created what I would argue is a symbolic visualization of the nuances of an EmDisEmbodied I.
Both Prince and Piper consider the I in its strength and its Universal-Particularness;
temporally as well as spatially; and consider the I’s erotic, abject and/or rhythmic nature. They
both understand the richness of the body and intimately connect the spatial awareness of the
body with the mind and the spirit. In an interview for an event inspired by the Serpentine Gallery
Pavilion in 2012, Piper discusses Kant and explains how he conceived of the spatial workings of
the brain where we bring in data, compare it to other datum, and then categorize it through
concepts related to difference that separate one set of datum from another. Piper explains that
Kant saw where there is something in the brain that allows us to not only bring in the data but
distinguish and arrange the parts in a linear order. We further solidify the data by comparing and
contrasting it, it is then held together to form an object of consciousness, an object of time. With
this organization of experience in this linear way we create a complex experience of what
existence is. With this action of comparing one relationship to another we understand continuity,
time, the differences between objects, and their location in space and we do this with different
people and our bodies as well. Piper and Prince want us to deconstruct our methods of thinking
and the ways we use categorizations to fix objects and others. While Piper wants us to slow
down and in a meditative way think through the ways we rationally categorize and understand
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the abject in terms of its power as a catalysis to shift our meanings and constructions, moving
beyond the use of it to stereotype; Prince creates concepts that can shift and change the ways we
conceive of our previous categories. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zMQd3KlV1AU)
Piper provides us spaces within her work to approach getting beyond ourselves and
moving beyond the stereotypes we may have of others. Her pieces allow us to be
EmDisEmbodied and to hold the cultural constrictions that limit us in suspension while
simultaneously being still aware of our embodiment. When we cogitate the spatiality of
consciousness, it becomes an object that we can step back from, separate from, consider, and
more importantly, re-consider. Our consciousness as viewers gets referred to and isolated from
us as perceiver. Our gaze gets separated from the ways we see. When we are able to see our
consciousness detached from ourselves we can see it more easily as changeable. Piper in
enabling us to EmDisEmbody, tasks us to shift our perspectives and recognize some of the
limitations of our own worldviews. She presents subjects, including herself, that are ends in
itself, and not a means to an end and subjects where those “ends” are always in process.
In an interview about her two written Volumes, Rationality and the Structure of the Self,
Piper speaks to the distinction between self and other and the need to imagine the world
viscerally and kinesthetically through the worldview of the other. She defines it as transpersonal
rationality – an ability to see another person as real as one’s self. The distinction then between a
self and other is not based on a conflict of egos or a conflict based on recognition but instead on
an ability to imagine the world from that person’s very different point of view. Piper in her move
and her thoughts concerning transpersonal rationality and ways she tries to apply discrepant
embodiment (Mercer), points towards what I envision as an EmDisEmbodied Erotic, Rhythmic,
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Abject I that respects the space of the other and views them as equal but different. However,
Piper goes further to define transpersonal rationality as also consisting of,
hard-wired cognitive dispositions that define us as human beings: to consistency,
coherence, impartiality, impersonality, intellectual discrimination, foresight, deliberation,
self-reflection and self-control. Egocentric rationality consists in placing these
dispositions in the service of satisfying our personal desires and advancing our selfinterest. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tURuyb76XQ)
With this definition Piper departs in certain ways from my ideas concerning
EmDisEmbodiment as I see desire as a key constitutive element of bodies and so it should not be
repressed. I also see our personal desires and self-interests as intimately connected to wanting to
see others in better circumstances rather than the way self-interest has been defined as an
individual aim. Thus, what should be examined and of concern is the way desire has been
manipulated and limited, where even the field of desire has been coopted and corrupted. An
EmDisEmbodied I can reframe desire to not only be about the self but within desire for the self is
care for the other, where that care rather than being seen as charity becomes necessity and rather
than it being seen as opposing the individual becomes a constitutive element for a relational
being.
Piper in contrast, has always been interested in the concept of thought occurrences where
our thoughts can motivate us to do something independently of what our desires make us do. She
sees desire as causing illusions as it pulls reason off balance and constructs a world that is offkilter. Piper states in an interview she gives on her two-part philosophical volumes addressing
the rationality of the self that these thought occurrences can help us form an epistemic skepticism
that is full of checks and balances. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tURuyb76XQ). Her
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suspicion of desire comes from a similar unease to Lorde’s, where she believes we objectify
others for satisfaction realizing that this objectification can only make us feel empty.
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_tURuyb76XQ)
However, while I do prioritize desire, which influences my interest in the psychoanalytic,
I appreciate Piper’s and other formalists caution towards certain forms of desire. Another key
concern in addition to Piper’s mentioned above is a feeling that desire can be used to move away
from a full appreciation of the present and the here and now.

Fig. 1-21. Piper, Adrian. Here and Now. 1968. Artist book folio with 64 loose leaves 8 x 8 x ½ inches.
www.ubu.com/concept/piper_here.html
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When we are always desiring something and do not feel fulfilled we could be in a constant state
of looking towards a better future or regretting the past. However, this is only one way of
thinking about desire, as it thinks of it only in terms of the individual and not the community. We
need to consider Lorde’s understanding of desire that comes from her notion of the erotic where
we are driven towards a more equitable and just world for self and other and away from seeing
others and things as a means for our satisfaction. We also need to understand the importance of
desiring the changes needed for the here and now.
Piper, following the aims of minimalist sculpture has moved towards anti-form to divorce
the art object from desire, representation, or narrative references to more fully make the
experience as immediate as possible. Similarly, to Fry and Bell she wants us to remove ourselves
from the ego. However, this removal is not to connect to a higher transcendental good away from
the relational other, but in order to be able to see the divinity within the other and to treat people
on this earth according to the understanding that all should be allowed to have a basic standard
of, “freedoms, responsibilities, rights and resources” regardless of what race they are. Here then I
again connect Piper’s prompt to Lorde’s notions of the erotic and desire. In Piper’s discussion of
the Black Lives Matter movement she sees a key distinction between understanding the
movement as advancing the interest of African-Americans, where it can resort to one ego’s
interest against another, from cultivating “a fundamental level of humanity in all Americans.”
For Piper the aim to transcend the ego does not end at transcendence but it comes back to the
immanence within our existence and our relations with each other. Piper reveals through her
work the understanding that all of us should be given the space towards transcendence through
immanence. (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/opinion/adrian-piper-speaks-forherself.html)
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If we turn back to the formalist white men, I argue that rather than submerging these men’s
ideas concerning the use of the transcendental to fully deconstruct their egos that this is an
important move for them to connect to beyond themselves, beyond racist conceptions, beyond
their cultural restrictions as their consciousnesses are so enmeshed in these restrictions through a
pathological form of whiteness. They need to leave their constructed systems, discourses and the
like as much as is possible to be better able to connect to the other. This does mean though that
in leaving, being atemporal, they will also protect themselves from ever being confronted by the
relational other and the responsibility within that confrontation. This confrontation is necessary
as rather than it being a fight for recognition it can bring a better understanding between self and
other.
There are ways to further argue the above points as I want to look further at how Fried
aimed to break down the ego and to move towards the spiritual. Embedded in this description is
critique but through EmDisEmbodiment, I do want to hold onto the fact that there are things that
I miss in their approach and perhaps their way is also a form of EmDisEmbodiment as they have
a different conception of life on earth. Mine sees the divinity within relationships between Is?,
that is uncertain and fluid, while theirs, it could be benevolently argued, understands the need to
move beyond the powerful discourses and white epistemologies that have stabilized certain
privileged Is.
Formalist like Michael Fried aimed to break down the I and the ego and move us towards
pure reason and preferred instead to enforce an objective and dis-interested subject who similarly
to Fry and Bell reinforced the modernist development of the CFRP subject in a different
direction than Piper’s. A course that did not think in terms of the historical context that created a
self/other that relates fundamentally to the subject/object philosophical debate. In his key essay,
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“Art and Objecthood” Fried wants to see the modern and modern art removed from time and
cultural experience. He took much from his mentor Clement Greenberg who states:
The avant-garde poet or artist tries in effect to imitate God by creating something valid solely
on its own terms, in the way nature itself is valid, in the way a landscape—not its picture—is
aesthetically valid; something given, increate, independent of meanings, similar or originals.
Content is to be dissolved so completely into form that the work of art or literature cannot be
reduced in whole or in part to anything not itself. (Greenberg 541)
Greenberg popularized the term “art for art's sake” and Fried in trying to uphold this philosophy
staunchly opposed what he felt was a lack of differentiation between the work of art and the
experience of viewing it, a phenomenon he described as “theatricality.” Fried was against this
theatricality as he saw this need for the audience to complete the work as pandering to that
audience. Furthermore, rather than bringing attention to the person viewing the piece and the
space that framed the conditions of that experience, he wanted both along with the ego of the
person to be filtered out.
In “Art and Objecthood,” Fried responds to the work of minimalists Donald Judd and
Robert Morris whom he sees as “literalists”. Fried does not like their confusion of the definition
of “object” with “art” and wants to hold a special pure place in the world for art objects. A
reaction not only against Judd and Morris but also against Marcel Duchamp's use of the found
object of a urinal as art in 1917. In contrast, Fried saw a distinct separation between objects that
were art and those that were found objects that were then for Fried non-art. He believed the
essence of modern art was to “deny or suspend its objecthood” and that the “interesting
incidents” of form were able to distinguish art from other objects in the world. Great art for Fried
was timeless and existed in an idealized space. It was ahistorical in the strictest of Kantian
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senses. True art like Plato's forms were to be truly and “wholly manifest”. We did not need to put
our meanings and interpretations onto the artwork the meaning was inherent in the work and did
not come from exterior factors like the environment or the context surrounding the work. The
artwork was to be outside of time and separate from our sensible worlds, from the literal world
we live in.
Fried wanted Modernist Art to be able to exists for itself, in its own realm beyond the
viewer. The Minimalist art that Fried objected to, created a presence through theatricality that
made it object-like as opposed to Modernist Art that was silent. For Fried the minimalist work of
Judd and Morris felt too much like it was crowding you especially due to the works
anthropomorphic feel and size. In connection to Greenbergian modernism, Fried saw a need to
create a certain form of purity and essentialism to art where it did not mingle with other forms
like theater. Thus, he did not like the idea of hybridity within art. Art shouldn’t intermingle, it
was to be pure, separate from theater, cinema, and the like.
Fried was also very much against Donald Judd's ideas that art just needed to be interesting
to be considered art. In opposition to Piper’s keen interest in addressing the audience, Art for
Fried didn’t need to be as caught up in what the viewer thinks or feels about it. For Fried, that
was too interpretative and learned it was not felt in a dis-interested way. I conjecture that in the
formalist’s minds like Fried, they wanted to reinforce a way of looking where viewers would
maintain their safe spaces as Cartesian Formalist Rational Platonic subjects. A pure space with
pure subjects that were able to elevate themselves above the quotidian, everyday objects and
other people.
Fried took other thoughts from Clement Greenberg. He didn’t like that the minimalist
created mainly sculptural objects. He felt paintings could more easily prevent artwork from
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becoming theatrical and promoted paintings that did not mean anything. Like, Greenberg he
wanted to chart a new course for American paintings that moved away from 20th century kitsch
painting that lived in the past. Unlike kitsch work, Greenberg promoted more “complex” work
that was not just representational. Representational work and art that they called kitsch art was
for them a way towards mind control and a tool for propaganda and fascism as it did not make
you think. They wanted Modernist Art to be a problem that asks questions without there being
answers. However, what I am arguing here is that they missed the latent answers such as purity,
disembodiment and the elimination of the ego that helped to reinforce rather than depart from the
limitations of certain forms of CFRP subjects that used these answers to elevate themselves
above others. One can see how Greenberg's essentialisms about art and Fry and Bell's aesthetic
emotion directly relates to Plato's theory of forms that then also influenced Fried.
Fried warns against the fact that literalist work by emphasizing its shape sculpturally in
terms of a whole and not in terms of relationships between parts, “… aspires, not to defeat or
suspend its own objecthood, but on the contrary to discover and project objecthood as such” (2).
Fried eschews the fact that in literalist work, rather than the value being associated in the work,
“the experience of literalist art is of an object in a situation – one that, virtually by definition,
includes the beholder” (3).
For Fried the key problem he had with literalist work was it was too human-centric, too
humanistic. He wanted a form of art that broke down the ego and that form of art for Fried
relates back to formal elements in harmonious relationships with each other. He is arguing for a
classical sensibility that prioritizes formal relationships and disputes Morris' “unitary forms” and
Judd's specific objects that assert their wholeness and indivisibility. Both Morris and Judd would
become known as pioneers of the anti-form movement. Morris unlike Fried wanted to explore
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and push our notions of space and movement, often incorporating mirrored surfaces and creating
passageways or portals scaled for the size of the human body. Both Morris and Judd, were
concerned with making the viewer conscious of their own space, the environment, and the

Fig. 1-22. Morris, Robert. Refractions. November 22, 2016–January 14, 2017 Exhibition at Sprueth
Magers, Berlin. spruethmagers.com/exhibitions/robert-morris-refractions-berlin/

context that the viewer is a part of. All very key for postmodernism and an EmDisEmbodied I
who is self-reflective, phenomenological and not only aware of an expanding and chaotic space
in time but their movement through that space and how that then relates to others and how those
others relate to the self.
However, Fried is completely against these installations and objects that bring attention to
the human ego. He sees them as falling outside of the confines of art and relating to a new genre
of theater that is corrupting his purer conception of what art should be in a classical and formal
sense. Fried views these anti-form objects as not sculpture as they are too, “concerned with the
actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters literalist work” (3). Fried does not like the
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idea that the experience of literalist art as he calls it is an “object in a situation—one that …
includes the beholder” (3). It is interesting to read this in contrast to Adrian Piper’s feelings on
the beholder where according to Fred Moten, he identifies a very different take Piper has on the
beholder of the piece where:
… to be for the beholder is to be able to mess up or mess with the beholder. It is the
potential of being catalytic. Beholding is always the entrance into a scene, into the
context of the other, of the object. This is a very different experience of beholding, a very
different experience of the beholder, than that offered by Fried. The Friedian beholder,
even in his fascination, never moves out of himself, never achieves or is submitted to a
kind of ecstasy, the transportative force of the syncope. The beholder is never estranged,
never lost or even dark to himself; rather he continually fulfills that self in the ascription
of meaning to the beheld and, more fundamentally, in the ascription of greatness or not,
authentic and autonomous aestheticity or not, to the artwork. The beholder arrives at that
self-possessive sense or knowledge of self that is the essence of what Fried calls
conviction. The beholder becomes a subject again in this profoundly antitheatrical
moment. One isn’t absorbed by the painting as in an entrance into its scene; instead, one
is, in the instant of the frame, in the visual experience of flatness as an instantaneous
moment of framing, absorbed into or by flatness reconceived as a mirror. The painting is
a mirror. Absorption is self-absorption. Such self-absorption comes in moments of
calmness, not under the disruptive and catalytic pressure of an object even if that object is
there for you, the disruptive and catalytic pressure of an other even if that other is there
for you. There’s something too dangerous about this broke, brokedown, breaking energy
of objection. (236)
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Thus, the Friedian beholder of an artwork should remain stable and calm as they are not to be
connected to anything that shakes their foundation of meaning since the formalist work should
have no outside meaning.
Fried is also opposed to the fact that these works are dependent on a viewer's already
existing concept of a shape or gestalt, “against which the appearance of the piece from different
points of view is constantly being compared” (3). Fried believes this largeness of the piece (at
least human size) in addition to its non-relational, unitary character both physically and
psychically distances the viewer from the piece. Fried sees these works as confronting the
viewer, where objects are not only in the viewer's space but in the viewer's way. He points to a
quote from Morris maintaining an interest not in the object but in the entire situation. Morris
states, “[t]he object has not become less important. It has merely become less self-important” (4).
Fried worries about Morris’ statement that, “[e]verything counts—not as part of the object, but as
part of the situation in which its objecthood is established and on which that objecthood at least
partly depends” (4). He critiques Morris for a lack of interest in the art object with more concerns
about controlling the entire situation that the art-viewer is a part of and that this need for control
then sets a stage presence. Fried states:
It is a function, not just of the obtrusiveness and, often, even aggressiveness of literalist
work, but of the special complicity that that work extorts from the beholder… Here again
the experience of being distanced by the work in question seems crucial: the beholder
knows himself to stand in an indeterminate, open-ended—and unexacting—relation as
subject to the impassive object on the wall or floor. In fact, being distanced by such objects
is not, I suggest, entirely unlike being distanced, or crowded, by the silent presence of
another person; the experience of coming upon literalist objects unexpectedly –for
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example, in somewhat darkened rooms—can be strongly, if momentarily, disquieting in
just this way. (4)
Implicit in this quote is not only Fried’s discomfort with the anthropomorphic object but with the
human other and how that other can unsettle the stable CRFP subject. Fried criticizes four main
aspects of literalists works: the size as so closely related to human-sized; what he sees as the
ideals of the nonrelational, the unitary, and wholistic, which tends also to relate to our
conceptions of other humans, symmetry; and an order which Fried unlike Judd does not see
rooted in new philosophical and scientific principles but instead, in a Kantian sense, related to
nature. He lastly objects to the hollowness of literalist work seeing this quality of having an
inside as “blatantly anthropomorphic” (6). He objects to this latent naturalism and
anthropomorphism within what he sees as the core of literalist theory and practice.
Although some will argue that Fried moves us away from faulted notions of the human, a
good direction to consider his work, I am worried about the ways his ideas also make it easy not
to see the other and more importantly to be seen by the other. I am interested in a positionality of
the subject that insists on a relation to the other and the object. A positionality that understands
that I as subject can never fully fathom the ways the other gazes at me. As Lacan would say, I
can never see the ways a sardine can sees me and as Josefina Ayerza states in, “What is a
Picture?”, when describing the Lacanian split between the eye and the gaze:
you may only look out from a spot in space, but you are looked at from everywhere else.
You look…what you see is determined by how you are looked at. Why? Because your
subjectivity is more likely to depend on the way you are looked at than on what you see…
The subject that is an object, that is the gaze, is outside: you are looked at, you are the
picture. Lacan’s sardine-tin story throws light on the issue of the “all-seen” subject, now
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splitting in search of itself, now diving, now reduced to zero.
(https://www.lacan.com/symptom17-resume2.html)
Fried, critical of these objects with a presence that confront and look at us while we behold
them, would not want the sardine can to see. For him this is connected too much to our egos and
humanness, “that the beholder is confronted by literalist work within a situation that he
experiences as his means that there is an important sense in which the work in question exists for
him alone, even if he is not actually alone with the work at the time” (8). Fried views this as
reinforcing the ego. He objects to Judd's notion that a work of art has to be only interesting,
“[f]or Judd, as for literalist sensibility generally, all that matters is whether or not a given work is
able to elicit and sustain (his) interest.” (8) He is against the idea of the repetitious in a literalist
work of art where Judd for example repeats identical units. Fried does not appreciate the fact that

Fig. 1-23. Judd, Donald. Untitled. 1967. Lacquer on galvanized iron. MOMA, New York Collection.

the experience of literalists work, persists in time and that it is, “a presentment of endless, or
indefinite, duration (9)”. Fried much prefers the work of Noland, Olitski, David Smith or Caro:
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Fig. 1-24. Olitski, Jules. Embracing Circles. 2011. Installation View. Freedman Art, New York.
www.freedmanart.com/exhibitions/jules-olitski

… because at every moment the work itself is wholly manifest. [...] It is this continuous and
entire presentness, amounting, as it were, to the perpetual creation of itself, that one
experiences as a kind of instantaneousness: as though if only one were infinitely more
acute, a single infinitely brief instant would be long enough to see everything, to
experience the work in all its depth and fullness, to be forever convinced by it. (9)
If one were to bring the world of semiotics into play a possible interpretation of the proper
forms of artwork for Fried would be a work where the stimulus object (object that stimulates the
senses) and referential object (what it refers to) become unseparated and undifferentiated. Thus,
the sign and the referent are indistinguishable. Here semiosis becomes unnecessary, as the art
object has nothing that it refers to outside of itself while the art viewer's ego is broken down as it
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approaches non-meaning especially if one considers ego in terms of an ego ideal. Fried further
goes on to state that it is, “the condition, that is, of existing in, indeed of secreting or constituting,
a continuous and perpetual present—that the other contemporary modernist arts, most notably
poetry and music, aspire.” He concludes by saying, “In these last sentences, however, I want to
call attention to the utter pervasiveness—the virtual universality—of the sensibility or mode of
being that I have characterized as corrupted or perverted by theatre. We are all literalists most or
all of our lives. Presentness is grace” (9). Fried argues for being present in the moment in a here
and now that is fully removed from our egos and faulty conceptions of the world. In his footnote
which people may miss, Fried draws a very clear connection to literalist and surrealist art. He
critiques surrealist work such as Dali's, believing that they were too focused on temporality and
its psychological play with dread, anxiety, memory, nostalgia, and other ego-driven emotions.
However, as I argue here and otherwise, one cannot in a God-like way believe they can
fully remove from one’s desires and fantasies as they will manifest in other more destructive
ways. As artists attempt these atemporal pieces they need to keep in mind the biases within their
bodies or at the very least oscillate between the two. Art critic Rosalind Krauss brings up an
interesting critique where she sees this elevation of form to the divine as also calling for an
upright and I would add a silent Man to appreciate the work, as the paintings are always installed
upright on the wall. Fry, disregarding his desires tries to be less egocentric but then consumes the
other while trying. Although a move away from a destructive ego is key, why myself and others
are fearful of this move is that it can lead to a disregard for the responsibility to the other and can
hide normative egos. Furthermore, what is revealed in chapter 3 is that it is desire that can drive
us towards revolutionary change and when desire is stilted or corrupted, when desire is about
lack and not connection it can lead to destructive means. It is important to look at the nuances of
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desire and how Fried’s need to surpass objecthood and think in terms of pure art and being could
also be used to filter out a connection to certain different bodies, epistemologically and
otherwise. With EmDisEmbodiment the thought event can be related very much to desire,
however a very different form of desire, not one that aims to freeze, figure it out, decipher but
one that is fluid, always searching, and is able to conceptualize a thing that based on context can
be, “at one time great and at another time small.” (Plato, The Republic. Acheron Press. Kindle
Edition)
In Fred Moten’s chapter, “Resistance of the Object: Adrian Piper’s Theatricality” he
presents a critique of Fried’s essay, his views on the object and the purpose of art. Also key
within Moten’s critique is how he sees formalism by these men as actually departing from what
he refers to as an “improvisation of Kant’s philosophical radicalism” (258) within Piper’s work.
A key read for me of Kant’s work is the limit he puts on the “human” in making the noumena,
the mysteries of the world, and the mysteries of the other not fully accessible to us. Furthermore,
although he expounds the virtues of the rational, he also wants us to be well aware of the limits
of that rationality.
Moten further sees a protection of the sphere of the other/the object in Piper’s performance
“Max's Kansas City”, where Piper does a performance blindfolded, with ears and nose plugged
and wearing gloves to shut down her sensory inputs. For the piece Piper writes:
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Fig. 1-25. Piper, Adrian. Untitled Performance at Max's Kansas City. 1970. Performance, Max’s Kansas
City, N.Y.. Black and white photograph by Rosemary Mayer. Generali Foundation Collection, Vienna.

Max’s was an Art Environment, replete with Art Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
about Art Consciousness. To even walk into Max’s was to be absorbed into the collective
Art Self-Conscious Consciousness, either as object or as collaborator. I didn’t want to be
absorbed as a collaborator, because that would mean having my own consciousness coopted and modified by that of others: It would mean allowing my consciousness to be
influenced by their perceptions of art, and exposing my perceptions of art to their
consciousness, and I didn’t want that. I have always had a very strong individualistic
streak. My solution was to privatize my own consciousness as much as possible, by
depriving it of sensory input from that environment; to isolate it from all tactile, aural,
and visual feedback. In doing so I presented myself as a silent, secret, passive object,
seemingly ready to be absorbed into their consciousness as an object. But I learned that
complete absorption was impossible, because my “voluntary” object like passivity
implied aggressive activity and choice, an independent presence confronting the ArtConscious environment with its autonomy. My objecthood became my subjecthood.
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(http://foundation.generali.at/en/collection/artist/piper-adrian/artwork/untitledperformance-at-maxs-kansas-city-nyc.html#.XqvFPpJKiDU\)
Moten interprets this as Piper being a reflection then of a body without organs or BwO, a
phrase further conceptualized by Deleuze and Guattari that is used to critique certain forms of
class consciousnesses related to capitalism. However, Moten reveals other notions when
associating Piper to this symbol as a “recalibration of absorption” away from the consciousness
of the subject who gazes at her. By taking on this guise and shutting down the input from the
subject, Piper as object retains a certain privacy while simultaneously protecting her own
consciousness. As Moten sees, she resists, “…deformation, to being messed up or messed with
by others, by the omnipresent and oppressive other” (240). Moten further identifies what he sees
as Piper not wanting her self-consciousness to be embedded or intertwined within an artconsciousness steeped in a limited construction of race through a “field of … bad judgment”, or,
“shaped by the visual pathology of racist categorization” (244). Thus, what Piper does here
through her body is she messes with the field of racial pathology that has coopted her body.
Thus, while she messes with the consciousnesses of those who have limited her body in the past
she protects herself, by blocking her sensory inputs, from being messed with from their field.
Kobena Mercer in, “Adrian Piper, A Reader” further expounds upon the importance of the
piece in breaking down the Cartesian I and the Western universalist subject. He relays the fact
that the object in Piper's notes is:
… inert, nonhuman matter that, in dualistic opposition to a subject, is placed below the
transcendental value Western philosophical traditions bestow upon consciousness, mind,
and spirit … her anomalous presence was an object in the sense of being “not I” – that
which cannot be assimilated into consciousness. To be an object in this sense is to resist

98
assimilation into the ego-consciousness of the audience to which the audience was
addressed. (113)
Mercer disagrees with Piper's read that the performance was a failure as he believes that Piper by
placing herself “closer to thinghood than personhood – began to reveal tangible limits to the
universal subject position taken for granted on the part of the anonymous and unmarked authorial
“I” in modernist art making”(113). Piper by making herself an object, plotting hers and the
viewer's consciousness deconstructs the stability of the Cartesian I and moves towards
EmDisEmbodiment, the object then with her agency is able to modify the subject.
As Moten states, “Piper traces the boundary between critical philosophy and racial
performance and thereby allows us to think the place of the latter in the former, to dwell on what
happens when racial performance is deployed in order to critique racial categories. He uses
Piper’s work to enrich and bring forward his critique of Fried’s dismissal of objecthood. His
posing of two key questions also suggest other aims within his work, “How do sound and its
reproduction allow and disturb the frame or boundary of the visual? What’s the relation between
phonic materiality and an original maternity?” (235) Moten sees the strength in aurality of
Piper’s performative acts with their resistance of the object and objecthood that joins blackness
and black performance to construct a project of a metaethics relating to Kant’s categorical
imperative. I will focus on his interest in sound in the section on Rhythm below, however I
would like to turn to delving into thoughts on the maternal and the abject two concepts that get
juxtaposed in the writings of Julia Kristeva and that Moten uses within his ideas. The last of
Moten’s two questions reveals ideas connected to Kristeva’s thoughts on the maternal, the abject
and what gets lost when entering the Symbolic and patriarchal.
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Kristeva maintains that the abject in opposition to the object relates to a breakdown of
meaning for the subject. She reveals how the pure beautiful image of the subject occurs through
an abjection of another and how we reject our own particular bodies as it relates to that abjected
other to maintain an ideal vision of our Is. Kristeva argues the division between the abject and
the object, understanding that while they are both seen as opposed to a stable and secure I, the
object/limited and controlled other is able to settle the stable subject within the desire for
meaning. The abject in contrast, unsettles the stability of the meaning of the opposition between
subject and object. The abject unlike the object, no longer “makes me ceaselessly and infinitely
homologous to it”. Kristeva states that this, “jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws
me toward the place where meaning collapses”. She continues:
A certain ―ego that merged with its master, a superego, has flatly driven it away. It lies
outside, beyond the set, and does not seem to agree to the latter's rules of the game. And
yet, from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master.
Without a sign (for him), it beseeches a discharge, a convulsion, a crying out. To each
ego its object, to each superego its abject.
Kristeva's project related to the abject is a key moment in contemporary philosophy that
complexly grapples with the need to understand continental philosophy’s relationship with the
other. A relationship that has been ignored with thoughts connected to absolute being, truth,
ideals and universals that could not recognize that other. Kristeva uses her conception of the
abject to connect to the remainder and its relation to non-totalizing thought. She shows the
casting aside of the maternal and feminine with the text, thoughts of the father and thus
philosophy and tries to instead return to a space before signification. Kristeva's ideas pointedly
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argue that the abject body cast aside by formalist subjectivity relates to the feminine and the
modernist formalist art project also casts aside what it sees as abject.
Kristeva relates this repression of the abjection of the other as connected to the repression
of the chora. The chora for Kristeva is the earliest stage of psychosexual development where you
do not distinguish yourself from your mother. She takes the word from Plato's discussion of the
receptacle or container in Timaeus. During this phase, speech, language, the sign, and thus the
text of the father is not yet understood. For Kristeva’s this non-differentiation of subject/object is
the intimate connection between mother/baby where the baby is ruled by a chaotic mix of needs
and drives and is closest to the pure materiality of existence. Kristeva further argues that this
initial connection to the chora is broken down once the child gets integrated into the world of
signs, “[t]hat other sex, the feminine, becomes synonymous with a radical evil that is to be
suppressed” (70). She seeks to look back at the places of otherness and heterogeneity in
‘meaning’ before signification emerges. Kristeva further sees how there are threats from within
and without to Plato's theory of pure forms and the modern formalist notions of pure subjectivity.
In Power of Horror, Kristeva shows how language represses maternal authority. Two
logical principles are used: firstly the strict binary between the pure and the impure, and the
“maintaining of a balance between the two sexes through endogamy” (81). She further looks at
the three major categories of abomination: “i) food taboos; 2) corporeal alteration and its climax,
death; and 3) the feminine body and incest” (93), unlike Plato and the formalists these intimately
connect to the body and its drives. In looking at these realms she is making a broader argument
about how society and religion, aspects of the Lacanian symbolic realm, structure themselves on
the basis of excluding the abject and the abjected body.
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Kristeva looks at cultural forms such as religion and literature to reveal how they relate
the subject to the other. In exploring the history of Christianity, she identifies the lust for
swallowing up the other, “A primal fantasy if ever there was one, that theme unremittingly
accompanies the tendency toward interiorizing and spiritualizing the abject” (118). Is this need to
swallow connected to a non-erotic way of thinking of others through the desire to freeze and
control them? She shows the way the abject is interiorized and revealed in her focus on the work
of Celine. A key text which allows her to explore the fragility of the body and how abjection
works within literature:
When reading Celine we are seized at that fragile spot of our subjectivity where our
collapsed defenses reveal, beneath the appearances of a fortified castle, a flayed skin;
neither inside nor outside, the wounding exterior turning into an abominable interior, war
bordering on putrescence, while social and family rigidity, that beautiful mask, crumbles
within the beloved abomination of innocent vice. Because it occupies its place, because it
hence decks itself out in the sacred power of horror, literature may also involve not an
ultimate resistance to but an unveiling of the abject: an elaboration, a discharge, and a
hollowing out of abjection through the Crisis of the Word. (135)
This “Crisis of the Word” brings forth fissures within Symbolic language that then relate to
Kristeva’s understanding of the semiotic which is a connection to a pre-Oedipal stage within
psychoanalysis developed by Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein and also relates to Lacanian
undifferentiated pre-Mirror stage. In Desire in Language (1980), Kristeva describes this stage as
the child having not differentiated themselves from the mother. Kristeva believes that the subject
even after entering the Symbolic continues to oscillate between the Semiotic (connection to the
mother) and the Symbolic with its laws, rules, and connection to the father. Kristeva sees the
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semiotic as tied to emotions, instincts and I would add the erotic. The semiotic exists within the
cracks within language and not the denotative meanings of words.

Fig. 1-26. Piper, Adrian. Catalysis III. 1970. Street Performance, New York City. Black and white
photograph by Rosemary Mayer. Collection Thomas Erben, New York. © Adrian Piper Research Archive
Foundation Berlin

Piper’s confuses the division between the abject and the object with her body through
performance where she becomes an abjected object that confronts the viewer. Piper expands on
the nuances of the formalist project by bringing the abjected body into conversation with
formalism thus bringing forth a crack within the strict and pure formalist aesthetic. Piper
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critiques the Cartesian I, by reclaiming abjection, and by calling forth a look that is engaged in a
temporal relationship instead of a look that is a gazing at. A contradiction of sorts especially
when one considers the traditional ways formalism has been constructed through the writings of
four of its main critics—namely, Clive Bell, Roger Fry, Clement Greenberg, and Michael Fried
and the ways their formalist projects have been used to further reinforce Plato's theory of forms
that prioritizes the mind over the body. Their ideas and work have been used to fortify the
Cartesian I’s distinct mind/body split.
This privileging of the mind over the body through “I think, therefore I am,” has also
been read as the form comes first and then becoming is a secondary and inferior iteration. The
form has a mysterious genesis that determines the ways of being-in-the-world that is not a beingwith this world. This being-in has been done by setting up binaries and separations—mind and
body, male and female, black and white, etc. Conceptions that already presuppose certain things
about being and that has been used to repress the abjected body of the female, the disabled
person, the black person, the homosexual, and many others.
While keeping in mind Kristeva’s ideas above, it is important to turn back to Moten’s
work and his collision of Piper’s theatricality with Fried’s critique of the object and how he reads
within this an aversion of the gaze of the subject from the object. Piper according to Moten,
resists this aversion for rather than being a passive object that then holds the means to fortify the
subject she instead approaches abjection to destabilize the subjects experiencing her pieces. A
destabilization that considers not only gender as Kristeva richly attunes us to but also an
intersectional connection to race. Piper in describing her “Catalysis” series states,
I can no longer see discrete forms or objects in art as viable reflections or expressions of
what seems to me to be going on in this society: They refer back to conditions of
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separateness, order, exclusivity, and the stability of easily accepted functional identities
that no longer exist. For what a posteriori seems to be this reason, the elimination of the
discrete form as art object (including communications media objects) as a thing in itself,
with its isolated internal relationships and self-determining aesthetic standards, really
interests me. I’ve been doing pieces the significance and experience of which is defined
as completely as possible by the viewer’s reaction and interpretation. Ideally the work has
no meaning or independent existence outside of its function as a medium of change. It
exists only as a catalytic agent between myself and the viewer.
(http://foundation.generali.at/en/collection/artist/piper-adrian/artwork/catalysisiv.html#.YQ3oRi2z1TY)
Here Piper reveals the need to address key political implications of the relationships between
bodies, and signals towards intersectionality by realizing that one node identities do not properly
consider the body and identity. She deconstructs the subject and calls for what I am referring to
as EmDisEmbodied Is through forms of catalysis and our encounter with her work.
In “Catalysis I”, she abjects herself by soaking her clothes in a solution of eggs, milk,
vinegar, and cod oil for one week. Wearing the clothes in public, Piper went on the bus and train
during rush hour and took the elevator to the top of the Empire State Building. In “Catalysis III”,
the artist walked down the street and around a Macy's department store with a sign on her body
saying 'wet paint', and in “Catalysis IV”, again during rush hour she stuffed her mouth with a
towel and let it hang out while riding the bus or train. With these and other non-normative acts
she abjects herself, allowing us to deconstruct the meanings of our forms of composure and how
we as subjects navigate the everyday. Harkening back to Kristeva, by becoming abject Piper,
takes us beyond our constructions and how we form meaning.
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“http://foundation.generali.at/en/collection/artist/piper-adrian/artwork/catalysisiv.html#.YQ3oRi2z1TY

Fig. 1-27. Piper, Adrian. Catalysis IV (1970). Street Performance, New York City. Black and white
photograph by Rosemary Mayer. Collection of the Generali Foundation, Vienna, Permanent Loan to the
Museum der Moderne Salzburg. © Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin and Generali
Foundation.
foundation.generali.at/en/collection/artist/piper-adrian/artwork/catalysis-iv.html#.YROdHS2z1Jk

In a similar fashion I see an EmDisEmbodied I as being able to go beyond the meanings
created by CFRP subjects, constructed by what Michel Foucault refers to as the biopower within
our discourses and culture. That is why it is so important in her performances for Piper to take on
an object and not a subject position, for implied within the subject position are controls to follow
related to biopower. As Moten states Piper becomes the objet d’ art. The object has been the
other side of the coin in relation to how to consider the I. Black peoples fear of universal subjects
that stand outside of it all, is also a fear of a certain normative form that disregards other forms
and furthermore, conceals its genesis and the latent connection of the universal to certain
privileged bodies.
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However, Piper connects to the history of bodies that have been objectified while also
showing the possibility of agency within that objectification, within that invisibility. Piper also
suggests that it is in these spaces of invisibility that much richness in relation to being exists.
Moten signals what happens when Piper brings forward that which has been forgotten by the
“mainstream”. Laid out before us by Piper and Moten is how the subject/object divide relates to
the hierarchical division between self (white, heterosexual, able-bodied, high classed male) in
opposition to many others and how those who are othered have been made objects of
insignificance by our discourses and biopower.
By understanding the realm of the subject as a very particular form of object rather than
one that hides its genesis is key to relational beings. This disembodied realm of the subject has
been protected in conscious and unconscious ways. Perhaps for our cultural moment then, a
certain form of embodiment is necessary for these subjects and a cultural understanding of the
universality of the other forms of objects (others) is also crucial. Thus, this is a universality that
would have a different take on the word universal, as it is not simply the same for all. Perhaps
then we can say that privileged bodies have to shift their consciousnesses to become particularuniversals where an emphasis is on realizing the ways their bodies are bodies within a deictic
field while others have to reach towards the universal or Universal-Particular and elevate their
bodies to bodies that matter. This also means the word EmDisEmbodiment shifts within the
deictic field, dependent on who uses it.
Piper and Moten’s critique of the pure subject position comes from an understanding that
the subject’s pureness is constructed to not include them. They do not fully subscribe to a norm
that is established by very different others outside of themselves. Thus, the object and the
resistance of the object becomes crucial. Moten further shows the limitations in formalists like
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Fried, Fry, Bell and Greenberg’s needs to connect to a pure world, for you can’t be a relational
being when in a pure disconnected and disembodied world. As Moten states in a critique of
Fried’s thoughts on the art viewer, “the (self-) absorbed beholder is an absent beholder, an
absented or subjected subject, located no place: the view(er) from nowhere. This viewer from
nowhere, this nowhere of viewing, this instantaneous no time of viewing, of the viewer, is what
he calls “presentness,” as opposed to presence” (237). Moten explores the ways Adrian Piper
uses her body to within her performances, insist on an “indexical present”, Piper's term which
she also has referred to as the self being in a heightened awareness of the here and now. He
defines this term as, “the deictic-confrontational field her art produces and within which it is to
be beheld” (233) where for Piper the meaning of her body as an art object is dependent on its
context.
With EmDisEmbodiment, I would like to discover ways artist like Piper, take this further,
recognizing also the reverse, that our bodies can determine meaning and not through only
oppressive means. I believe that a more nuanced representation of the body can deconstruct
hierarchical meanings connected to pure fixed form and embedded within our epistemologies,
ontologies, hermeneutics, aesthetics, and the like. Thus, Piper’s work and Fanonian conceptions
of the Universal-Particular are of such importance as they understand how universals expounded
upon within theory have to consider one’s body politic rather than trying to be non-objective by
disparaging the body. Furthermore, we should be looking at why something is said and from
what perspective and not only what is said thus the psychoanalytic or a similar methodology
should be present. This concentration on the whys of theoretical or artistic work, considering the
theorist from their positionality while not fixing them within this cultural position, can open up
the space to allow for different conversations. What Piper, Fanon and others do so well is
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contradictorily place themselves through non-placement or non-fixity. They understand and can
hold onto their singularity at the same time they are aware of their particularness. They approach
EmDisEmbodiment.
Piper speaks to feeling disembodied and erased away as she read Immanuel Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason (1781). In “Food for the Spirit,” she spent the summer alone in her
apartment, eating nothing, drinking only juice and water and practicing yoga. To counter the
feeling of disappearing from the world, Piper read into a tape recorder and photographed her
image in the mirror, to ensure her existence. Kaelen Wilson-Goldie in “Carnal Knowledge: Sex +
Philosophy,” writes: “Piper appears to hover ghostlike between the abstract, intellectual, and
immaterial, and the earthy, sensual, and unabashedly physical” (4). Piper states that her,
“purpose is to transform the viewer psychologically, by presenting him or her with an
unavoidable concrete reality that cuts through the defensive rationalizations by which we insulate
ourselves against the facts of our political responsibility” (Piper, Out of Order, Out of Sight:
Selected Writings in Meta-Art, 1968-1992 234). Piper commits, as Lewis Gordon states, “the
crime of appearing” while reading theory that tries to disavow her existence she presents the
particular as a form of the “universal,” thus complicating this concept of the “universal.”
A further understanding of Piper's deictic-confrontational field, her indexical present, her
Universal-Particularness, and her EmDisEmbodiment, is through the art criticism of Rosalind
Krauss. Moten brings attention to the ways Krauss averted her gaze from Piper by instead
according to Moten believing that “…there must not be any important black artists because, if
there were, they would have brought themselves to her attention” (233). Cultural circumstances
have not brought these thinkers together as Krauss chose not to seek out Piper and other black
artists. There are important connections to be drawn between Piper’s self-referential photography

109
and Krauss’ ideas related to the shifting index and the instability of the I. Krauss believes
photography is an indexical sign that “heralds a disruption in the autonomy of the sign…
inherently ‘empty’” (998) and is “the result of a physical imprint transferred by light reflections
onto a sensitive surface. The photograph is thus a type of icon, or visual likeness, which bears an
indexical relationship to its object” (Krauss 997).
Piper uses her Food for the Spirit, photographs of 1971 as an indexical sign. An index
where meaning is dependent on the context in which it is used such as here, I, you, me.

Fig. 1-28. Adrian Piper, Food for the Spirit, 1998, a private loft
performance, silver gelatin print. Mary B. Jackson Fund.
risdmuseum.org/art-design/collection/food-spirit-200097

When looking at this photograph one becomes less comfortable in their own subject position. We
are in front of a reflective image and feel dislodged from our position of stable subject. The use
of the camera is an interesting addition to the photo. While one becomes unstable by looking at
the reflective image there is an oscillation between the stability when one imagines themselves
fixed by the camera that is pointed at them. There is a shifting back and forth between the
unstable subject position of being viewed and the more stable subject position of the voyeur.
This shifting creates an uncertainty between the ‘I’/’you’ binary. This further relates to Krauss'
belief that the self is felt only as an image of oneself. However, ‘indexes’ are used to connect
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with that felt knowledge of the self. 'Indexes' are different from symbols as there is usually a
physical relationship to the initial referent i.e. – cast shadows, footprints etc. – like physical
traces and in Piper’s case, her body.
An EmDisEmbodied understanding of the body is as an index, physical, material but also
singular, nuanced and unexplainable. A body that can turn itself inside out and that can abject
itself from cultural understandings of what their particular body should be. My interests in
thinking through EmDisEmbodiment, which does not see biological deterministic approaches as
the starting point but instead sees biology as able to influence the cognitive. Perhaps, actually
that is stated wrongly, as I am more interested in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological
perspective of a non-separation between the body and cognition, our bodies as perceptive and
thinking and not as objects for an “I think”. Frantz Fanon's ability to relate bodies to sociogeny,
and Adrian Piper's work that through the abject connects to EmDisEmbodiment and beingthought allows them to separate themselves from cultural constrictions of the body whereas
Fanon states, his mind/body connection becomes a third consciousness and as Piper does with
her meta-art, meta-theory, meta-body and meta-ethics critiques.
Let’s return back to Lacan for a moment and his belief that we are born into language and
thus the difficulty of thinking the body beyond language, culture and the Symbolic. What Lacan
and others identify is that these implications of culture et al. on the body, is never a fully
comfortable situation as we are always desiring more as we live within our cultural
understandings either consciously, unconsciously or subconsciously. He uses Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological model of vision to explore a “reversibility” of vision where the body becomes
subject and object realizing it is seeing but also seen and understanding the split between the eye
and the gaze elaborated on earlier in this chapter. Lacan explores how our gaze also corresponds
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to a desire for gaining a complete self as the other gazes back. However, because the other gazes
back in such a multi-dimensional and I would add erotic way it reminds the CFRP subject that he
is unable to gaze at himself the way the object or other is able to. As Courtney Tunis states,
“Slavoj Žižek expands on this idea, explaining that the gaze of the object is in itself an object. It
serves as constant reminder to the subject that there is an angle from which he cannot see. He
cannot gaze at himself in the way the object does, nor can he gaze at the object from its own
angle, thus he is a victim of the stain, the realization that “I can never see the picture from the
point that it is gazing at me”. (https://csmt.uchicago.edu/glossary2004/scopicvocative.htm)
Charles Gaines a conceptual artist working since the 70s is now being recognized for his
importance in deconstructing representation and language and I would argue connects to this
notion of the stain by prioritizing the lack within the subject’s gaze, that never fully sees the
object nor how he is being looked at. He also prioritizes a more multi-dimensional way of
conceiving beyond a singular subjective gaze. This is an important characteristic of
EmDisEmbodied Is, whereas object-subjects they have the ability to not prioritize their gaze and
to understand the importance of the gaze of the other. In understanding that no human can fully
close the gap between what is perceived and the thing in itself they further realize their limited
view is a part of a relation where they can express their voice without submerging the voices of
others. Their view is a view, not the most important, God-like view. Gaines wants to make sure
we realize we do not have infallible views and to bring attention to the void within representation
and our views. In an interview for the Third Rail with Nate Young he states, “But then if you try
to close the gap between the object of perception and the apparatus that we use to perceive it,
that gap isn’t closable. There’s no place where that moment of mediation is resolved. The best
thing you could say is that there’s this persistent void between the two and I thought that would
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be a critique of representation in the early grid work.” (http://thirdrailquarterly.org/charlesgaines/) The limitation that Gaines highlights in the subject position and in our apparatuses of
perception is also a key concern for Kant who in a similar way turns to rationality to put checks
and balances on the human.

Fig. 1-29. Gaines, Charles. Faces, Set #4: Stephan W. Walls. 1978. Ink on paper and photograph.
Triptych: 23x 19 in. each (framed); 23x 57 in. (overall framed). Collection of Marc Lee.
hammer. ucla.edu/exhibitions/2015/charles-gaines-gridwork-1974-1989.

Fig. 1-30. Gaines, Charles. Numbers and Trees, Central Park, Series I, Tree #9. 2016. Black-and-white
photograph, acrylic on Plexiglas, 8 x 10 x 6'. www.artforum.com/interviews/charles-gaines-talks-abouthis-work-in-solidary-solitary-73083
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To help account for this lack or stain of this void between how we represent and what is
represented a lack also between the noumena and our means of perception, the Lacanian Real
and the world of the Symbolic, in his Numbers and Trees series, Gaines considers 26 different
species of trees accounting for the different letters of the alphabet. Using this system and blurring
together the 26 trees he creates a visual nuanced representation of the concept tree. In addition,
no tree is prioritized over the other to represent “tree” each species of tree that Gaines decided on
establishes a Universal-Particular of the concept tree. This and other pieces by Gaines concerned
with processes and systems, signals his aim to remove subjectivity and the creative imagination
from art by following self-determined rules and procedures. In an interview with Jonathan
Griffin, Gaines states of these various systems he creates that go beyond his creative
imagination, “[o]ne of the joys was the fact that I could experience things that I couldn't predict,
that I couldn't anticipate”. (https://jonathangriffin.org/2021/04/01/charles-gaines/)
When questioned about the politics of this in the same interview Gaines further states that
even his works with plants and trees had a political dimension as if you expand and question the
limitations of our apparatuses of cognition and conception this also connects to our limited
conceptions of race and otherwise. In an essay fellow artist Gina Osterloh writes in relation to
Gaines’ Shadows series, “Shadows became a roadmap by which to free myself from the
language of representation, systems and social codes that attempt to describe and summarize my
personhood without my participation.” Osterloh speaks of the limitations of racial categories to
fix and fit her Filipina-German heritage. She looks at how representation and language can relate
to certain ideologies, including the ideologies of the everyday and the banal that determines,
“how we conceive of our bodies, the social codes and concepts that we adhere to unconsciously,
and the means by which ideas are disseminated and dispersed through visual recognition and
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through everyday acts, such as speaking”. What Oberloh identifies in Gaines’ work is how he
wants to bring attention to how we “perceive difference and create meaning in relation to our
own rotational turn, dependent upon our particular set of coordinates in time and space.”

Fig. 1-31. Gaines, Charles. Shadows IX, Set 1, 2, 3 and 4. 1980.
www.hauserwirth.com/ursula/25824-shadow-gap-rare-look-charles-gaines-shadows-series
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Fig. 1-32. Piper, Adrian. Hypothesis: Situation #14 – 1969
robinlevertonart.com/2015/01/26/theory-lecture-5-feminism/

This is similar to Piper’s Hypothesis series where she maps her movement through space
and time with various photographs she takes at discrete instances. Both question that tie between
the signifier and the signified and shows how it relates to the instability of the subject in time and
space. Osterloh identifies how in Gaines’ shadow piece he breaks apart the shadow from the
plant where, “[b]oth plant and shadow then have the potential to generate individual meaning,
independent of each other.” Osterloh understands the strength in the politics of Gaines work in
allowing us not only to see different things but to also see the invisible we may filter out and thus
to find modes and ways to see and conceptualize differently. As Osterloh nicely summarizes in
the questions she poses of her own practice and the avenues she sees in Gaines’ work, “How can
an artist separate her body from limiting cultural signifiers at this particular moment in time and
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space? In other words, through art, how can I unhinge my person from the dominant ideological
language of representation, as well as from many of the social structures into which I was born?
How can I disrupt the seemingly natural process by which pictorial and linguistic representation
work?” Osterloh to some extent answers these pertinent questions, when she concludes, “With
Shadows 1978–1980, Gaines reminds us that we have agency, and with it the power to
determine, and to refuse, and to shift, how meaning is made.”
(https://www.hauserwirth.com/ursula/25824-shadow-gap-rare-look-charles-gaines-shadowsseries)

Fig. 1-33. Osterloh, Gina. Anonymous Front. 2010. Archival pigment print 36 x 45"
www.ginaosterloh.com/work/anonymous-front
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Fig. 1-34. Osterloh, Gina Holding Zero, #1. 2020. Archival pigment print, 43 x 56.5 inches.
www.ginaosterloh.com/work/holding-zero

In “Peeling Back the Layers”, Gaines considers the role of identity in his work. “Now I
think that anybody who makes art is participating in a reflection of their lived experience.
Anybody. But it’s a question that white artists aren't asked.” (https://africanspan.com/charlesgaines-peeling-back-the-layers/?amp=1). In the series, “Numbers and Faces: Multi-Racial/Ethnic
Combinations Series 1”, using photographs of people overlayed on plexi he investigates beauty,
semiotics and genetic and ethnic systems of classification. Jonathan Griffin states of Gaines:
The assumption, Gaines came to realize, was that white western art tapped into a
universality that was unavailable to other cultures. Modernism, as he sees it, was simply
the most recent manifestation of a whole history of white cultural production that
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stretched back to the Enlightenment, which, thanks to philosophers such as Hegel and
Kant, saw itself as demonstrably superior to the so-called “primitive” art and culture of
non-white peoples. The Enlightenment, Gaines believes, “is totally responsible for the
invention of racism”. (https://jonathangriffin.org/2021/04/01/charles-gaines/)

Fig. 1-35. Gaines, Charles. Detail of Numbers and Faces: Multi-Racial/Ethnic Mixtures Collection 1:
Face #11, Martina Crouch (Nigerian Igbo Tribe/White). 2020. In “Charles Gaines: Peeling back the
layers” at africanspan.com/charles-gaines-peeling-back-the-layers/?amp=1
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However, although Gaines has a very different take on identity and how that relates to
art, abstracting it and having a less direct political approach, unlike the formalist critics
discussed, for Gaines it is not his way or the highway. He also appreciates different less
abstracted approaches to identity. When asked about how he felt about the work of contemporary
artists working within identity politics, Gaines replied that the diverse conversations were “very
healthy, and infinitely more interesting than the kinds of debates that were going on in the ’70s,
which were very narrowly prescribed. I feel quite happy about that.”
(https://africanspan.com/charles-gaines-peeling-back-the-layers/?amp=1)
Fred Moten’s deep interest in Gaines is connected to wanting to see black bodies beyond
the very narrow lens of racism and certain social constructions. For Moten, Gaines’ work is a
beautiful visual representation of his notion of blur. Moten is interested in entanglements and
relations where there is a blurring of borders. He further wants to trouble notions of selfdetermination and sovereignty within political and aesthetic realms. Moten disturbs ways of
reading, hearing, and seeing, blurring the senses to create new epistemologies. He has been key
in bringing Gaines and Piper’s work into philosophical discussions using their art as
representatives to establish the importance of the realm, agency and nuances of the object
through the notion of blur. A blurring that he sees in Piper’s:
… double-identification, with both Aunt Hester and the Master, the substitutive mother
and never fully constituted father, links Piper to [Frederick] Douglass. This is to say that
Piper’s performance work moves at the intersection of a feminist, anti-slavery aesthetic
and the emergence and convergence of conceptual and minimalist art. This black
feminist, antislavery minimalism makes possible the reappearance of the art object after
the fact of the disappearance of the object that conceptual art had instantiated… These
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things indicate a lived critique of the assumed equivalence of personhood and subjectivity
and, by extension, a force of resistance or objection that is always already in excess of the
limits of subjection/subjectivity. In the end, Piper’s conceptualism allows her rich
historical animation of the minimalist object. (241-242)
Blur speaks to the “≠ + > ~” represented in each of my chapters. I use these symbols to
confuse the distinction I make with dualistic poles such as Lorde vs. Plato, and the CFRP subject
vs. the EmDisEmbodied I. I use the symbols to blur and to consider the terms and the
philosophers within their instability. Even though I try to set a clear distinction away from Plato
in my argument for my erotic EmDisEmbodied I, I have to realize that these distinctions perhaps
at times mirror and may not ever fully break away from the thing it critiques as I have not fully
broken away from the binary. This is a process and happens continuously as this refusal is not
concerned with a fixed anti-definition of what the other side of the pole or blackness is, a holding
of clear ideas related to how to act or possess blackness on the other side of whiteness. Moten
speaks to the fugitivity of blackness where definitions and limitations from the outside have to be
constantly refused.
Blackness for Moten becomes about owning depossession and about understanding the
non-sovereign and unstable non-position of blackness. As Margo Natalie Crawford states in a
review of Moten’s, Black and Blur (consent not to be a single being) the blur can be, “the
knowing of the unknowing” and continues,
Dispossession is the escape from the logic of possession tied to consenting to be a single
being. Black and Blur calls for “acknowledging what it is to own dispossession, which
cannot be owned but by which one can be possessed” (85). The aesthetic of being
possessed by dispossession, like the practice of apposition, is the choreography of this
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exquisite assemblage of essays that show that the black radical tradition is a tradition of
cutting, anticipating, and “suspending the process of subjection. (3)
(https://static.primary.prod.gcms.theinfra.com/static/site/alh/document/Alh_Online_Review_Series_19/19Margo_Natalie_Cra
wford-2.pdf?node=4d29a6822b61e1455352&version=9808:270d8c8341ced19a70a8)

Fig. 1-36. Gaines, Charles. Detail of Numbers and Faces: Multi-Racial/Ethnic Combinations Series 1:
Face #11, Martina Crouch (Nigerian Igbo Tribe/White). 2020. Acrylic paint, acrylic sheet & photograph.

But how do I consent not to be a single being while in the process of decolonizing the I?
How do I mess with my colonized consciousness or that of others while trying to filter out how it
messes with me? How do I resist the way it blurs into me? How do I consider the rhythm and the
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back and forth between the two? Do I perhaps move to another way of thinking about rhythm? A
rhythm beyond the back and forth, a rhythm connected to the pre-linguistic the pre-symbolic.
In “Manifesto 2” Charles Gaines systematically assigns a note to each letter to translate
into music an excerpt from a speech from Malcolm X from the last key public appearance before
a death that many believed Malcolm X had always known was coming. I will quote the excerpt
in its entirety of his speech that had a key aim of bringing oppressed communities together
including Africans and African-Americans by recognizing the impact of colonialism, he states:

Fig. 1-37. Gaines, Charles. Manifestos 2 (Malcolm X Speech at Ford Auditorium). 2013. Detail.
thirdrailquarterly.org/charles-gaines/

And by the colonial powers of Europe having complete control over Africa, they
projected the image of Africa negatively. They projected Africa always in a negative
light: jungles, savages, cannibals, nothing civilized. Why then naturally it was so negative
[that] it was negative to you and me, and you and I began to hate it. We didn’t want
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anybody telling us anything about Africa, much less calling us Africans. In hating Africa
and in hating the Africans, we ended up hating ourselves, without even realizing it.
Because you can’t hate the roots of a tree and not hate the tree. You can’t hate your origin
and not end up hating yourself. You can’t hate Africa and not hate yourself.
You show me one of these people over here who have been thoroughly
brainwashed, who has a negative attitude toward Africa, and I’ll show you one that has a
negative attitude toward himself. You can’t have a positive attitude toward yourself and a
negative attitude toward Africa at the same time. To the same degree that your
understanding of and attitude toward Africa becomes positive, you’ll find that your
understanding of and your attitude toward yourself will also become positive. And this is
what the white man knows. So they very skillfully made you and me hate our African
identity, our African characteristics.
You know yourself–and we have been a people who hated our African
characteristics. We hated our hair, we hated the shape of our nose–we wanted one of
those long, dog-like noses, you know. Yeah. We hated the color of our skin, hated the
blood of Africa that was in our veins. And in hating our features and our skin and our
blood, why, we had to end up hating ourselves.
And we hated ourselves. Our color became to us a chain. We felt that it was
holding us back. Our color became to us like a prison, which we felt was keeping us
confined, not letting us go this way or that way. We felt that all of these restrictions were
based solely upon our color. And the psychological reaction to that would have to be that
as long as we felt imprisoned or chained or trapped by Black skin, Black features, and
Black blood, that skin and those features and that blood that was holding us back
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automatically had to become hateful to us. And it became hateful to us. It made us feel
inferior; it made us feel inadequate; it made us feel helpless.
And when we fell victims to this feeling of inadequacy or inferiority or
helplessness, we turned to somebody else to show us the way. We didn’t have confidence
in another Black man to show us the way, or Black people to show us the way. In those
days we didn’t. We didn’t think a Black man could do anything but play some horn–you
know, some sounds and make you happy with some songs and in that way. But in serious
things, where our food, clothing, and shelter was concerned and our education was
concerned, we turned to the man. (https://www.blackpast.org/african-americanhistory/speeches-african-american-history/1965-malcolm-x-speech-ford-auditorium/)
During Malcolm X’s cultural moment, he felt the key was about survival. And that
survival was beyond playing the horn. His call for violent self-defense was a call for this survival
which meant a clear definition away from the ways colonialism had made some disparage the
African within us. Are we in a new moment where we can also now realize the strength within
the rhythms created by that horn?
Some of the Formalist men I have discussed here have decided to forget, filter out rhythm
and objectify their bodies in their aim to silence their cultural egos, desires, and an erotic that has
frozen and controlled others. Certain implementations of whiteness have gotten into the spiritual,
psychological, philosophical ways of these men and others in the past and an argument could be
made that implicit within their critique of the body is a critique of their bodies and the material
circumstances that those bodies have created on others. However, when they critique libido and
ego, it is important to realize from where and why they form their critique and whose egos and
libidos are being critiqued. Trying to wholly manifest a pure way of thinking or a pure art is
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problematic as it leaves out so many others. However, if these men were to consider the aspects
of their thoughts and work that connect to the rhythmic, erotic, abject, that place beyond their
meanings and those other more fluid untaught forms of desire they could perhaps add more to
their stories.
Roger Fry sees us as having a pleasure in order and logical inevitability even in the most
complex relations. However, Fry similarly to Bell, without a meta-analysis of motivations posits,
“I must be dogmatic and declare that the esthetic emotion is an emotion about form” (6). For Fry
the form of the work has a meaning of its own that can give rise to an emotion that does not
depend on associating it with other things through cognition to that form. Unlike Clive Bell, he
believes that most untrained people are better able to connect to emotions that come from the
associations to the artwork rather than the purely esthetic ones connected to form. In speaking of
the tune from “God Save the King” he states, that people, “have never, properly speaking, heard
the form because they have always passed at once into that richly varied world of racial and
social emotion which has gathered round it” (8). Fry attempts to look beyond the vast
proliferation of pictures, writings, music, etc. impure art where formal design is becoming
secondary to “the excitation of the emotions associated to objects” (8). He points our attention to
those who do not sacrifice their appreciation of formal relations to emotions associated with
objects in the outside world, rather they concentrate on connecting the relationship of the parts
within the work of art. He believes that these purer esthetic emotions resulting from an
appreciation of formal elements have much more of a longevity than those related to emotions
from objects that excite. This appreciation is mathematical, predictable, repetitive, it is a pleasure
which, “consists in the recognition of inevitable sequences; a pleasure which you see
corresponds to the pleasure which we found in marking the inevitable sequence of the notes in a
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tune; in fact, again a pleasure derived from the contemplation of the relations and
correspondences of form” (13).
However, what if Fry rather than denigrating and maligning objects, instead embraced the
emotions that excited him about objects. Emotions however that are not corrupted by cultural
constructions and constrictions. What if Fry did not avert his gaze from the abject/object/other?
Perhaps then he would not completely overlook the actual content behind a tune such as “God
Save the King”. By only concerning oneself with the blind humming of repetitive notes, pleased
alone by that repetition, one remains unaware of who the King is that needs saving or the God
that should save them and how that simple phrase could reinforce God-Kings and the men who
become them. People then no longer question the form or who and whose interests gets
associated to that form. Ideas such as this bring us back to Kantian notions of the beautiful and
the danger when the beautiful or form ought to just be without question. Especially when that
form is associated to a certain neutrality that very much has latent content.
Adrian Piper who as an African-American female artist, an American artist and a global
artist, reclaims humming from the vestiges of such tunes as “God Save the King” to speak to the
ways certain EmDisEmbodied Is think, feel, and experience humming differently. Piper has us
hum in her piece The Humming Room, to connect in an active and deeper sense to ourselves and
the other. Piper wants us to highlight our inner hums asking within her piece for us to decide
what it is that we want to hum to while simultaneously being able to transcend in some ways the
ego that decides what to hum when they hum.
In the catalog for A Synthesis of Intuitions, Christophe Cherix states, “The Humming
Room ... opens the possibility for viewers to escape the constraints of institutional realities as
well as the constraints of the self. Hummers are often unconscious of the fact that they are
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humming. If humming can fill a void of silence or block the sounds of the outside world, it may
also and perhaps more significantly, allow the individual to transcend the ego...” (26). Cherix
continues to highlight how humming connects us to another task more fully. Expanding on this, I
would conjecture that humming also allows us to connect to a spiritual rhythm for relating to the
heterotopia22 of the other when as Piper states, we “anchor the individual ego in deeper levels of
the self that transcends it” (27). As Cherix continues, “a humming person remains aware of and
connected to the environment but also mysterious to it” (27).
Moten shows us how Piper goes beyond the racial pathology of her environment by
filtering it out. He wonders if the aversion to Piper is a way to refuse to hear the sound and
emphasize the aural in her work by prioritizing vision in artwork and limiting that field of vision
to not consider objecthood and artwork to relate to blackness and black performance. Moten in
considering Zora Neale Hurston's suggestion that the essence of the Negro is drama and
theatricality wonders if Piper by performatively confronting the various ways people avert their
gaze, leads her to use a mode of theatricality and objecthood that was not in Fried's field of
possibilities and thus something he could never anticipate. At the end of Adrian Piper’s
retrospective: A Synthesis of Intuitions, 1965–2016 at the MoMA in 2018, after you walk
humming through the space, you are greeted with Piper, dancing, free. There is a certain freedom
to knowing that you may not have the final answer but are on a path of life where you can
discover deeper rhythms through abjection and the erotic (my addition Piper would disagree with
the more regular use of the word; however she very much wants to move the viewer to consider
community through Lorde’s notion of eroticism).
Piper in the past has asked us to connect to the rhythm of funk by going around to
College campuses to teach us to find those rhythms within ourselves. Rhythms beyond and that
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collapse the Symbolic and as Kristeva would argue that bring us back to the semiotic, the space
before meaning, the space within the womb. Where we associate mainly with rhythms.

Fig. 1-38. Piper, Adrian. Adrian Moves to Berlin.
Performance, 2007; Video Wall Projection
01:02:33, 2017. www.adrianpiper.com/
vs/video_am.shtml

Fig. 1-39. Piper, Adrian. Funk Lessons. 1983.
Video, 00:15:17. www.adrianpiper.com/
vs/video_fl.shtml. Adrian Piper teaches us how to
listen and dance to funk.

Rhythms that allow us to keep the expanse before us fluid. If we connect back to that rhythm we
are not fixing the endpoint of being, or what formalism, art, culture, the other or otherwise
should be. As Kristeva states of rhythm and song they “arouse the impure, the other of mind, the
passionate-corporeal-sexual-virile, but they harmonize it, arrange it differently than the wise
man's knowledge does” (17). She recalls how Plato, only allowed uses of rhythm and meter to
the mother rocking her child to soothe him from “frenzied outbursts” within the well-ordered
state. As the first quote in the Chapter shows, Plato did not want the poets nor the artists to
corrupt the well-functioning state. Plato did not want them to bring forth the excited rhythmic,
the erotic, and the abject. Kristeva sees poetry and literature and I would add art as flowing
through the cracks within the Symbolic, or as Kristeva states “…the gap, inherited from Plato,
between body and soul” (17-18). Plato wanted to make the abject an object and use a calming
rhythm to control these fissures.
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In my EmDisEmbodied approach I do not agree with the formalist critics seeing their
approach as the only position for art. This connects too much for me to Plato’s repressive wellordered State. I am interested in further exploring key tenets within both the modernist and more
postmodernist approaches and even delving into the embodied formalism of the Stieglitz Circle
that if I had more time I would do here.23 These tenets relate to the ways the self is not only
determined by the text (histories, experiences, etc.) but underlying patterns may suggest other
mysterious ahistorical structures also at play. However, I would suggest that these ahistorical
structures rather than trying to be grasped, pinpointed, and gridded, should be an ever-reminding
signal of how limited our concepts can be. Also, rather than dichotomizing the avenues of
thought I want to also look at how ‘both’ views contribute to a very rich conversation for
Western art and philosophy.

Fig. 1-40. Weems, Carrie Mae. The Edge of Time – Ancient Rome, 2006, digital c-type print, 1.9 × 1.6 m

There was a key reason the modern formalist wanted to break down humanism and the ego and
as Rosalind Krauss considers, the myths they use for their move away from humanism. Although
I am not as convinced about these ways and see their spiritual connection to purity as too
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connected to biases from; the Symbolic, language, the white male upright heterosexual ego; the
humanist bourgeoise project associated with it; Christian and other notions of purity, and the
complacency that allowed for colonialism, fascism, and Nazi death camps I do however,
appreciate the need to move away from egos related to white epistemologies that promote
hegemonies.
In “Contingent and Universal: Adrian Piper and the Minimalist Ideal”, John Bowles
states, “[a]bstraction is freedom from the socially prescribed and consensually accepted; freedom
to violate in imagination the constraints of public practice, to play with conventions, or to
indulge them. Abstraction is a solitary journey through the conceptual universe, with no anchors,
no signposts, no map, no foundations to cling to.” However, freedom is also being able to
connect to the other on a deeper level beyond the self. Many including Lorde and other
passionate subjects, artists, and musicians have called for the erotic, the particular, and for their
perceptive experiences and bodies to be recognized as vital components of divine truth and thus
also of the State. In not viewing their particular experiences as inferior, these artists, creatives,
and thinkers connect deeply to the erotic, fluid, and Universal-Particular I and thus also to their
EmDisEmbodied Is? They understand their Universal-Particular view of the world and use that to
follow the rhythm of their hearts while exploring and delving into their abject and erotic natures.

≠+>~

Fig. 1-41. Prince’ symbol when he no longer wanted to be referred to as Prince and the male/female
symbols used in many countries. music.laptopsticker.org/oracal-prince-symbol-vinyl-decal-sticker-logomusic.html & en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Gender_symbols_side_by_side_solid.svg
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CHAPTER TWO :
I=I
In an email exchange with a fellow colleague on my College campus he concluded his
disagreement with a comparison I made with, “the only logical comparison…”. Why did he think
there would be only one way of logically comparing? If his was the only logical comparison then
what was mine? Was it illogical, uncouth, or too radical for him? Why did he feel the need to use
words such as “only” and “logical”? And how can those words be used to silence ways of
thinking and desiring?
In, Not Manet’s Type, Carrie Mae Weems represents herself and her desire rather than
leaving it up to either the formalist, impressionist, cubist, dadaist, or modernist that have ignored
black women. Weems confronts the non-erotic ways
thought has been constructed in the past, where aspects of
the other are blatantly left out so they become objects to
gaze at and not to see in their own right. Weems does not
allow the potential viewer’s gaze to complete its
objectification of the other, as she turns away from the
camera. The piece references the fact that she was neither
Manet’s, Picasso’s, or Duchamp’s type. The use of a
mirror is interesting as it reminds us of our gaze. It moves
us towards EmDisEmbodiment as we engage with the
figure before us as a full human being with all the
nuances and fluidity of their existence.

Fig. 2-1. Weems, Carrie Mae. Not
Manet’s Type. 1977. Courtesy of the
artist and Jack Shainman Gallery, New
York. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/notmanet.html.
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Fig. 2-2. Weems, Carrie Mae. Not Manet’s Type. 1977. Courtesy of the artist and Jack Shainman Gallery,
New York. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/not-manet.html.
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Fig. 2-3. Weems, Carrie Mae. Untitled (Woman standing alone). © Carrie Mae Weems. Courtesy of the
artist and Jack Shainman Gallery, New York

In “Untitled (Woman standing alone)” Weems turns our gaze back onto us, now the viewer’s
look is confronted by a strong confident black woman’s gaze. A gaze that has rarely been
represented in Western Art History. Weems further shows the nuances of desire and the erotic in
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her Kitchen Table Series, presenting a more complex picture of male/female desire than done by
many others.

Fig. 2-4. Weems, Carrie Mae. The Kitchen Table
Series. 1990.

Fig. 2-5. Marie Bracquemond (1841–1916),
Under the Lamp (1887), oil on canvas, 68.6 x 113
cm, Private collection. Wikimedia Commons.

Former paintings have put the viewer in the position of the male gaze fixed onto nudes.
One of the few female Impressionist painters Marie Bracquemond has a similar dining setting to
Weem’s. However, the white man and woman are completely disconnected. The bowl and lamp
situated between them, block the possibility of any deep connection between the two and the
female looks off to the left of the canvas as the male’s piercing eyes confronts her. This
disconnection speaks to their times. A time where women were culturally set up as objects to be
owned by white men.
Carrie Mae Weems uses her imagery to imagine desire in ways outside of the grid of
normative Western culture, ways that had not been imagined through Western art history before.
Mae Weems grasps on to radical forms of desire, beyond this grid of normativity where certain
males as purveyors of knowledge whether it be intellectual, scientific, visual, and otherwise map
desire onto their worldview. In her series, Not Manet’s Type, the barely legible captions read,
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Fig. 2-6. Weems, Carrie Mae. Not Manet’s Type. 1977. Courtesy of the artist and Jack Shainman Gallery,
New York. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/not-manet.html.

Standing on shaky ground I posed myself for critical study but was no longer certain of the
questions to ask, (forgive the weird line breaks as I place the text in sequence with the imagery)

Fig. 2-7. Weems, Carrie Mae. Not Manet’s Type. 1977. Courtesy of the artist and Jack Shainman Gallery,
New York. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/not-manet.html.
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it was clear I was not Manet's type Picasso - who had a way with women - only used me &
Duchamp never even considered me

Fig. 2-8. Weems, Carrie Mae. Not Manet’s Type. 1977. Courtesy of the artist and Jack Shainman Gallery,
New York. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/not-manet.html.

but it could have been worse imagine my fate had de Kooning gotten hold of me …

Fig. 2-9. Weems, Carrie Mae. Not Manet’s Type.
1977. Courtesy of the artist and Jack Shainman
Gallery, New York.
carriemaeweems.net/galleries/not-manet.html.

Fig. 2-10. de Kooning, Willem, Woman II, 1952.
Oil on canvas. Museum of Modern Art, New
York.
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Fig. 2-11. de Kooning, Willem. Woman I. 1950-52. Oil on canvas. Museum of Modern Art, New York.

Weem’s referencing of Willem de Kooning is key as he has been critiqued by many of
misogyny and for his objectification of the female body with his series of Woman paintings
where he represents woman in figurative towards abstract ways. While criticism can be essential
to shift and change ways of thinking, I would like to take a more non-critical approach to explore
for a moment another reading that reveals some aspects to the word EmDisEmbodiment where
De Kooning’s EmDisEmbodiment comes through connecting to the abject, to formlessness. Julia
Kristeva in her comparison of the object with the abject reveals a key difference between the
two. While the object fortifies the self the abject challenges and destabilizes it. As Kristeva
states:
The abject is not an object facing me, which I name or imagine... The abject has
only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I. If the object, however,
through its opposition, settles me within the fragile texture of a desire for
meaning, which, as a matter of fact, makes me ceaselessly and infinitely
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homologous to it, what is abject, onthe contrary, the jettisoned object, is radically
excluded and draws me toward the placewhere meaning collapses. (1-2)
I would posit that de Kooning, through these pieces, is on the edge of presenting not
objectified woman but a much more nuanced complicated and abjected woman. A woman that
breaks down his edge of meaning a woman that challenges and puts a check on his I. It is not
hard to see why this de Kooning Woman series develops the years after World War II. Many
artists suffering from the horrors of the war were questioning everything that brought them to
that moment and thus became attracted to the grotesque as a way to connect to different
modalities questioning language, culture, logic, the arts, and the very foundations that helped
ground who they were. One can see a stark difference in de Kooning’s paintings of women
before and after the war.

Fig. 2-12. de Kooning, Willem. Seated Woman.
Circa 1940. Oil and charcoal on Masonite. The
Albert M. Greenfield and Elizabeth M. Greenfield
Collection, 1974, Philadelphia Museum of Art;
and see Fig. 2-11.

Fig. 2-13. de Kooning, Willem. Seated Woman.
Circa 1940. Oil and charcoal on Masonite. The
Albert M. Greenfield and Elizabeth M. Greenfield
Collection, 1974, Philadelphia Museum of Art.
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Fig. 2-14. de Kooning, Willem. Woman V. 1952-53. Oil and charcoal on canvas. National Gallery of
Australia.

Donald Kuspit writes:
The early woman images convey love -- the women are treated kindly, respectfully.
The later images are full of murderous hatred, as their battered, perversely distorted
bodies -- sadistically slashed and hacked and finally torn to pieces, their skin shredded so
that it can no longer contain its flesh, which spills and spins out of control, leaving their
bodies barely recognizable. De Kooning’s woman is certainly a far cry from the classical
beautiful Venus, not only because she’s ugly and repulsive, but because she’shateful and
malicious.
“Malicious”, “ugly”, “repulsive”, “slashed”, “battered”, what exactly is Kuspit doing
here? How much is Kuspit’s reading of the work about him, about de Kooning, about the cultural
moment? How much will his reading prescribe more onto the moment, describe the moment, or
depart from that moment? Leaving these words aside, what seems to be key, my own
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prescription, is that anxiety and instability are evident through de Kooning’s pieces after the war.
An anxiety that is not connected to fear of the particular, the determinate but as Martin
Heidegger would identify, an anxiety that is anxious about the indeterminate.
Considering that de Kooning’s city of birth was nothing more than rubble after the war,
could well support my reading. It is not surprising that he does them during his bouts with
anxiety and alcoholism. He takes solace in these paintings as Donald Kuspit states, “de Kooning
destabilizes woman’s body, projecting his own instability into it, suggesting that his sadistic use
and abuse of their bodies shows his identification with them…”
(http://www.artnet.com/magazineus/features/kuspit/willem-de-kooning-at-moma-10-6-11.asp)
This use and abuse of the body for Kuspit, arises because of man's fear of and desire for woman.
Kuspit points to a quote from Wolfgang Lederer’s “The Fear of Woman”, “Well, yes, we must
face it: the little woman — or, more specifically, her body — has, throughout history though to
varying degrees, been considered dirty, diseased, putrid — the more so, perhaps, as she is
actually desirable.”

Fig. 2-15. de Kooning, Willem. Woman with Bicycle. 1952-53. Oil, enamel and charcoal on linen.
Whitney Museum of American Art, New York.
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But what woman is being represented by de Kooning above? Weems does not see herself
in that woman, I don’t see myself in that woman. Perhaps that woman is more of a self-portrait of
de Kooning; perhaps it is a portrait of de Kooning’s other that is intimately related to the trace of
the self; perhaps of his wife Elaine; perhaps a manifestation of his anxieties surrounding
“woman”; one can only conjecture. This “fear of woman” as Lederer states, goes beyond the fear
of the body of the white woman, we can also add a fear of Black women who invarying ways
stand outside of the myth of woman24, Black men, non-binary people, red, gay, trans, disabled
and other bodies. And it is not only bodies that are feared but particular forms of consciousnesses
related to these bodies as they impede upon and make unstable certain forms of white
consciousnesses that are not open to other ways of thinking and being. Due to this, other forms
of consciousnesses are culturally repressed.
In Lewis Gordon’s, Fear of Black Consciousness, he sees forms of black consciousness
as immobile and capitalizes the B to suggest a Black consciousness that is active that is “not only
a Black person’s point of view but also a political consciousness that addresses the choking
contradictions of anti-black societies.” (draft) Gordon continues that this apprehension towards
Black consciousness is connected to a fear of seeing one’s negative reflection. He also identifies
this fear of Black consciousness within the Black person themselves, and their obliviousness to
their own anti-blackness. Gordon continues, “This is why, despite being an avowed Black
nationalist, Clarence Thomas, the only black member of the U.S. Supreme Court, could be a
neoconservative. He imagines himself in a world of truth among the white antiblack racists and
being an exception among the blacks they hate.” (draft)
Exceptionalism is a term that I and others in the Black, communities of color, and othered
communities work through. That is, communities that have not fit into the preferred norm. In
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“Sidney Poitier, Mike Brown, and the Myth of Black Exceptionalism”, Enumale Agada brings
our attention to the narratives around Mike Brown’s death and how those narratives needed to
analyze who or what Mike Brown as a Black man had done as a precondition for valuing his life.
She looks at the news reports to show how the nuances of Mike Brown’s life were not presented
instead:
“He was going off to college in a matter of days,” one side declared. “No, he was a weedsmoking thug that stole from a local convenience store,” the other side claimed. Beneath
both of these arguments, I heard the familiar echo of the black exceptionalism myth. Both
arguments undermined Mike Brown’s inherent value as a human being by creating a
hierarchy of blackness in which the lives of educated, promising, exceptional blacks were
to be valued more highly than the lives of stereotypical blacks, a.k.a. thugs. But Mike
Brown existed outside of stereotypes and blanket assumptions about black people and
about black men in particular. He was a human being. He held all of the complexity and
contradictions that all human beings possess. His humanity can neither be summed up in
five-minute news segments nor put in historically created and socially perpetuated bins
for “good” blacks and “bad” blacks. His humanity is what makes his violent death at the
hands of a police officer sworn to protect and serve atrocious and despicable. Yes Mike
Brown’s death speaks to America’s violent racial past and carries weighty social and
political implications. But that should not obscure the inherent value that he had as a
human being—value that was not increased by the fact that he was going to college nor
decreased by allegations that he smoked pot or stole cigars.
(http://celluloidinBlackandwhite.blogspot.com/2015/01/sidney-poitier-mike-brown-andmyth-of.html)
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In “Black Aesthetics, Black Value”, Lewis Gordon further identifies the marked nature of
Black bodies in the United States as illicit appearance without value, recognizing
#BlackLivesMatter’s, “semiological battle with governing norms of signification” (21). Gordon
strikes a comparison between this and Black aesthetics’ “collision course” with Euromodern
thought with both having aims to show the value in Black life. Gordon admonishes an
ideological system that sees only individuals (certain kinds of individuals), and does not see the
need for the rights of Black people as a group, thus ignoring North America’s racist history.
Gordon argues for combatting these criminal ideologies that re-enforce racism that justifies the
categorization of Black people as neither selves or others but as outside the realm of ethics. He
further calls for a Black aesthetics that is decolonial and that deeply considers freedom and
metacritical reflections on reason. These metacritical reflections would eschew exoticism where
whiteness is still set up as the “purveyor of all things legitimate” (26) and thus not do three key
things that others have, presume a claim to sole legitimacy; construct a formalism that affirms
Eurocentricity; and/or disavow Black art as “mere ritual or entertainment” (25). This view of
Black aesthetics constructs black people with agency where “the black (seen from the outside)
becomes the Black (a valued perspective in the world)” (Gordon 26). The black person then is no
longer an object to be studied but as I would argue, is an EmDisEmbodied I. Where this
EmDisEmbodied Iness already pre-exists in the subject, a preexistence that comes with their
humanity.
Artists such as Piper, Gaines, and Weems are working towards establishing selves by
presenting themselves both as separated from limited cultural constructions while also realizing
their implications within these constructions. Implications however that can shift and change in
time. With their focus on the black body in some of their works, they deconstruct mainstream
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falsified notions of blackness and question whiteness as the norm. They bring forth new forms of
perception within their works that become important parts of the Symbolic. They also refer back
to formalist and modernist approaches that erased the black body to bring attention to those
limitations. By referencing Manet and others, Weems furthermore looks closely at desire,
eroticism and by foregrounding both, presents to us her own self valuation of a self that has not
been historically and culturally valued. Weems similarly to the other artists discussed changes
the narrative related to cultural value and reveals the limitations of the white man’s gaze.
Luce Irigaray, also explores the limitations of the (white – my addition) man’s gaze. She
looks at the ways that while he studies others he also separates from himself through his “exstasis within the transcendental (subject)” and as
she further posits by, “[r]ising to a perspective that
would dominate the totality, to the vantage point
of greatest power, he then cuts himself off from
the bedrock, from his empirical relationship
with the matrix that he claims to survey. To
specularize and to speculate” (Speculum of the
Other Woman, 133- 134). Her understanding of
how man detaches from his experience to then
speculate about others is not dissimilar to what
Gordon mentions above in how whiteness is the
“purveyor of all that is legitimate” (26). Irigaray
believes that even when man feels fragmented,

Fig. 2-16. de Kooning, Willem. The Visit.
1966-67. Oil and charcoal on canvas. National
Gallery of Australia.
www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/kooning-thevisit-t01108
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multiple and plural, man as subject will still, “postulate itself as the cause of all the mirages that
can be enumerated endlessly and therefore put back together again as one” (135). Irigaray further
recognizes that even when the man feels shattered, perhaps because he feels shattered, he will
still claim, “that he is the reason for it all” (135).
Although Irigaray does universalize man in her discussion, she does recognize how some
men separate from the world, where they seek outside of themselves for identity through God,
the sun, nature or woman. Referring back to the Copernican revolution she indicates that man
becomes the sun as it is around his being that things revolve, while woman is positioned as the
earth. Concerning the white man’s privileging of his sphere of freedom25, Irigaray, through a
white feminist lens, expands upon the need for the masculine to determine the feminine in his
sphere when she says, “He is masculine and feminine and the relationships between them… In
whose sight everything outside remains forever a condition making possible the image and the
reproduction of the self” (136) and as she continues, “man only asks (himself) questions that he
can already answer” (137). She further argues that man seeks outside of himself to “preserve his
stake in the value of his representation” whereby he, “plants his foot” on matter to “spring
farther, leap higher…” (134) and thus he leaps and springs off of a matter that includes the
othered bodies he objectifies.
But Irigaray does not only criticize man, she also criticizes woman who, “By
resubmitting herself to the established order, in this role of delirious double, she abandons, even
denies, the prerogative historically granted her: unconsciousness. She prostitutes the
unconscious itself to the ever-present projects and projections of masculine consciousness”
(141). According to Irigaray, woman feeds into this image created for her by man by being
unaware of herself. As Irigaray puts it woman is caught up with “her circumvolutions upon
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herself” which also, “carry off the things confided to her for re-presentation” (134). Woman,
Irigaray believes sets herself up as an object due to her inability to “say what she represents”
(134). She further believes, “the silent allegiance of the one [woman] guarantees the autosufficiency, the auto-nomy of the other[man]…” (135). Irigaray calls for the “object”/woman to
speak, to see, to represent herself. Although Irigaray does not pinpoint exactly what those
representations will be, she does realizes how impermanent these representations have been
through specularization – specularizing and the objectification of woman.
Weems however, speaks for and represents herself in, Not Manet’s Type that continues, “I knew,
not from memory, but from hope, that there were other models by which to live

Fig. 2-17. Weems, Carrie Mae. Not Manet’s Type. 1977. Courtesy of the artist and Jack Shainman
Gallery, New York. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/not-manet.html.
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Fig. 2-18. Weems, Carrie Mae. Not Manet’s Type. 1977. Courtesy of the artist and Jack Shainman
Gallery, New York. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/not-manet.html.

I took a tip from Frida who from her bed painted incessantly – beautifully while Diego scaled the
scaffolds to the top of the world.” Weems also briefly refers to man’s escape from himself.
While Irigaray’s man, “becomes the sun”, “springs farther”, “leaps higher” and represses himself
“high up in heaven” (134-135) Weem’s man scales the scaffolds and tops the world. She takes a
tip from Frida to find another model to live by that opposes any view of herself as just model.
She recognizes herself as not a part of the white man’s art historical visual imagination as she
realizes just how subjective that visual imagination has been. The title of the series Not Manet’s
Type, says it all as she brings Manet and all the various artistic geniuses of the past down to
earth, foregrounding their desire and how that desire similarly to Fry’s in chapter one, structures
their worldviews. Weems builds her own visual imaginative, highlighting her body, her thoughts,
and her body-thoughts. Furthermore, she makes what has been invisible, visible and it is through
this power of the invisible that she brings forth a more nuanced understanding of the Black
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female body. She presents this body not as an object to be perused, or categorized, but also not as
a master subject to be. As she states, she is standing on shaky ground, and further emphasizes her
uncertainty on what questions to ask. Rather than being threatened by that uncertainty, Weems
highlights her EmDisEmbodiment by moving beyond a one sex model as critiqued by Luce
Irigaray of desiring and feeling, and by being able to embody through disembodiment. She goes
outside of the cultural norms and means of representation by tapping into her imagination and an
area outside of what one could refer to as the Symbolic, culture, society, laws or what Lacan
would refer to as the rules of the father.

Fig. 2-19. Dürer, Albrecht. Draughtsman Making a Perspective Drawing of a Reclining Woman. ca.
1600. Woodcut Print. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.
wiki/File:Draughtsman_Making_a_Perspective_Drawing_of_a_Reclining_Woman_MET_DT248337.jpg

These rules of the father according to Irigaray in, Speculum of the Other Woman, have
certain men attempting to mirror women’s desire as a representation of their own. According to
Irigaray, that desire framed and plotted female desire where this grid of some males’ desires was
interested only in the idea that I = I, 1 = 1, and to further represent Irigaray’s thought 2 = 1. It
was not interested in another 1 as autonomous in its own sense. A one (1) that was running

149
parallel, in close proximity, while having some similarities, remaining very different. As Irigaray
states:
So it would be a case of you men speaking among yourselves about woman, who cannot
be involved in hearing or producing a discourse that concerns the riddle, the logogriph
she represents for you. The enigma that is woman will therefore constitute the target, the
object, the stake of amasculine discourse, of a debate among men, which would not
consult her, would not concern her. (13)

Fig. 2-20. de Kooning, Willem. Black and White Abstraction. 1950-51. Sapolin enamel on paper.
Whitney Museum of American Art, New York.
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Irigaray sees the discourses surrounding and theories
about the subject as “appropriated by the “masculine”.
She worries that when we submit to such a theory we then
subject ourselves to objectivization within discourse and
we also re-objectivize ourselves by identifying as a
masculine subject. She calls for women to reconnect to
their own relationships to the imaginary, to connect to
their bodies, and to move beyond prioritizing the visual by
reconsidering the importance of touch. An avenue that I
seek to do, where I present at times very tactile images to
you, while you read these thoughts.
This jungle of thought is exciting while intimi-

Fig. 2-21. Weems, Carrie Mae. Slow
Fade to Black. 2010. Courtesy of the
artist and Jack Shainman Gallery, New
York.
carriemaeweems.net/galleries/slowfade.html

dating. We can only touch upon this jungle.These words I write are strife with contradictions,
omissions, and if I pretend to see it all I miss so much. However, although intimidated by this
cacophony of ideas, I would like to continue by looking back at that which is outside of the main
purview of this chapter but is still very much connected, including Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s
beliefs about the pure I, as he considers I = I differently than Irigaray’s formulation.
Fichte states that the I posits itself, the I is, because the I does. It is not a fixed thing with
static fixed features, rather it is self-producing, owing its existence to nothing but itself. For
Fichte, we construct the explanations of ourselves to ourselves. Weems work very much follows
this vein of positing herself beyond the grids and measurements of society.
(https://dialecticspiritualism.com/about-johann-gottlieb-fichte/). Fichte distinguished between
two main philosophers, idealists and dogmatists. The idealist will have a transcendental
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philosophical approach which begins with the thing in itself outside of experience while
dogmatist will take a naturalistic and experiential approach. The philosopher, according to
Fichte, is able to abstract both from the thing and from themselves cognizing the thing or there
Is. Fichte further believes that when he does, (in Fichte’s world philosophers were only men):
… he has abstracted from experience and has thereby succeeded in elevating himself
above experience. If he abstracts from the thing, then he is left with an intellect in itself
as the explanatory ground of experience; that is to say, he is left with the intellect in
abstraction from its relationship to experience. If he abstracts from the intellect, then he is
left with a thing in itself (that is, in abstraction from the fact that it occurs within
experience) as the explanatory ground of experience. The first way of proceeding is
called idealism; the second is called dogmatism” (11).

Fig. 2-22. Yamashita, Kumi. CITY VIEW (detail). 2003. Aluminum numbers, single light source,
shadow. Permanent Collection Namba Parks Tower, Osaka, Japan.
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Fichte further argues against the dogmatic approach. He understands dogmatic
philosophers as wanting to guarantee the reality of the thing in itself, “he wants to establish the
necessity of thinking of it as the basis or foundation of all experience. And he will have
succeeded in doing just this if he can show that experience is really explained thereby and that it
cannot be explained without thinking of this thing in itself” (14). Fichte further sees the
dogmatist as:
losing himself when his thinking is attacked, as deep down he already believes the
validity of the other side. The idealist on the other hand, looks down on the dogmatist as
the dogmatist does not say anything to him that he does not already know and has seen as
wrong. The dogmatist grows angry when questioned the idealist remains cool and
collected. (19)
Fichte continues by arguing for the idealistic approach, although Fichte does elucidate that the
kind of philosophy chosen is connected to the kind of person one is, “animated by the very soul
of the person who adopts it” (20) and thus does give space to the world of the dogmatist.
I highlight this as I see a key connection to these last words and EmDisEmbodiment. I
would never presume to say that there are only two types of philosophers considering that there
are African, Asian and other philosophies I am unaware of, however Fichte’s thoughts
concerning how our philosophies illuminate from our very soul and I would add our souls of
existence, does resonate. The words I write here, the cacophony or, as I stated in the
introduction, the stew, is intimately connected to my Jamaican-American or American-Jamaican
immigrant experience. I believe that experience is so important to how I see the world and what I
can provide as a point of view that does not presume to be the answer or the only way to see or
express things. However, there is something important about aspects of Fichte’s pure I for those

153
who have been oppressed by colonialism, racism, sexism, homophobia and the like. They need to
value themselves not through the value system of the Symbolic and cultural mainstream. They
need to tap into an imaginary world of what their lives could be through EmDisEmbodiment.
They have to understand their appearance beyond the illicit.
Fichte argues for the I to protect its sphere of freedom and that each rational person
should have their own sphere of freedom. However, Fichte also warns that while protecting one's
sphere of freedom one still should hold onto the knowledge that it is a sphere and thus should
realize that it should be limited. This point is key, as we are relational beings and cannot be
recklessly free. The non-I, also has its own sphere that should be respected and thus should put a
check on one's I. This is especially important when one thinks culturally, as those in power
without much limits have used their power to very much inhibit the spheres of freedom of other
Is.
The EmDisEmbodied I is aware of another’s sphere of freedom and is able to look
outside of one's experience to consider the limit that they may have on others and the limits they
may put on themselves because of others, the thoughts of others, or more correctly what we think
are the thoughts of others and how they frame our Is. An EmDisEmbodied I, similarly to Lorde is
doubly or multiply conscious and can also think, cognize ideas, and consider representations
through feeling. They move beyond an I = I that thinks only in terms of the non-I as the same
kind of rational I as their I but is able to consider the historical, lived and affective experience of
their and the other’s I.
Fichte's notions of I = I, when interpreted in a certain way could lead to possible avenues
for increasing the spheres of freedoms of multiple Is, unfortunately his I = I formulation and
other beliefs leads him to support German nationalism, a not too difficult move for him when
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those seen outside the German State are viewed as irrational or outside the rational realm of his
Fichtean I. The issue at hand I propose is that Fichte needed to be more aware of a non-I that was
not a non-I projected through the vision of his I what both Irigaray and Gordon warn us about. A
form of disembodiment then would have to occur, but a disembodiment that did not privilege his
own cultural I, a disembodiment that was aware of his discourses and the ways they affected his
I. A disembodiment that was not done in Bad Faith26 a disembodiment that was instead done
through EmDisEmbodiment as no human can really fully disembody.
To return to my encounter that started this chapter, why was my colleague fearing other
logical comparisons that contradicted his own? Why did he fear my autonomous I? These are
rhetorical questions that have no answers. I speak of my colleague because sometimes the other
can be used to generate thought. Sometimes anger can be used to generate a reaction. But where
does my anger come from? Was it because his comparison that he thought was the only logical
one existed in a space that to him I had no access to? The logic came before even the comparison
was enumerated. How could one argue with a comparison whose a priori condition was that it
was the only logical one?
So yes, I was angry. But anger can only take me so far. So, I continue with questions,
why did I have such a strong need to protect my logical comparison from my colleagues and why
was I at first angry when I was not allowed this sphere of the rational? For some feminists, mind
vs. body has also been interrelated with male vs female, where the female was regarded as so
caught up in her bodily existence it prevented her from obtaining rationality. This sphere of
irrationality also extends beyond the gender divide as Black, gay, disabled males (and the list
continues) were also seen as irrational by certain cultures. It was a very few and particular group
of people that would be able to live up to the rational. This realm existed for the white man of a
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certain standing, able-bodiness, religion, and sexuality. Could that then explain the anger I felt to
my colleagues’ email? However, will my need to protect my sphere of rationality through that
anger make me place myself on a grid.? And what rationality am I trying to protect?

Fig. 2-23. Image appropriation and manipulation by the author from
www.pinterest.com/pin/362399101269955500/ and
sophia.smith.edu/afr111-f19/carrie-mae-weems-portrait-of-a-woman-who-has-fallen-from-grace-into-thehands-of-evil/

To address this further I should think through whether it is my sphere of rationality or my
sphere of reason that needs protecting. I will define a sphere of rationality as something that
already exists that I need to then fit into, while a sphere of reason indicates that I have agency in
determining the content of that sphere as it shifts and changes in time and through relationality.
Sylvia Wynter in, Do Not Call Us Negroes, identifies a “specific cultural rationality” in historical
text books for young students that sets up a very distinctive ideology that follows from
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“prescriptive rules” that construct a particular native model that is then made universal. She
further analyzes these prescriptive rules and shows how the native model establishes the United
States as a Euro American and White nation. Wynter posits that the text book America Will Be,
automatically conceives of the States as a “land of immigrants” who are white where whiteness
is presented as the unifying principle of the nation. This imagined “biological body” of the nation
creates a national identity that excludes the Black, the Red and Chicano populations that exists
on the land not through immigration but through other much more fraught means due to
colonialism. These and other bodies were seen as add-ons to the “true” narrative of the generic,
that is the white American citizen. What Wynter makes us well aware of is just how much of our
spheres of rationality in the United States have been controlled by a certain culture of rationality.
Using such examples as our monument to Ellis Island and our cultural avoidance of the Middle
Passage as well as the use of coded phrases like “ethnic diversity”, “cultural pluralism”, and
“model minority”, Wynter elucidates that these phrases are used to identify Asians, light skinned
Hispanics, and other minority groups that have transformed the White Immigrant Body of the
nation into a non-Black (and non-Red) immigrant Body. Wynter further adds the Chicano body
to these subjugated Black and Red non-immigrant bodies, reminding us of the fact that many
were here 100s of years before the arrival of the mayflower. In places like New Mexico,
Mexicans to this day are still trying to reclaim land once owned by their ancestors.
In fact, in the 1960s Mexican-Americans made up the majority of the population of South
Texas migrant workers. Anglo wealthy land owners, exploited this huge population of workers
that were a part of a lower-class labor pool. Los Cinco, a group of five Chicanos in 1963
challenged Anglo politicians to gain more rights for fellow Mexican-Americans. This is the same
year that in Birmingham Alabama the state was finding further ways to clamp down on the rights
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of black and brown Americans. Texas was also marred in conflict, which included land grabbing,
killing, and the abuse of Mexican-Americans. These bodies once referred to as “the invisible
minority” were also denied the right to vote and lynched to keep them in check and similarly to
the Black student population, their abuse was state sanctioned where authorities used riot gear to
beat students. This “specific cultural rationality” that Wynter explores, placed Chicano/a, Red
and Black bodies on a lower scale that gave license for those with power to do what they wanted
with those bodies. Thus, black, native-american, and chicano/a peoples also did not have access
to rationality within this cultural rationality.
Jose Angel Gutierrez the co-founder of the Raza Unida Party understood the connections
and the way the cultural rationality in the States gave the license to subjugate his and other
bodies. He speaks of meeting Willie Velasquez at St. Mary’s University where they formed
study groups reading about such key Black activists like Stokley Carmichael, Martin Luther
King Jr., and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. They were aware of how
connected education was to the privileging and denigration of certain bodies. However, they
used these study groups to become more aware of the power within those bodies to reframe and
focus their educations to better represent and not denigrate and make invisible the Chicano,
Black, and Red body.
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tukgadlabjc&list=PLTL35zLkmSEcDqfmTLg5I7KyNKil96ME&index=6) The Mexican American students with support by some
faculty and staff, staged high school walk outs in East LA. A key activist Chicano, Sal Castro a
professor who no longer could stand for the bias, advocated for change. He was fired due to his
activism, but a subsequent nine-day sleep in staged by parents of students at his school resulted
in him being re-hired. These Mexican-American bodies once referred to as “the invisible

158
minority” found ways through their invisibility to demand to be heard.
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xY6cytReBm8)
So, while Weems looks to Frida Kahlo for a “model to live by”, Gutierrez looks to
Stokely Carmichael, Martin Luther King Jr., and SNCC. History is rife with different minorities
looking to each other for their rich histories of revolutionary and non-revolutionary content.
Kahlo's work is recognized for many aspects including the ways she creates an icon for
Chicanos, the Chicana feminist, mainstream feminist, LGBTQ+ and disability movements. As
Mary Ann Caw highlights in The Expanding Discourse: Feminism and Art History, Kahlo's
work has been celebrated internationally both as representative of Mexican national and
indigenous traditions and by feminists for what is seen as her nuanced and powerful depiction of
the female experience and form. (399) A form that shifted and changed throughout her life as she
navigated through various physical ailments.

Fig. 2-2-24. Taymor, Julie, Director. Frida. 2002. Film.
disabilitythinking.blogspot.com/2014_07_08_archive.html
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Fig. 2-25. Red Star, Wendy. Let Them Have Their Voice. 2018. Still for video.
www.lightwork.org/archive/wendy-red-star/

Other artists have similarly expanded the discourse through their work highlighting
indigenous traditions while relaying the unexplainable within Native Americans’ beings.
In Let Them Have Their Voice, Wendy Red Star critiques the photographs of various crow men
by artist Edward Curtis to create a much more nuanced view including them singing.
(https://www.lightwork.org/archive/wendy-red-star/). She further looks at the relation of music
to the visual arts by highlighting her father’s Crow Indian rock band of the 1960s. “Older Crows
have told me, ‘White people had The Beatles, we had The Maniacs,” Red Star says. “To me,
they’re legendary.”
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Fig. 2-26. Red Star, Wendy. The Maniacs (We’re Not The Best, But We’re Better Than The Rest). 2018.
Installation at University Art Gallery, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces.
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Fig. 2-27. Red Star, Wendy. Four Seasons Series (Indian Summer). 2012. Minneapolis Institute of Art,
Minnesota. collections.artsmia.org/art/115818/indian-summer-wendy-red-star

In her Four Seasons series of self-portraits, Red Star presents a counter-narrative to the
presentation of Native American culture in museums. The artist puts herself in a diorama setting
that is colorful, visually striking but also extremely artificial. Red Star who was raised on the
Crow Indian Reservation in Montana, explores popular depictions of Native Americans and the
connection of tradition with contemporary life. Red Star states, “This is the beauty of the series,
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the confusion of stereotypes, where the lines begin to blur from truth/reality. I just happen to fit
into that slippery slope well.”
(https://selfportraitsofcolor.tumblr.com/post/140127843269/wendy-red-star-the-four-seasons)
Jill Ahlberg Yohe, the St. Louis Art Museum’s former assistant curator of Native
American art, described Red Star’s technique as follows:
With insight and with humor, she reclaims the presentation of community and self. Red
Star faces the camera and pushes through the surface, encouraging viewers to experience
a moment of revelation. Red Star addresses both continuity and changes in Native
aesthetics. She incorporates regalia that she and her family have crafted into her artworks
that boldly confront non-Native presentations of Native peoples. Red Star’s choice to
integrate traditional aspects of Crow art, such as the elk-tooth dress, moccasins, hair
ornaments, and bag into a contemporary “fine art” vocabulary of self-portraiture and
photography reveal an artist gifted in many artistic spheres.
(https://selfportraitsofcolor.tumblr.com/post/140127843269/wendy-red-star-the-fourseasons)
Slavoj Žižek has stated how many Native Americans eschew the term that they have been
labelled with, objecting to the fact that if they are called Native Americans then who are the
Cultural Americans? (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTPGjm39bpM). As Wynter
elucidates the Cultural Americans were constructed using a certain form of cultural rationality
where “culture” became a pseudonym for whiteness or thosethat approached whiteness.
In “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom”, Wynter identifies the
ways race has been used to set up a clear distinction between the cultural “globally hegemonic
ethnoclass world of ‘Man’ and the ‘empirical human world’” (262). An overrepresentation of
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this hegemonic “Man” then enables “the interests, reality, and well-being of the empirical
human… to continue to be imperatively subordinated to those of ‘Man.’” (262). This global
project creates the rise of Europe and subordinates Africa through enslavement, Latin America
through conquest, and Asia through subjugation. In Part I of this key essay she explores, “The
Janus Face of the Invention of “Man”: Laws of Nature and the Thinkability of Natural, rather
than Supernatural Causality versus the Dynamics of the Colonizer/Colonized Answer to the
Question of Who/What We Are”.

Fig. 2-28. Weems, Carrie Mae. From Here I Saw What Happened and I Cried, 1995-1996, 33 toned
prints. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/from-here.html

In it she explores how the construct of race allowed the expanding West to shift from,
“earlier mortal/immortal, natural/supernatural, human/the ancestors, the gods/God distinction as
the one on whose basis all human groups had millennially ‘grounded’ their descriptive
statement/prescriptive statements of what it is to be human. They then regrounded these divisions
even within the secular through a newly projected human/subhuman distinction instead” (265).
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She traces how the research by Walter Mignolo identified the “colonial difference” and Jacob
Pandian’s anthropological project uncovered the discourses that reinforced new modes of being
human that is of being “Man” (266). Man became the political subject of the state to replace the
Christian who was the religious subject of the Church. Wynter further identifies the discursive
practices that allowed for this:
So that rather than “sustainable knowledge” merely disregarding the “other ways of
knowing” of the Amerindian peoples, as Mignolo contends, Pandian proposes instead
that it was to be the discourses of this knowledge, including centrally those of
anthropology, that would function to construct all the non-Europeans that encountered
(including those whose lands its settlers expropriated and those whom they enslaved or
enserfed) as the physical referent of, in the first phase, its irrational or subrational Human
Other to its new “descriptive statement” of Man as a political subject. While the
“Indians” were portrayed as the very acme of the savage, irrational Other, the “Negroes”
were assimilated to the former’s category, represented as its most extreme form and as
the ostensible missing link between rational humans and irrational animals. (266)
Thus, a “True Christian Self” (281) becomes the “Rational Self of Man” (277) while Indians of
the New World Territories and enslaved peoples of Black Africa become the
“irrational/subrational Human Other” (266). Wynter understands how this division of peoples
would become foundational to modernity where the Earth was constructed as base and vile and
associated to base bodies. While Irigaray connects these base earth-bound bodies to woman as
mentioned above, Wynter connects these bodies to Red and Black bodies and to what she would
later refer to as “fallen flesh” where the human is set up as sinful by nature and thus “Man” aims
to move beyond the human/subhuman and sin.
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In “Portrait of a Woman Who Has Fallen from Grace and Into the Hands of Evil”,
Weems turns the script, concerning base black woman, on its head by fully embracing the notion
of “fallen fresh”. Weems is not shameful and does not seem angry and presents for us a counter
to this connection of the Christian self to a certain construction of “Man”. The ways she
represents her desire is through EmDisEmbodiment and by connecting to that which is beyond
our visual, written and verbal languages. As discussed above with Not Manet’s Type, there were
limited if any visual representations of black female subjectivity connecting that body to desire
or eroticism within Western Art History. Weems’s earlier work represents one of the key
moments where an African-American woman can be seen connecting to her interiority and
relating that to the modern episteme associated with desire. Weems’ power in this image comes
from something beyond anger, her power is erotic, an erotic that is connected to the Lacanian
Real, that area of the unnamable that connects to the unexplainable like love, self- awareness and
survival. Weems taps into her imaginary that is intimately connected to the Symbolic and always
lies simultaneously below its surface or as Macarena Gómez-Barris would say in The Extractive
Zone, within ‘submerged perspectives’ areas where one can ‘perceive otherwise’. (9) In, Carrie
Mae Weems, Three Decades of Photography and Video, Henry Louis Gates Jr. states in the
forward that “For Weems, the individual woman in particular is never simply a passive
construction of herself but is rather a vibrant and vital performer in the stories she tells and the
stories that are told about her” (vii) and I would add the ways she presents herself to the gaze.
Weems stages in the image below a narrative that she has control of. She moves beyond the
Symbolic construction of desire as it relates to Black Female subjectivity forcing “Man” to
confront another on an equal plane.
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Fig. 2-29. Weems, Carrie Mae, Portrait of a Woman who has Fallen from Grace and into the Hands of
Evil. 1987. Purchased by Smith College. sophia.smith.edu/afr111-f19/carrie-mae-weems-portrait-of-awoman-who-has-fallen-from-grace-into-the- hands-of-evil/

Joseph Winters provides a further connection to the Christian self and how it relates to
power dynamics and the hierarchization of bodies in his talk, “The Sacred Gone Astray”. He
speaks about the incongruity within the sacred where it can both be seen as order, cohesion,
purity but also contamination and excess. He brings forth the point that within the colonial mind
not having religion, that is Christian religion, called into question Black and Native American’s
humanity. Religion was used to decide who counts and who does not count as human. The sacred
vs. profane logic was directly then implicated within race, coloniality and anti-blackness.
Winters highlights the ways that the sacred has been complicit with colonial terror and anti-
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blackness and further shows the ways Mircea Eliade and his studies on religion connects the
sacred to being while the profane is seen as lack.
According to Eliade one can approach the sacred through sacred objects and places such
as a door to a temple, the top of a mountain, and passageways. Winters realizes that these ways
of understanding and accessing the sacred leads to conquest and settlement as the colonialist

Fig. 2-30. Weems, Carrie Mae. Roaming. 2006. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/roaming.html.

believes they have the right to order chaotic lands. These aspects of the sacred also privilege
form over chaos, solidity over fluidity, and habitable land over uncultivated space. Furthermore,
death becomes life and settlement becomes creation. The colonialist can reenact the ways God
creates the world by founding worlds and settling territories. To do this, certain bodies then are
constructed as ruin, destruction, disintegration and death. Certain populations are also seen as
disorder and thus embodying the monstrous. Winters references the work of Fred Moten and the
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ways he explains how blackness has been set up as “disordering, deformational forces that are
indispensable to normative order, to normative form.”
Winters also refers to the work of Charles Long stating that he reveals how the “opaque
represents a muddiness that threatens to unravel rigid boundaries of normative forms and where
instead the project of settlement tries to contain the opaque.” Winters uses the work of Fanon and
Wynter to “get at the underbelly of the sacred.” They show how the production of sacred space is
tied to “settling territories, occupying foreign lands, containing opacity.” The sacred is connected
to the color line and the hierarchical position between whites and blacks. European man’s way of
defining the human has dominated and excluded other ways of imagining the human. Thus,
Winters states, “a certain vision of the human has become settled in opposition to bodies and
territories that have come to signify a danger for colonial settler projects.” The
overrepresentation of Man becomes the only representation of humanness. There is a distinction
made between spirit (Man) and fallen flesh (everyone else). Aspects of culture that cannot be
assimilated into the colonizing moment are discarded, certain bodies are “put to the grave.”
But Winters argues that coloniality does not determine the only way to “imagine or
perform the sacred.” There are precedents to seeing more paradoxically ways of imagining the
sacred. Former notions of the left-hand sacred that connected to the opaque, the formless, the
ecstatic and unsettlement, anguish and volatility distinguished itself from the right-hand sacred
that prioritized form, purity, and territorial possession and expansion. In this sense the sacred can
manifest itself through the profane within a paradoxical space of opposition and intimacy.
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Fig. 2-31. Image appropriation and manipulation by the author from
www.pinterest.com/pin/362399101269955500/ and
sophia.smith.edu/afr111-f19/carrie-mae-weems-portrait-of-a-woman-who-has-fallen-from-grace-into-thehands-of-evil/

According to Winters, there is that edge between the profane and the sacred where
“reliable distinctions breakdown, stable forms unravel.” The sacred is seen here as, “passage,
movement, a jagged edge, intimacy and deformation. The sacred in this formation then interrupts
being and our stable, coherent, durable selves. Festivals, religious ceremonies where the distance
between the other breaks down gives us a sense of that sacred. Winters believes that any project
that is invested in futurity, god, and the fulfillment of meaning, “will to some extent restrain
those beings, entities and desires and threaten the success of that project.”
He puts the work of Mircea Eliade and his research on the history of religion in
conversation with the projects of Sylvia Wynter and Frantz Fanon. However, he argues that
Fanon’s work departs from a volatile sacred that has been used to separate being from non-being
and the legible world from chaotic space. Considering Wynter’s and Fanon’s thoughts on the
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“implicit critique of the grammar of the sacred” he further argues that Fanon in Black Skin, White
Masks, departs from this volatile notion of the sacred connected to settlement and possession.
Winters calls for a sacred that “wounds our investments in coherence” and finds in Fanon’s
Black Skin, White Masks, an example of the sacred that acts through language in its poetic
expression and instability in language. Fanon presents, “flesh as excess and not fully contained
by grammar and language. For Winter’s, Fanon’s writing is an example of the “sacred gone
astray.” Winters continues that his “arrangement of words remains faithful to opacity and
surpluses of the flesh and he shows how the language of the colonizer can be used by the
colonized” to express the anguish of colonization. Winters shows the ways that Fanon does not
want to search for a pre-colonial blackness, does not want to “put down roots”, but does see
himself as a foundation that paradoxically is also a “torn, wounded, abyss.” This and other
aspects explain Fanon’s attraction to touch as it underscores a “receptivity to vulnerability” and
also means a more direct connection to the other than [sight] - my addition. Winters also
emphasizes the interrogative nature of the way Fanon ends Black Skin, White Masks, calling like
Fanon for a “slow seeking after and opening up to something.” Winters wants us to “work
through passive thought without aiming for a resolution” and sees these questions by Fanon as
asking the reader to pause, stand still and reflect, to imagine without a definitive answer. Winters
seeks a, “sacred that has gone astray in the flesh rather than becoming the place holder for
settlement and possessing the earth.” Winters sees hope in the fact that Fanon plays with
language and grammar to “outline new forms of intimacy and sociality through wounds and
cuts” and Winters calls for a reexamination of the sacred to “provide hope in the current Order of
Things.” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3RjFaWa9bAs)
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Slavoj Žižek sees the subject as substance, as an ideology within this Order of Things
showing then how important Winters and Weems work are as they reveal the importance of
“fallen flesh”. In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek looks at the subject and elucidates
the ways the state determines our thoughts, desires and field of possibilities. He further believes
that any name or ideology will not compensate fully for the lack and groundlessness we all feel
as humans. Žižek understands what he has called “the obscene underside” of ideology and
realizes that you do not simply have rules to tell you what to do but you also have metarules
telling us how to conform to what to do. Žižek sees the ways that ideologies interpolate you in to
a subject. In an interview with Tavis Smiley he speaks of his hero Malcolm X and the potential
within the X of not being named, placed and pinpointed within these ideologies.
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTPGjm39bpM)
It is interesting to note that within Weem’s Kitchen Table Series she sits in front of a
picture of Malcolm X. In this series, she presents herself in so many roles that there are no easy
ways to place or name her. (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/t-magazine/carrie-maeweems-interview.html?) Weems presents a subject that has found a way to go beyond the Art
historical ideologies that present how a black woman should be seen. What Weems and Winters
show is that even within the states field of possibilities there are ways to make the invisible
visible.
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Fig. 2-32. Weems, Carrie Mae. Untitled (man smoking) from Kitchen Table Series. 1990. Gelatin silver
print. d1lfxha3ugu3d4.cloudfront.net/images/opencollection/objects/size4/1991.168_PS2.jpg

Zizek’s believes that an ever-present groundless lack lies within the Symbolic (the
law/discourse/rule of the father) - Wynter’s cultural rationality of Man. According to Žižek this
lack is the void of the Real (that which is beyond signification). In The Sublime Object of
Ideology, he states:
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The Real is the fullness of the inert presence, positivity; nothing is lacking in the Realthat is, the lack is introduced only by the symbolization; it is a signifier which introduces
a void, an absence in the Real. But at the same time the Real is in itself a hole, a gap, an
opening in the middle of the symbolic order - it is the lack around which the symbolic
order is structured. The Real as a starting point, as a basis, is a positive fullness without
lack; as a product, a leftover of symbolization, it is, in contrast, the void, the emptiness
created, encircled by the symbolic structure. (191)
This lack could also be seen as a wound or a cut as Winters describes above. Winters sees
potentialities within or through this wound when he calls for a sacred that “wounds our
investments in coherence”. This void however for Žižek directly relates to Lacan’s notions of
lack and the objet petit a. He further argues that systems like capitalism play off of this void of
the Real this inability to obtain the objet petit a in order to fortify their positions. For Zizek, it is
the desire of the subject to obtain the unattainable that makes the subject keep wanting more,
aiming for the universal position and being attracted to monological ideologies that do not
question their axioms. Žižek wants to interrogate these ideological positions and affect their
positions. He looks at totalitarian ideology in order to reveal how its “rule is secured not by its
truth-value but by simple extra-ideological violence and promise of gain” (20). This relates in an
interesting way to Wynter’s ideas on how racial categories are constructed through powerful
discourses. Žižek brings forward very important questions including, what could be missing in
certain forms of whiteness that then form the need to fill in for this lack through the subjugation
of others? I am arguing throughout that rhythm, eroticism, the abject, connected to
EmDisEmbodiment are some of those missing elements that all bodies can connect with in
different ways.
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Žižek similarly to Gordon and Irigaray, further worries about what he refers to as
‘external reflection’ where one situates oneself in a god-like fashion above or outside of one’s
own discourses. These discourses are limited but set themselves up as neutral absolutes. He
critiques Kant’s notions of the sublime, understanding and imagination, where Kant is not able to
formulate ‘determinate’ reflection. Instead for Kant the Thing-in-itself (perhaps somewhat
synonymous to the Real) is separate from the phenomenological being. In other words, the
sublime becomes sublime only through our “subjective reflection external to the Thing, not the
Thing-in-itself - that is, it represents only the way we, as finite subjects caught in the limits of
our phenomenal experience, can mark in a negative mode the dimension of the trans-phenomenal
Thing” (241). He contrasts this to Hegel who is able to see, “an immanent reflexive
determination of the Thing-in-itself” (241). Žižek believes that Kant’s method of reflection that
separates the understanding and the imagination from the external world and prioritizes an
external human consciousness does not then fully unleash the power towards the end, towards
changing, shifting and destabilizing discourses. The potentialities for these changes are stagnant
within the language rather than being performed or designated by subjects with agency.
This is a powerful argument made by Žižek, as those disembodied bodies would not appreciate
the ways Fanon uses language as the colonized, to combat the colonizer; how Winters sees the
power in a different or shifting understanding of the sacred; and how Weems falls from grace.
Fanon, Winters, Wynter, and Weems are finding that agency within what has been seen
as invisible bodies, showing how they were only invisible to certain understandings of the
Symbolic. They also look at the discourses, epistemes and their hidden premises. Fanon in Black
Skin White Masks, gives us an understanding of how the colonizer framed his language and
modes of non-being; Winters sees the right handed sacred as related to
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whiteness and setting subjects up with a certain disembodied mindset that thinks in terms of
discovery, settlement, colonization; Wynter looks at how settler-colonialist instituted certain
forms of cultural rationality to categorizations of the bodies of who did and did not count; while
Weems through her artwork and agency reveals the covert, invisible and underhanded
dimensions within mainstream Western art history.

Fig. 2-33. Weems, Carrie Mae. Roaming. 2006. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/roaming.html.
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Žižek additionally reveals the power of totalitarian discourses and ideologies that hide
their axioms and methods in a mystical manner, “[i]f I say: Roman law and German law are both
laws, it is something which goes by itself. But if, on the contrary, I say: the Law, this abstract
thing, realizes itself in Roman law and in German law, i.e. in these concrete laws, the
interconnection becomes mystical” (29). This mysticism is the power behind the universal. Žižek
argues against any origin or ‘primal baptism’ (98) that equates law with some intrinsic Law or
what he sees as a situated particular to a universal. He connects this also to bodies, as he wants
us to recognize the subject of the substance by naming the subject that creates the discourse. He
further wants us to reveal the lack and thus desire that creates notions of the ‘universal’ that
connect it to whiteness. According to Lacan this lack and desire can never be satisfied as one can
never obtain the objet petit a as it connects to a remainder that is intrinsic though our constitution
within language. Žižek in contrast highlights the residues or stain related to our ideologies. In
reference to Althusser and Pascal, Žižek states:
Althusser speaks only of the process of ideological interpellation through which the
symbolic machine of ideology is 'internalized' into the ideological experience of Meaning
and Truth: but we can learn from Pascal that this 'internalization', by structural necessity,
never fully succeeds, that there is always a residue, a leftover, a stain of traumatic
irrationality and senselessness sticking to it, and that this leftover far from hindering the
full submission of the subject to the ideological command, is the very condition of it: it is
precisely this non-integrated surplus of senseless traumatism which confers on the Law
its unconditional authority: in other words, which — in so far as it escapes ideological
sense sustains what we might call the ideological jouis-sense, enjoyment-in-sense (enjoymeant), proper to ideology. (43)
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Zizek’s thoughts bring up important questions including, how do we find ways to enjoy the
dissatisfaction, to be ok with the impure, the residue, the stain while still changing systems that
feed on this dissatisfaction and that hurt self and other? Žižek argues for working within the text,
the rational, the discourses to better approach jouissance and this remainder. In connection to
Fanonian thought, he is not interested in origins, the latent content, ‘hidden kernels’ behind the
form. He sees these as empty and void. Instead he is interested in how we use the languages that
we have to reveal the latent content as this is directly connected to our desires and the objet petit
a and also intimately relates to the ways we structure patriarchy.
This is why he has an interest in dream-work and the mechanisms of displacement and
condensation. He views these mechanisms as operating through the discourses of patriarchy and
he wants us, to be agents in interrogating these mechanisms. In relating these ideas to
commodities, he sees the real problem as not to, “penetrate to the 'hidden kernel' of the
commodity - the determination of its value by the quantity of the work consumed in its
production - but to explain why work assumed the form of the value of a commodity, why it can
affirm its social character only in the commodity-form of its product” (35). He reveals how these
mechanisms when ignored can fortify patriarchy and the ‘universal’. Thus, while critiquing
universalization he also warns against only thinking in terms of particular and situated
knowledges that will not properly acknowledge the mechanisms of patriarchy.
These mechanisms are highlighted in Caribbean Reasonings: After Man Towards the
Human, a selection of critical essays on Sylvia Wynter’s work, Lewis Gordon shows the
connections between Wynter and Frantz Fanon’s work including Wynter’s use of Fanon’s notion
of the sociogenic principle. Fanon expanded on Freud's concepts of ontogeny (the natural

178
development of the individual subject) and phylogeny (development of groups of subjects),
defining the concept of sociogeny. A key technique of hegemony and patriarchy which can be
used to identify how social factors like, sin, poverty, crime, health, are linked to certain
population groups as if those groups were biologically, or ontogenetically, predisposed towards
those phenomena. These groups then are set up as the problem instead of the systems at play that
constrict them. The construction of the Black/Red/Chicano/a subhuman as described above is
fortified through this sociogenic principle. Fanon reveals how this blending of sociogeny and
ontogeny plays a key role in the social construction of race and Wynter further extends this to
reveal the ways this is used to construct the others as the subhuman to “Man”.
Elsa Goveia in looking at Wynter’s work, pinpoints the cultural pluralist model that was
created to benefit minorities that most approached whiteness. Cultural pluralism was thought of
in terms of “ethnic” and “gender” single issues that benefited the in between categories and the
middle classes. Wynter also indicates the class dynamics at play where lower class Chicanos
were associated with Black people and Native Americans and separated from non-White
immigrants of the middle and upper classes who subscribed to an America that “while no longer
hegemonically WASP, is also essentially non-Black, non-Red and non-lower class” (12). Thus,
these cultural pluralists and multi-culturalist tropes were used to “deploy cultural diversity of
multiple groups in order to marginalize the centrality of Black and Red America to the instituting
of America” (12). Wynter states that the strategy of classifying Black and Red issues with the
many issues gathered under the category of women and minority, “defused the thrust to reduce
the structural inequalities of the U.S. order” (18). She additionally identifies a “native model”
within the Caribbean where, “The unifying belief was the racial inferiority of the Black
population group and the African-derived cultural matrix of which they are the bearers” (13).
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Wynter recognizes the connections between a multicultural perspective and the “cultural model”
perspective where in the first the Black American is just one of a number of ethnic groups while
the latter constructs the marginalization of the Black American to reinforce the present “native
model” serving then to integrate the United States as a “nation of immigrants” (18). These new
immigrants to gain normality (forms of whiteness) would need to put as much distance between
themselves and blackness.

Fig. 2-34. Weems, Carrie Mae. The Hampton Project. 2000. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/hampton.html.

Carrie Mae Weems in The Hampton Project, a series of digital photographs on muslin cloths and
canvas with audio, shows how this whitening of model minorities, an anti-black; anti-red; and
anti-Chicano agenda; has a historical trajectory that goes back to such places as Hampton
Normal and Agricultural Institute (now Hampton University). Founded in Virginia in 1868 it
was the first school in the States to offer education for African and Native Americans.
According to Kathyryn Delmez:
Despite largely good intentions, the students were stripped of cultural specificities in
favor of conformity and forced assimilation. Weems reveals and grieves for this loss by
appropriating and deconstructing images taken in 1899 by the photojournalist Frances

180
Benjamin Johnston to demonstrate the success of this seemingly enlightened program…
Weems adds somber narrative such as “Leaving blankets and chains at the door / you
checked in one way / and came out another.” In one triptych, Weems brackets a
photograph of the white founder of the school and his family between an image of ten
boys in Native American dress and one of them in traditional Western attire taken after
“acquiring the ways of the patriarch.” (184)
Weems reveled after the project that Hampton ended up not promoting the show as they
did not want to discuss the Native-American internment, nor deal with the fact that many Native
Americans were asking the Hampton for their bones back. This attempt to erase the other by
whiteness has led to a blanketing of negativity attached to the word “whiteness” which has been
seen as connected to an assumption of the hierarchies the construct has instituted in regards to
race. Concepts such as white privilege, automatically assume that when people have light skin it
is associated with a certain form of privilege whether they be working class, disabled, gay, etc. I
use white men and my colleague as the villain in this chapter not only because I was perturbed
by the email with his only logical comparison but also because it is a part of a contemporary
cultural narrative. However, what I hope to do here is to look beyond the surfaces of the
narratives to various nuances of blackness, whiteness, otherness and how these terms relate to
hybridity. Also, I want to keep in mind that, even though white men have crosses to bear as the
oppressors against women, Black people and others, men – Black, white, Asian, and otherwise,
women, also of many different colors, those on the margins, borders, in other categories and
shifting between these categories can also take on oppressor roles mirroring that of the white
male of power. As we dig deeper I also want to keep the remainder in mind a key condition to
EmDisEmbodiment.
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I am interested in the remainder, psychoanalysis, and the Lacanian Real because these are
the tools I currently have that speak to the unthinkable, the unnamable, and the unimaginable. I
also believe strongly in our need to not repress or forget about desire but instead to investigate
how it has been coopted by systems of power. I believe that by looking at models like Audre
Lorde’s eroticism or Zizek’s understanding of the power within the remainder, we can better
approach EmDisEmbodiment. We can also do this as we connect to the other when we view art,
read poetry, love someone. EmDisEmbodiment attempts to locate and connect to a remainder that
can never be located or pinpointed. A remainder that allows us to consider the opaqueness within
the I that is counter to any grids we can use to try to contain it. For it is the remainder that
perhaps can allow us to understand why we try to frame others.

Fig. 2-35. Caspar David Friedrich Wanderer
above the Sea of Fog, 1818; and Carrie Mae
Weems Roaming. 2006.
carriemaeweems.net/galleries/roaming.html.

Fig. 2-36. Weems, Carrie Mae. Roaming. 2006.
carriemaeweems.net/galleries/roaming.html.
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Fig. 2-37. O’Grady, Lorraine. Art Is. . . (Cop Framed). 1983/2009. Performance, C print.
lorraineogrady.com/art/art-is/

Lorraine O’Grady in reclaiming Black female subjectivity sees it as a movement away
from determinacy by the other. Similarly, to Weems she does this through a project of selfawareness rather than certainty. However, for O’Grady the establishment of subjectivity comes
with a strong subject who must reclaim and change the thoughts, gaze, desires of and
descriptions by the other. In “Olympia’s Maid: Reclaiming Black Female Subjectivity”, O’Grady
states, “art requires that we distinguish between the unconscious and the limits of its current
theory, and that we remain alive to what may escape the net of theoretical description”(183). She
further states:
It is cruelly ironic, of course, that just as the need to establish our subjectivity in preface
to theorizing our view of the world becomes most dire, the idea of subjectivity itself has
become “problematized.” But when we look to see just whose subjectivity has had the
ground shifted out from under it in the tremors of postmodernism, we find (who else?)
the one to whom Hartsock refers as “the transcendental voice of the Enlightenment” or,
better yet, “He Who Theorizes.” Well, good riddance to him. We who are inching our
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way from the margins to the center cannot afford to take his problems or his truths for our
own. (98)
How do we then expand our theories, expand that net? How does a connection of theory to the
body allow for that expansion?

Fig. 2-38. O’Grady, Lorraine. Art Is… (Woman with Man and Cop Watching). 1983/2009. Performance,
C print. lorraineogrady.com/art/art-is/

Fig. 2-39. O’Grady, Lorraine. Art Is… (Framing Cop). 1983/2009. Performance, C print.
lorraineogrady.com/art/art-is/
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In theory, ontology has been set up as relating to an overarching view of being. But what
if there are multiple paths to those beings? How then can theory be better expressed to allow for
the remainder, for these multiple Is? As opposed to an ontological overarching view of being that
tries to set being on one right path, an EmDisEmbodied I realizes that there are various ways of
thinking, constructing, deconstructing, re-constructing, seeing, that allow us to theorize toward
multiple fulfilling and relational paths for Being. Édouard Glissant demands for the “right to
opacity,” where we should be allowed to be opaque, to not be framed, and pinpointed. So, if I
look back at my previous suppositions, while I may think de Kooning is anxious about the
breakdown of his instability of meaning and see Irigaray, Mae Weems’ and O’ Grady’s other
models of the conception woman that they live by. I should also remember as Lacan contends,
“psychoanalysis should not try to produce ‘male’ and ‘female’ as complementary entities, sure of
each other and of their own identity, but should expose the fantasy on which this notion rests”.
(https://www.vice.com/en/article/9kvaey/martine-gutierrez-trans-latinx-artist-indigenousfashion-photography)
It is important to be self-conscious and aware of my self-motivations when writing this
and the following exploration of work and writings by Lorraine O’Grady who like Weems
reconstitutes subjectivity through symbolizations that move away from an autonomous,
essentialist subject controlled by the state. Through modes of Otherness, Vision, and Desire,
O’Grady provides us great insight into subjectivity and the relationship between the self and
Other. She forces us to look through the lens of the particular (what I argue is a different form of
the universal) instead of the universal, which generates certain questions: How do privileged and
non-privileged positions come into play, limiting thoughts, theories, and relations to the Other?
Her artistic practice less interested in truth but in questions, positionalities, contingent truths, and
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subjective becomings reveals the suitability of her practice for the philosophical discourse of our
moment which can be viewed as a philosophical discourse moving us beyond our frames of
cultural constructions and constrictions. O’Grady states in, “Olympia’s Maid: Reclaiming Black
Female Subjectivity (1992/1994):
My work in progress deals with what Gayatri Spivak has called the “’winning back’ of
the position of the questioning subject.” To win back that position for the African
American female will require balancing in mental solution a subversion of two objects
that may appear superficially distinct: on the one hand, phallocentric theory; and on the
other, the lived realities of Western imperialist history, for which all forms of that theory,
including the most recent, function as willing or unwilling instruments. It is no
overstatement to say that the greatest barrier I/we face in winning back the questioning
subject position is the West’s continuing tradition of binary, “either–or” logic, a
philosophic system that defines the body in opposition to the mind. (101-102)
Lorraine O’Grady understands that the Black female body has been erased in the West, seeing it
as the hidden side of a coin with the white female body on the other side. O’Grady reveals how
the not-white woman is excluded from sexual difference with a discussion of Laura, Olympia’s
maid, fully clothed and painted off to the side of the nude sexually evocative Olympia. As Aruna
D’Souza states in Lorraine O’Grady: Writing in Space,
… O’Grady begins with the question of who, exactly, was the black woman who posed
as the attendant in Manet’s Olympia. While a number of white feminists had addressed
the question of the model for Olympia herself – attempting to wrest subjectivity for her
from the male artist’s flattening and objectifying gaze – no one had proposed the same
for Laure, the model for her maid” (xxvi).
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Fig. 2-40. Russell, Oneika. Olympia Variations. 2006. aica-sc.net/2016/05/13/remix-in-the-caribbean2016/

O’Grady’s further questioning of feminism’s construction of “Woman”, identifies how the Black
woman’s body and Laure in Manet’s painting is:
“… the chaos that must be excised, and it is her excision that stabilizes the West’s
construct of the female body, for the femininity of the white female body is ensured by
assigning the not-white to a chaos safely removed from sight. Thus only the white body
remains as the object of a voyeuristic, fetishizing male gaze. (96)
D’Souza further points to a quote by O’Grady to highlight the need to explore what the
deconstruction of whiteness without considering the other can miss. O’Grady states, “When
Western modernist philosophy’s ‘universal subject’ finally became relativized …, rather than
face life as one of multiple local subjects, it took refuge in denying subjectivity altogether,” and
D’Souza adds:
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While much postmodern thought had addressed itself to identifying – and even
dismantling – foundational oppositions such as male/female, white/black, culture/nature,
and mind/body, O’Grady was one of a number of feminist thinkers who saw such
deconstructive moves as, paradoxically, retrenching the unequal power relations on either
side of the binaristic divides… the primacy of male-white-culture-mind had been
stealthily upheld once again. Even with the challenges posed by deconstruction, O’Grady
recognized, the basic Western ontology, in which “somebody always has to win,
“remains intact” (xxvii).
D’Souza understands the ways that O’Grady’s critique of either/or constructions is a larger
critique of white supremacy and sees O’Grady’s notion of “both/and” (the title of O’Grady’s
exhibition at the Brooklyn Museum as I write this) as a more hybrid artistic and ontological view
to combat racism and anti-blackness. O’Grady argues for a hybridity that does not erase
difference where rather than dualistic Is that are not on equal planes, the Is can appreciate in a
non-hierarchical way the other I. This is what I argue for EmDisEmbodied Is. O’Grady brings
our attention to the fact that within the either/or construction will be another entity determining
the hierarchical nature of the different sides of the construction which then becomes the triptych.
Thus, she is instead drawn to the diptych, seeing it as a good form for the representation of
both/and. She puts together paired photographs that represent two dissimilar entities that
nevertheless create “a totally unresolvable, circular conversation” that is “never-ending” (xxx).
O’Grady wants to embrace this lack of resolution establishing the diptych as anti-dualistic.
O’Grady further shows the erasure of Black female desire and sexuality by looking at the
representation of Sojourner Truth, the only Black guest at Judy Chicago’s iconic feminist
artwork, Dinner Party (1973 – 78):
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When thirty-six of thirty-nine places are set with versions of Chicago’s famous “vagina”
and recognizable slits have been given to such sex bombs as Queen Elizabeth I, Emily
Dickinson, and Susan B. Anthony, what is one to think whenTruth, the mother of four,
receives the only plate inscribed with a face? (176)
O’Grady not only looks at the erasure of Black female sexuality and desire by cultural constructs
connected to the phallocentric gaze but shows how it is internalized by Black females. She
relays her memory of visiting public pools around the United States and seeing Black girls and
women bathing with suits on next to nude white female bodies. She wonders why North
American Blacks have avoided the nude, so popular in Western Art. In conveying the muted
reception of the sexual and spiritual nudes by Black painter Sandra Payne she states, “We do not
yet have the courage to look” (178), O’Grady believes that, “To name ourselves rather than be
named we must first see ourselves. For some of us this will not be easy. So long unmirrored in
our true selves, we have forgotten how we look” (176).
She calls for a movement away from the Other and his “truths” and towards selfaffirmation. These thoughts by O’Grady, are in stark contrast to Emmanuel Levinas’ views in
Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the- Other. Levinas calls for discovering one’s subjectivity through the
face of the other. He sees being as “not consciousness of self” but as “relation with the other than
self and awakening” (Levinas 63). He continues:
Awakening of me by the other, of me by the Stranger, of me by the stateless person…
Awakening which is neither reflection upon oneself nor universalization; an awakening
that signifies a responsibility for the other who must be fed and clothed, my substitution
for the other, my expiation for the suffering, and not doubt, for the wrong doing of the
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other person. Expiation, assigned to me without any possible evasion and in which my
own uniqueness is exalted, irreplaceable. (63)
While O’ Grady calls for the Black female subject to further explore self-consciousness,
Levinas believes the unified I or cogito has been destroyed, “[p]sychoanalysis casts a
fundamental suspicion on the most unimpeachable testimony of self-consciousness” (24).
However, even though they disagree in this regard on other points there are similarities. Levinas
like O’Grady calls for relating to the other as different. “It remains a relationship to the other as
other, and not a reduction of the other to the same” (174-175). Both Levinas and O’Grady in
different ways find the “need to dissolve the false 'we' into its real multiplicity” (O’Grady 176) a
quote O’Grady borrows from Nancy Hartsock’s essay “Rethinking Modernism.” Levinas argues
that we need to move away from the scopic and the gaze to a stance of listening and O’Grady
believes that, “we must be willing to hear each other and call each other by our ‘true-true name’”
(176) borrowing from the title of a story by Caribbean writer Merle Hodge. However, for
O’Grady the establishment of subjectivity comes with a strong subject who must move away
from the thoughts, gaze, and desires of the other. She worries about the establishment of
subjectivity through the art of Renee Greene as, “it is addressed more to the other than the self
and seems to deconstruct the subject just before it expresses it” (177). Unlike Levinas’ disregard
of the cogito, O’ Grady calls for holding on to the cogito, her favorite being, “I dance, therefore I
think” (182).
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Fig. 2-41. Green, Renée. Mise-en-scène: Commemorative Toile, 1992–94, installation view, Pat Hearn
Gallery, New York. Courtesy: Free Agent Media. www.frieze.com/article/iman-issa-violence-reneegreens-upholstery-fabrics

In “the Oppositional Gaze” bell hooks looks closely at desire in the relations between self
and Other and the oppositional stance and gaze needed to obstruct the power dynamics at play
between the self and other. She quotes Stuart Hall as he challenges the totalizing of Blackness by
white representation through white presence, “The error is not to conceptualize this ‘presence’ in
terms of power, but to locate that power as external to us – an extrinsic force, whose influence
can be thrown off like the serpent sheds its skin” (hooks 94-95). Hooks further quotes from
Frantz Fanon’s iconic Black Skin, White Masks to show how power is both inside and outside of
us, a part of ones very being,“the movements, the attitudes, the glances of the Other fixed me
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there … the place of the Other, fixes us, not only in its violence, hostility and aggression, but in
the ambivalence of its desire” (95).
Hooks explores the use of the oppositional gaze to remove oneself from this fixing. She
looks at the gaze of Black females when watching Hollywood narratives that reinforce the
phallocentric gaze through the white female body. However, hooks observes that “Black female
spectators actively chose not to identify with the film’s imaginary subject because such
identification was disenabling” (99) she continues, “Black female spectators, who refused to
identify with white womanhood, who would not take on the phallocentric gaze of desire and
possession, created a critical space where the binary opposition Mulvey posits of “woman as
image, man as bearer of look” was continually deconstructed” (99). She questions why
mainstream feminist film criticism does not look at the strength of this oppositional gaze in
bringing attention to the fiction/fantasy of the phallocentric gaze. She worries that this feminist
criticism instead creates, “a totalizing narrative of woman as object whose image functions solely
to reaffirm and reinscribe patriarchy” (99).
Hooks oppositional gaze differs in many ways to Jacques Lacan’s split between the eye
(the cogito – conscious subject, subject of knowledge) and the gaze in The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psycho-analysis. “What determines me [. . .] in the visible, is the gaze that is
outside. It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects.
Hence it comes about that the gaze is the instrument through which light is embodied and
through which [. . .] I am photo- graphed” (Lacan 106). Lacan’s gaze is much more determined
by the outside, that which looks upon us, as opposed to hook’s oppositional gaze that is
determined by a self-conscious, resistant subject. This distinction relates to the way Weems’s
and O’Grady’s subjectivity turns to the self while Levinas’ looks to the other.
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Lacan reveals how he sees the gaze as a subject of desire through vision and the
Symbolic realm of language and societal codes. For Lacan, the gaze becomes a scopic drive to
reclaim one’s ego – to give the illusion that the I makes sense by transcending the self and seeing
how others see that self. ‘‘The gaze I encounter [. . .] is, not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by
me in the field of the Other’’ (84). Subjectivity is thus mapped onto the self through
the gaze of the Other. However, this desire to map the self and reclaim the ego can never be fully
satisfied as it is from a subject that is split, ruptured and lacking. A split that happens when the
child moves from the pre-imaginary to the Symbolic creating the loss of the objet petit a as the
Symbolic is unable to fully represent pure reality.
Hooks considers this scopic drive in her description of Miss Pauline Breedlove, a poor
maid in the house of a prosperous white family, “To experience pleasure, Miss Pauline sitting in
the dark must imagine herself transformed, turned into the white woman portrayed on the screen.
After watching movies, feeling the pleasure, she says ‘But it made coming home hard’” (98). It
could be argued that Miss Breedlove sees her ego ideal on screen, a Lacanian term to represent
an image of herself that she wants to become. Miss Breedlove is perhaps a self-shaped by desire
that can never be fully satisfied, a subjectivity that is caught between a desire for a fixed
consciousness and an unsettled unconscious. This desire reveals why narratives like Levinas’
that call for a discovery of oneself through the other could become problematic especially when
power dynamics are considered.
Lacan also relates this lack in the subject, connected to the constrictions of the symbolic
realm and language, to our desire to find the objet petit a within our theories and meanings, a
desire that is never fully satisfied. He recognizes how this desire makes us vulnerable to false
forms of finality and, as I see it, our aims to find universals for all. For Lacan, language predates

193
the conscious, we have a wiring for language with a link between our unconscious and language.
This symbolic system of language, with its infinite pursuit of meaning is the world of the adult,
of signifiers, code, language and the law, enforced by the paternal superego through the
repression of desire. Language for Lacan is that of the father, a phallic signifier. However due to
this natural connection Lacan draws between language and the unconscious there are ways his
writings and thoughts has been seen as prescriptive.
Jacqueline Rose in Sexuality in the Field of Vision argues against this prescriptiveness
and shows how theory within the symbolic realm that has been set up as masculine, heterosexual
and universal can instead be seen as positioned through an exploration into the complexities of
sexuality and the anti-binaries at play within the unconscious that destabilizes the symbolic
realm. Rose articulates the unconscious at the point of resistance through feminism and the
questioning of the legislative nature of language to divide sexuality. She argues that:
feminism, through its foregrounding of sexuality (site of fantasies, impasses, conflict and
desire) and of sexual difference (the structure towards which it just as constantly breaks)
is in a privileged position to challenge the dualities (inside/outside, victim/aggressor, real
event/fantasy, and even good/evil) upon which so much traditional political analysis and
theory [my addition] has so often relied” (15)
O’Grady poignantly critiques Rose’s complete disregard of race, where on numerous occasions
Rose refers to class and sexuality without thinking about their connection to race. However,
within O’Grady’s theoretical critique her own heteronormativity is revealed, when she argues
against the importance of sexuality in defining the body, believing instead that Black people do
not think about sex they just do it. Here this equating of sex with sexuality discounts the nuances
at play in Rose’s work on sexuality as a lived experience. Similarly, Rose, Levinas and Lacan
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overlook the role race plays in their theories and discussions. Although each of the thinkers have
very interesting things to say, it is important to see the limitations based on their subject
positions. However, the question should not be which subject position wins out as the
best or most complete definition of subjectivity, instead one should realize the essentialisms at
play within language whether that of Lacan, Levinas or O’ Grady’s.
As O’Grady states we have to realize that “To name ourselves rather than be named we
must first see ourselves” (209) - see ourselves as the conditioned, specific, biased beings that we
are. This is perhaps why O’Grady has her own ambivalences to language, writing and theory,
calling for strategic essentialisms. In “Art is…” a performative work by O’Grady, a troupe of 15
African-American and Latino performers and the artist walked around a float carrying empty
gold picture frames. According to Louis Bury in “In and Out of Frame: Lorraine O'Grady's ‘Art
Is...’” at hyperallergic.com, these frames were given to onlookers and also held in front of them
to “encourage the mostly Black audience to consider themselves as valid subjects, even makers,
of art”. Photographs taken by the spectators were then collected by O’Grady to document the
performance. “Art is…” highlights the difference between inside and outside. Borders become
arbitrary - there’s often as much happening on the outside of the photograph’s internal frame as
in it. Here “Art is…” rather than finding answers, poses many interesting questions; including
how we frame and are framed, how we frame ourselves as oppressors, oppressed and oppressors
within ourselves. The work can be shown to both provide a corollary to “the split between the
eye and the gaze” and the “oppositional gaze” and a connection to the way Fanon realizes how
we are defined by both what is inside and outside us. “Art is…” also points to the importance of
having agency in the framing, while at the same time realizing our limitations in how we frame.
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In describing the work Bury continues “whereas frames that are filled with a picture
establish a hierarchy between viewer and viewed, an empty frame frames thing in two
simultaneous directions, making each viewer also the viewed, potentially eliminating the
hierarchy.” What O’Grady also represents is the fact that frames can never truly fix us and
always need to be reframed, true reality escapes framing in a similar way the objet petit a is left
outside of the Symbolic realm. A conceptual art that questions its own constructs can be used as
one frame to constantly redefine subjectivity. As an artistic practice less interested in truth but in
questions, positionalities, contingent truths and subjective becomings it is a very rife territory for
philosophical discourse. It can be used to continue to move us beyond our frames of cultural
constructions and constrictions. With her performative work, O’Grady turns to a form that
creates, “a system for uncovering the unexpected” (183). In paraphrasing Stuart Hall, O’Grady
states, “in one’s dedication to the search for “truth” and “a final stage,” one invariably learns that
meaning never arrives, being never arrives, we are always only becoming” (184). In a similar
way art is always searching, being a comfortable medium with the in-between places, the
disjunctures, the intersectionalities, and the interstices. Conceptual art is more in tune to a psyche
that is moving away from the constrictions of the Symbolic and perhaps towards the mysterious
world of an imagined Lacanian Real - the unstable pre-imaginary, pre-symbolic world or perhaps
towards the world of the post-human or the trans-human to further combat the constrictions on
the black body.
In “Race, the Inhuman and the Plasticity of Life”, Jayna Brown looks at how the
biologically has been used and abused by introducing her thoughts about the HeLa cells, the first
known cells outside of a body that has grown and reproduced. Thus, these cells set up a new
paradigm where life could flourish and reproduce “outside heterosexual conception and could
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transcend the notion of species” (321). The fact that these cells come from a black body adds
much to the conversation regarding the human. Brown uses this introduction as a starting point to
argue for the plasticity of life and for thinking beyond the human towards:
the possibilities, real and imagined, for “utterly new mode(s) of existence.” It reaches for
the potential for alternative versions of life and liveliness. I seek to reclaim “life” from its
association with heteronormative reproduction and family structures and the human rights
discourses that attach themselves to the term. I seek to detach it from the conservative
“right to life” discourse as well as a liberal politics of inclusivity, including the plea for
societal recognition in the political agendas of some LGBTQI and POC social
movements. I wonder if reparation and restoration to the category human is enough of an
aim. Claims that human life depends on being socially legible ironically reinscribe a
politics of exclusion. I also call into question a persistent biological determinism that tries
to assign value and meaning to particular biological formations. (323)
Brown wants to imagine other forms of kinship and mutual care outside of the heteronormative
model. She wants to queer the biological, “to broaden our thoughts about biological life away
from notions of ancestral descendancy to the possibility of ethical connections and political
affiliations that do not rely on being related” (323). It is not surprising that Brown would be
apprehensive about any project that seeks to define the human and instead suggests we conceive
of the trans-human and a “wilder sort of empiricism” where there is a connection to other forms
of being, “other forms of energetics, sonic and haptic, rather than visual or discursive”.
(https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/a_wilder_sort_of_empiricism/). Brown concludes
her thoughts on plasticity and one sees her apprehension to the move towards the human when
she states:
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Black, queer, and disabled people know what it is to be considered inhuman. We feel the
politics by which the human is legitimated, how the lines around the human are policed,
and the inhuman ways that racialized, disabled, and queer bodies are treated. We are
painfully aware of “the way power is present in any attempt to represent material reality.”
But we (an assumptive we, not a falsely inclusive one) are less ethically bound to honor
the boundaries of a bodily sovereignty never granted to us. What would it look like to
take as our provocation the idea that we embrace our inhumanness? To let go of the
assumption of heteronormative human (and racial) superiority, and open up to new forms
of sociality and modes of being? (337)
Brown’s words resonate with many black queer bodies that have had to work through their
invisibilities and like Weems find power through that invisibility. In a world where being visible
for queer people quite possibly means death, nuances the discussion of social death as it relates
to invisibility. Brown continues in “A Wilder Sort of Empiricism: Madness, Visions and
Speculative Life” to imagine alter universes and life on her own terms to ‘question and stretch’
what is considered human to release herself from raciologies and “the relational dynamics out of
which they germinate?” She hopes for a future with alternate worlds that not only think about
how to reconstitute the state but the bodily organism as well. She imagines a future, “in which
we have a different assemblage of bodies altogether” where sensation is emphasized. Rather than
the human prioritizing mind over body she imagines a human that is “sentient and deeply alive as
they inhabit their bodies.” Similarly, to Fanon, she takes the interrogative approach, ending with
multiple key questions. Similar questions that I would pose to the EmDisEmbodied I.
How are bodies inhabited and modified in these visions, and what range of potentialities
are there? How can we think about life without supporting a universalist sense of being,
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which is to obscure recognition of the differing forms of relationship to life?...What
happens when we disaggregate the idea of individual identity from the concept of life
itself? What if the concept of the self was fully dismantled? “A life has quite different
features than those associated with the self — the consciousness, memory, and personal
identity,” writes Deleuze. “It unfolds according to another logic: a logic of impersonal
individuation rather than personal individualization…it is always indefinite…in contrast
to the self, a life is ‘impersonal and yet singular,’ and so requires a ‘wilder’ sort of
empiricism–a transcendental empiricism.
(https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/a_wilder_sort_of_empiricism/)
Brown does not necessarily see these bodies that prioritize lives over selves as needing to
be understood within the framework of the posthuman condition as she sees these beings as
already “existing in alternate time/space frames.” She sees these “alienated, alien non-subjects”
unbounded by the definitions of the human as having an “expanded capacity for life … freed of
regulatory terms of humanness” and a “particular access to not just go to, but to define other
states of beingness.”
(https://socialtextjournal.org/periscope_article/a_wilder_sort_of_empiricism/)
Zakiyyah Iman Jackson in, Becoming Human: Matter and Meaning in an Antiblack
World, further looks at the distinctions between the human and the non-human. She also
questions the need to strive for humanness. Jackson reveals the problematic human vs. animal
hierarchical binary and questions the prioritizing of the human to allow then for the further
desecration of the animal world in a similarly way the construction of Man was used to violently
control the subhuman, given him the license to do what he saw fit to Black and Red people who
he placed in this category. For Jackson, she does not want to be caught up in this tautology where
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subhuman is now replaced with animal. She also sees the ways that Black people, and
specifically black women, have often been positioned at the edge of humanness and animality
and so does not want to recapitulate a universalizing liberal–humanist framework that used the
human to erase certain beings both in terms of their knowledges and their bodies. Furthermore,
the fact that this binary has been used to also license human domination over other creatures,
adds to Jackson’s critique. Jackson also sees the gender constructs and the binary implicit in
humanness where connections back to male-and-femaleness in Genesis normalizes
heterosexuality and procreation. She critiques Nalo Hopkinson and the visual artist Wangechi
Mutu for not fully opposing white Western liberal humanist frameworks. She argues against

Fig. 2-42. Mutu, Wangechi, Riding Death in My Sleep, 2002, ink collage on paper, 60 x 44”.
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becoming human as she sees inherent in the notion that even if black bodies are seen as human,
they will be seen as inferior humans, even if not subhuman, to Caucasians. Thus, she does not
equate black freedom with universal humanity as she argues that Black people should not try to
move into a category of the human. A category that intrinsically produces racial hierarchy
through the process of abjection. Jackson believes that trying to achieve humanity reinforces the
ideal of ‘universal humanity’ as it continues to be fully unattainable by black and othered bodies,
due to its historical definition. Furthermore, even if black people attain a certain form of
humanity it is to maintain a hold on the malleability of those black bodies. Susannah Cornwall in
her book review of Jackson’s project states,
This is not, ultimately, an anti-normative book. Jackson’s critique of the concept of
plasticity, and her insistence on the irreducibility of bodies contra fluidity, poses an
important challenge to some antimaterialist strands of queer theory. Furthermore, Jackson
clearly expects that the texts she cites have the power to make a change: the book was,
she notes, ‘underwritten by the belief that if history is processual and contingent, then art
holds the potential of keeping possibility open or serving as a form of redress’ (p. 214).
(https://academic.oup.com/litthe/advance-article/doi/10.1093/litthe/fraa029/6017440)
In “Animality and Blackness”, Jackson argues that it is not the invisibility of blackness
that led to its dehumanization but rather “the violent appropriation – inclusion and recognition –
of black(ened) humanity in the interest of plasticizing that very humanity, whereby ‘the animal’
is one but not the only form blackness it thought to encompass.” According to Jackson the fleshy
being of blackness is “produced as sub/super/human at once, a form where form shall not hold.”
Jackson eschews prior scholarships call for greater inclusion that also ignores differing
conceptions of being and the nonhuman. Jackson calls for reframing the “animalization of
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blackness” critiquing anti-black formulations of African reason for overlooking how gender,
sexuality and maternity have been key to the animalization of blackness. She further sees the
ways that ‘Man’ sets up a dichotomy between human and animal and uses blackness to prop up
Eurocentric humanism forming this clear distinction between human and animal. She further
sees racialized formations of gender and sexuality as central to the human – animal binarism as
black female abjection is a prerequisite for this dichotomy and states:
Within the structure of much thought on race there is an implicit assumption that the
recognition of one as a human being will protect one from (or acts as an insurance policy
against) ontologizing violence. Departing from a melancholic attachment to such an
ideal, I argue that the violence and terror scholars describe is endemic to the recognition
of humanity itself – when that humanity is cast as black. A recognition of black
humanity, demonstrated across these pages, is not denied or excluded but weaponized by
a conception of ‘the human’ foundationally organized by the idea of a racial telos. For
Wynter, the Negro is not so much excluded from the category Man and its
overrepresentation of humanity but foundational to it as its antipodal figure, as the nadir
of Man. I argue that the recognition of humanity and its suspension act as alibis for each
other’s terror, such that the pursuit of human recognition or a compact with ‘the human’
would only plunge one headlong into further terror and domination. Is the black a human
being? The answer is hegemonically yes. However, this, in actuality, may be the wrong
question as an affirmative offers no assurances. A better question may be: If being
recognized as human offers no reprieve from ontologizing dominance and violence, then
what might we gain from the rupture of ‘the human’?... As long as ‘the animal’ remains
an intrinsic but abject feature of ‘the human’, black freedom will remain elusive and
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black lives in peril, as ‘the animal’ and ‘the black’ are not only interdependent
representations but also entangled concepts.
(https://criticalposthumanism.net/animality-and-blackness/)
Jackson believes that any attempts to bring blackness into the fold of humanity is just the
reproduction of a black humanity that has been imposed on black people a forced separation
from ‘the animal’ a mode of being separate from Man and disciplined and exterminated by said
Man. Jackson brings up some excellent points and I shall heed her advice and not so easily
separate the concept of human from animal and other projects should fully consider that in
relation to EmDisEmbodiment. I believe EmDisEmbodiment will not only allow for better
connections to other humans but to animals and the world as well.
I would like to conclude by looking at Lewis Gordon’s thoughts whose remarks on
Wynter brings up some connections to the EmDisEmbodied I. Gordon sees where denying the
other’s subjectivity means denying their point of view or in Husserlian terms ignoring their
human embodied subjectivity. Thus, a black person in an anti- black racist world who does not
see their inner subjectivity then experiences a world where “all is permitted against him or her”
(240). However, their position is also very powerful as they realize this anti-black white society
is a construction, the world is much larger than the white one. Through double consciousness,
they realize the contradictions and paradoxes within their society. They can thus embody through
disembodiment - a realization of the fallacy of this anti-black world. Double consciousness is
then, “a subversion of white normativity through identifying white normativity as normativity”
(243). Gordon identifies how those with double consciousness can see beyond the feigned nature
of white normativity as “’universal,’ ‘complete,’ and ‘absolute’” (243). While whiteness has
exemplified certain forms of blindnesses, due to the visibility of black and othered bodies within
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our cultural moment white people (men especially) have been confronted with the need to
embody beyond their disembodiment, to come back down to earth. Gordon sees the geography of
reason shifting through EmDisEmbodiment, I take a note from all of these theorists and artists as
I explore the various ideas within, as Gordon sees, our open teleological moment.
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Fig. 2-43. Images and details from Carrie Mae Weems, Framed by Modernism, 1996.
carriemaeweems.net/galleries/framed.html
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Fig. 2-44. Images from Carrie Mae Weems, From Here I Saw What Happened and I Cried, 1995-1996,
33 toned prints. carriemaeweems.net/galleries/from-here.html
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Fig. 2-45. Linguet, Mirtho. Flora 1, 2012. Color print.
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Fig. 2-46. Pope.L, William. Eating The Wall Street Journal, 2000. Performance, newspaper, toilet, mixed
media.

Fig. 2-47. Author Sylvia Wynter.
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Fig. 2-48. Davis, Annalee. Saccharum officinarum and Queen Anne’s Lace (detail). 2015. Latex on
Ledger Pages, Photo credit: Mark King

Fig. 2-49. Davis, Annalee. [Photo above by Mark King: (Detail) Edith Theodocia Gertrude et al, 2016.
Mixed media on ledger page, 55 x 40 cm.]
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CHAPTER THREE :
I ≠ I: the EmDisEmbodied Fluid I
Therefore, the feminine must be deciphered as inter-dict: within the signs or
between them, between the realized meanings, between the lines. . . dearly
representable/dark continent, logos/silence or idle chatter… these are interpretive
modalities of the female function rigorously postulated by the pursuit of a certain
game for which she will always find herself signed up without having begun to
play. Set between-at least-two, or two half, men. A hinge bending according to
their exchanges. A reserve supply of negativity sustaining the articulation of their
moves, or refusals to move, in a partly fictional progress toward the mastery of
power. Of knowledge. In which she will have no part. Off-stage, off-side, beyond
representation, beyond selfhood. A power in reserve for the dialectical operations
to come. (Speculum of the Other Woman, Luce Irigaray, 22)

In the middle of the flanks of women lies the womb, a female viscus, closely
resembling an animal; for it is moved of itself hither and thither in the flanks, also
upwards in a direct line to below the cartilage of the thorax, and also obliquely to
the right or to the left, either to the liver or the spleen, and it likewise is subject to
prolapsus downwards, and in a word, it is altogether erratic. It delights also in
fragrant smells, and advances towards them; and it has an aversion to fetid smells,
and flees from them; and, on the whole, the womb is like an animal within an
animal.” -- Published in Nobrow 8 – Hysteria
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Fig. 3-1. Elemil Martínez, Rosa. Illustration of the Uterus. pixabay.com/illustrations/ovary-utero-uteruswoman-fertility-5294636/

Although the above is from the physician Aretaeus of Cappadocia, much of the thinking
about what has been referred to as the wandering womb comes from Plato, who had a deep
denial of the body and such internal female organs as the womb. As discussed in previous
chapters, Plato saw the body as the inferior child to the superior mind. This early form of the
mind/body division reveals the aversion the Greeks had towards bodily impulses. Constantly
fighting against the strength and one could say the thinking of the body and its internal organs,
the Greeks thought that the womb could smell and thus control the mind. As the quote also
reveals, many thought of the womb as an independent animal whose desires were not able to be
controlled by rationality. This animalized but also personified womb would irrationally move,
wander and feel.
“Hysteria,” from the ancient Greek word for “uterus,” was seen to be caused by this
“wandering,” and unsettled womb. Although Plato rejected the motility of the womb he
associated hysteria with, “a moving psychological force which arises from the womb: sexual
desire perverted by frustration” (Adair 357). To heal the condition, Greek doctors placed smells
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at the opening of the vagina to attract the womb back into a more settled state. This was needed
as the unsettled nature of this bodily internal organ was seen as negatively influencing the mind
and one's behaviors. Thus, Plato's denial of the womb and the body reveals an underlying fear of
the power of the female body, referred to as an animal in the above quote. Hysteria and the
hysterical woman needed to be tamed and healed.

Fig. 3-2.Wellcome Library, London. wellcomeimages.org. 1559. Die Handschrift des Schnitt- und
Augenarztes Caspar Stromayr in Lindau im Bodensee : Caspar. Stromayr Published: [1925] Treatment of
prolapse of uterus. An object is placed in the woman’s vagina. However, smells were also placed at the
entrance to entice the Uterus downwards.

In, “The History of Hysteria,” Victoria Fairclough connects this fear by Plato and others
to a, “hegemonic obsession to what is lacking in male physiology, the womb. This unknown
alien space became characterized as a site of dangerous yet fascinating energies which remained
permanently beyond masculine understanding”. Fairclough further highlights the connection
during Greek and Western times of the female sex to their ability to reproduce, “the hegemonic
order reduced a woman from the status of subject to a wandering womb”. Any disease of an
unknown nature would be subscribed to this wandering womb she also shows Christianity's
connection of this wandering womb to the devil. In quoting Cristina Mazzoni in Saint Hysteria:
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Neurosis, Mysticism and Gender in European Culture, Fairclough contends that sexual deviation
was central to ideas about hysteria. As Mazzoni states, “a supernatural manifestation of evil and
an externalised and personalised agency, the demon[,] took the place of the womb in wandering
about the female body[14]”.
However, more modern ideas concerning hysteria were not solely associated with the
female body. In the late 19th century Jean-Martin Charcot set up a clinic for hysterics at La
Salpêtrière hospital in Paris. Through his experiments with “hysterical” women he determined
that hysteria was not a result of sexual frustration. Charcot further presented several cases of
male hysterics and those he called models of masculinity such as engineers or soldiers, paving
the way for his neurological innovations and his argument that hysteria was not only found in
female bodies. Charcot's clinic and ideas would also become foundational for Sigmund Freud’s
early work and, later, for surrealism.
Freud was a disciple of Charcot and held a fellowship at Salpêtrière between 1885 and
1886. In understanding the non-pure and split nature of the human, this and his research on
hysteria would lead Freud to theories concerning the unconscious. Fairclough points us to
Freud's definition of hysteria and reveals his early consideration of subjectivity's relationship to
language. Sounding Lacanian, Freud sees hysteria as the “unconscious refusal to accept a single
and defined subject position in the oedipal structuration of desire and identity” whereby it
resulted in “bodily symptoms, two sexual identities – masculine and feminine – which contended
with each other for dominance”. Furthermore Fairclough shows how again quoting Freud, he
saw hysterics as displacing, “that site of conflict upward, playing out their sexualised
contestation of identity in a more ambiguous register of the body, [and t]hus, hysteria is
frequently marked by disturbances of voice, vision, hearing, and even breathing…[as h]ysteria
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records a conflict…a confusion between body and language” (qtd. in Fairclough). Fairclough
concludes that this confusion is in fact a body language that should not be co-opted by
psychoanalytic myths and structures of patriarchal discourse but should instead connect to the
Kristevean chora. This chora, in contrast to Plato’s use of the word, is a connection a child has
with the womb inside the womb and the space before the Symbolic and language further
discussed in chapter one.
Although others like Judith Butler have argued against a separation of the Kristevean
chora from the Lacanian Symbolic, Fairclough understands hysteria as:
not a failure to communicate, nor is it an expression of patriarchally conceived
psychological phenomena. Instead it is an alternate, transgressive form of communication
that attempts to convey ontological traits of female existence.
Picking up on some of the arguments from Luce Irigaray considered below, Fairclough sees
hegemony as “unable and unwilling” to acknowledge the expressions of the ontologically
feminine. Thus, hysterical women, through their body language are able to become both subject
and object, undermining, “the Sartrian foundation of masculine 27/signifier, feminine/signified
upon which the concept of the masculine subject is based” (Fairclough).
In, “The Hysterical Female Subject,” Fairclough conjectures that it is precisely by being
designated Other and outside of patriarchy that the hysteric gains power. According to
Fairclough, “[b]y utilising a form of communication that is beyond the masculine definition of
language their [the hysterics] form of expression cannot be excluded”. In analyzing the book
Wuthering Heights, she reveals how a male character creates, “a wall of masculine, symbolic
language through which the female chora cannot penetrate”. Fairclough further nuances her
analysis by acknowledging Hélène Cixous ideas concerning the patriarchal:
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As Cixous writes, ‘the hysteric “makes-believe” the father, plays the father, “makesbelieve” the master [19] in the sense that she occupies the role of the Other which they
strive to control. Therefore, women in general, and the hysteric in particular, construct
masculine society in positing themselves as the negative image, the terrifying, nebulous
chaos against which patriarchy is self-defined: ‘without the hysteric there’s no
father…without the hysteric, no master, no analyst, no analysis!’
Although Fairclough acknowledges that the separation of self and Other can buy into the
hegemonic system, she worries that if we think instead of their absence and thus the entire
universe as becoming “a single undifferentiated entity”, there then becomes no need for
communication and that 'undifferentiated entity' becomes a cover for the invisible patriarchal
norm. Fairclough realizes that the control of communication is “vital for the masculine order”
where through the 'thetic phase' as described by Kristeva (a phase connected to the Lacanian
mirror phase) - one recognizes their distinction between themselves and the outside world but
then becomes the active party while the subjects and objects around them they classify are
considered passive. The subject becomes the positer, while the other is classifiable. Fairclough
continues, “[s]ince the subject becomes an active agent with the ability to place the Other
participant within the submissive, signified position, patriarchy is able to maintain its hegemony
by controlling language and ensuring that it remains the subject with the authority to posit and
resist being posited”.
Fairclough concludes by arguing that even though patriarchy attempted to prevent female
misbehavior through language and linguistic control, the hysteric through:
… physical expression and a rejection of the thetic phase fundamental to masculine
symbolic language … was able to destabilise the subject/object binary and the medical
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opinion by which it was supported. This challenged Victorian ideological conceptions of
feminine passivity that complimented masculine assertiveness, thereby reflecting the
certainty of patriarchal power back upon the masculine subject.
Fairclough further shows how the female hysteric no longer reflects or mirrors the masculine
gaze and breaks away from Luce Irigaray's thoughts on woman falling into the framework of the
specular image of the man. Fairclough sees how the hysteric rather than, “mirroring the
masculine gaze, denies the masculine subject the possibility of seeing a reflection of his own
power and effect through the female Other…”. This alternative way of communicating and being
outside of the patriarchal forms for Fairclough allows for a space that no longer reflects the
masculine and challenges the autonomy of the male authority by showing its absence.
These theories along with Freud's newfound understanding of hysteria as psychological
and not physical; related to language and the Symbolic; and both a masculine and a feminine
condition; had a deep influence on Surrealism. The Phenomenon of Ecstasy by Salvador Dali,

Fig. 3-3. Dali, Salvador. The Phenomenon of Ecstasy. 1933. Photocollage. 10.6" x 7.2".
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features the photographic studies of Charcot’s female hysterics in erotic poses. Hysteria proved
to the surrealist that their ambition of merging art with life, dreams with reality was quite
possible. Some additionally believed in the power of the hysteric to culturally represent and
allow for movements away from the Symbolic and bourgeois norms. One could exist within
these in-between, hybridized states. Surrealist like Salvador Dali and Andre Breton had a
profound interest in hysteria and hysterics, believing them and the condition to be a great source
of creativity that could inspire the imagination through a connection to a more instinctual sense
of the unconscious. However, unlike Freud and Charcot, who were interested in curing hysterics,
Breton saw hysteria as a way towards “the expulsion of man from himself” (Nadja 24).
According to Aaron H. Esman in Psychoanalysis and Surrealism: André Breton and Sigmund
Freud, “[u]nlike Freud, Breton conceived psychoanalysis as the foundation of a weltanschauung,
one that would favor psychic reality over ‘common sense,’ and that would promote revolutionary
action against a sick and repressive society.” For Breton, “Hysteria is not a pathological
phenomenon and can in every respect be considered a supreme vehicle of expression.”28 He saw
the madwoman as directly connected to the unconscious and according to Adrianna Alksnin
many white male surrealist felt that, “[t]he only way to drink from this source of inspiration is by
means of sexual intercourse! as if the surrealist artist could absorb the aura of madness while
making love to a hysteric girl.”29 It has also been suggested that interns at Salpêtrière slept with
the hysterical women that were being studied. This exchange of fluids was seen as essential for
the movement towards new ways of thinking and being.
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Fig. 3-4. Dali, Salvador. Autumnal Cannibalism. 1936. Oil on canvas. Tate Gallery Collection,
www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/dali-autumnal-cannibalism-t01978

I see this aim to consume the hysteric by the surrealists and the interns at Salpêtrière as a
desire to conquer some of their fears and anxieties surrounding what I will refer to as the Fluid I.
However, while both in some ways saw the hysteric as an objectified other, I will argue that the
Surrealist made a move towards seeing this objectified woman as a subject in their self-reflective
way of relating this subject position to themselves, as Luce Irigaray also highlights in her
discussions. Thus, the Surrealists departed from Plato's fear of the body and characteristics
related to the Fluid I such as its relational, transitory, sensory, relative and changing nature and
were in opposition to Plato's highest and pure forms which were to be outside of time and space,
that is absolute, universal, beyond the senses, and thus unchanging and not subject to opinions.
Purity and not hybridity was a key feature of these Platonic forms. These pure forms were related
to pure thinking, pure living and pure being. The unchanging nature of these forms thus could
not tolerate the changing and fevered nature of hysteria. The surrealist on the other hand, were
intrigued by this fevered nature and saw it as one of the ultimate sources of creativity. Hysteria
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could form modalities that could present different more real ways of thinking and being. Ways
that moved away from what they saw as the true pathology - the bourgeois, colonial, stated, and
privileged nature of many Europeans of the time. My conception of the Fluid I develops in ways
from Salvador Dali's imagery, his connection to hysteria, and his writings especially those
concerning the paranoiac-critical method.
Dali's paranoiac-critical method developed from his thoughts on how to expand surrealist
automatism. Automatism was used by the artist to subdue conscious control over the making
process and instead allows the unconscious irrational mind to take over. It was used by such
artist as Wilfredo Lam and Joan Miro. Automatism prioritized the transcendental, exterior,
spiritual, primordial world that could be reached by giving up control of the conscious rational
world to the unconscious and subconscious worlds. Lam used the method to bring forth forgotten
African traditions through his art. He further looked at his multicultural heritage to explore
relationships between African and Oceanic influences. Through his paintings he relayed dreams
and contradictions as opposed to the certainty of reality. Lam was also fascinated with the
Santería religion, in which rituals and beliefs from West Africa are hybridized with Catholicism.
Lam, on a trip to Haiti, encountered Santería and Vodou rituals where the worshipper is
possessed or ‘ridden’ by a spirit or Loa. The influence of these rituals is evident throughout
Lam’s work. He painted mask-like faces and hybrid figures including the ‘horse-headed woman’.
Lam believed that through his art and this connection to non-Western imagery he had found
ways to decolonize the mind. Furthermore, Joan Miro also felt that creativity should come from
deep within a person’s subconscious and created biomorphic shapes and symbols that become an
abstracted visual language in his work.

224
One can see the very key differences between automatism and Dali's paranoiac-critical
method. Through this method Dali was interested in the conversation between the irrational and
rational worlds, fluidity and solidity, reality and surreality, masculine and feminine, subject and
object, and self and other. He fought against simple dichotomies and the Manichean separations
between such terms as rational and irrational and subject and object. In, “The Object as Revealed
in Surrealist Experiment”, he explores the experiments the surrealists did to see beyond the
comfort of the stable subject or self. The surrealists would in groups do trance sessions, engage
in communal exquisite drawings, communal poetry and other ways to move away from the

Fig. 3-5. Dali, Salvador, Hugo. Valentine. Breton, Andre. Dali, Gala. Cadavre exquis (sketch) , ca. 1932.
ink. 14 x 9 cm. (5.5 x 3.5 in.). www.artnet.com/artists/salvador-dali-valentine-hugo-andre-breton-andgala-dali/cadavre-exquis-sketch-NeQAxg68K3ynXZBVDWz1Iw2,
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individualistic self. Dali quotes himself by stating, “‘I think the time is rapidly coming when it
will be possible (simultaneously with automatism and other passive states) to systemize
confusion thanks to a paranoiac and active process of thought, and so assist in discrediting
completely the world of reality’” (90-91, Surrealists on Art). He sees the paranoiac-critical
method as liberating automatism and, “[t]hrough the new relation thus established our eyes see
the light of things in the external world” (91). Dali continues by speaking of the fear associated
with the loss of “our former habitual phantoms which only two well ensured our peace of mind”
and towards the newfound need to, “regard the world of objects, the objective world, as the true
and manifested content of a new dream” (91). The objects, in contradiction to the thetic phase,
thus become forms in time and not just passive and solid objects in space.

Fig. 3-6. Halsman, Philippe. Dalí Atomicus. 1948. www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-story-surrealphotograph-salvador-dali-three-flying-cats
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Dali further looks at the poet's “drama” and fears related to this instability, “[a]t the limit
of the emerging cultivation of desire, we seem to be attracted by a new body, we perceive the
existence of a thousand bodies of objects we feel we have forgotten” (91). Dali observes a
movement away from just seeing the outside object, the outside body as “primitively the concept
of a second self”. He explores further this concept he takes from Ludwig Feuerbach and sees
how the object is, “usually produced with the help of the ‘you’ which is the ‘objective
self,’”(91). Dali's work consistently shows this movement towards fluid forms and selves, an
inspiration perhaps from his deep interest in the work of Freud and Lacan and very much related
to the post-structuralist thinking to come. Dali’s fascination with clocks along with his merging
of the feminine, masculine, animal, insect, and mechanical all speak to this desire to liquify the
stable I. Time and duration then become key components in how we relate to ourselves and
others and we can no longer presume a concrete and stable history or present, poststructuralism
and not solely structuralism begins to fully impact our thoughts about being.

Fig. 3-7. Dali, Salvador. The Great Masturbator. 1929. Oil on canvas. www.wikiart.org/en/salvadordali/the-great-masturbator-1929
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In “When Lacan met Dali: Lacan’s “Paranoid” Reading of Saussure’s Theory of the
Sign”, Despina-Alexandra Constantinidou emphasizes the ways that the Surrealists, Dali and
especially his interest in paranoia influenced the way Lacan would come to break the signifier
away from what is signified. Constantinidou further understands the importance of seeing the
workings of the unconscious as visible within the field of representation rather than within a
subterranean or hidden state. For Dali the unconscious is very present, manifest as opposed to
latent helping to account for the fluidity of the I as it contributes to being.
The Fluid I is further conceived through Irigaray's thoughts and ideas. Irigaray disrupts
what she sees as the Symbolic rule of the father by using the biological body as a starting point
to create shifting metaphors, believing that sexual difference can be used as a model to enrich
our thinking and discourses. For Irigaray, there is something very valuable in the difference of
woman to man for with difference there is always then going to be something that is bigger than
ourselves, giving us that space for expansion. In contrast to the representational phallocentric
ways she sees us constructing our beings from the Classical age, she wants us to focus on the
“feminine”30 and touch. Irigaray elucidates the ways that female desire and eroticism have not
been able to be captured by the phallocentric and heteronormative world but instead have been
fragmented and repressed.
Irigaray wants us to appreciate the many ways of feeling pleasure, feeling unity within
the multiplicity rather than needing one goal, one means, one methodology, one way of thinking,
one thesis, one argument and one conclusion. For Irigaray, sexual pleasure does not involve one
type of activity and in a similar fashion our discourses and the way we frame those discourses
need to be open to difference and multiplicity.
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Fig. 3-8. Schneemann, Carolee. Eye Body #24 from Eye Body: 36 Transformative Actions for Camera.
1963. © 2021 Estate of Carolee Schneemann. www.moma.org/collection/
works/200122?artist_id=7712&page=1&sov_referrer=artist

In counter to Sigmund Freud’s one sex model she sees the self-caressing of woman who,
“‘touches herself’ all the time, and moreover no one can forbid her to do so, for her genitals are
formed of two lips in continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she is already two --but not
divisible into one(s)-that caress each other” (24). These lips, continuously touching each other,

Fig. 3-9. O’Keefe, Georgia. Blue Flower. 1918. Pastel on paper, 20 x 16 inches.
Georgia O'Keeffe Museum.

229
are ways towards a being that is more self-reflexive, more at ease with being with the other,
realizing and accepting the abjected psychological other within.
Irigaray's concepts concerning fluidity and proximity allow a space of departure away
from closing and fixing our Is in such modes as representation, grids, and tables. She argues
against this gridding and Sigmund Freud’s ideas concerning the hysterical woman. She contends
that women should not be excluded from the subject position. She sees how Western discourse

Fig. 3-10. Martin, Agnes, Summer. 1964. Archival Pigment Print, 20" x 16".
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and logic rather than being universal are set up to maintain male (particular males – my addition)
interests. She also points to what she refers to as the “speculum of the other woman” the title of
one of her books which relates to a process of specularisation where man projects himself on to
the world which is then reflected back to him. Woman then becomes this reflected image
repressing her own very different way of being. Woman31 is erased while also being a key
foundation of the image man creates for himself. Irigaray shows how this erasure has happened
throughout the ages and in various discourses from the philosophical to the psychoanalytic.

Fig. 3-11. Dali, Salvador. Dalí Seen from the Back Painting Gala from the Back Eternalized by Six
Virtual Corneas Provisionally Reflected by Six Real Mirrors. 1972-73. Stereoscopic work.
www.salvador-dali.org/en/artwork/catalogue-raisonne-paintings/obra/853/dali-seen-from-the-backpainting-gala-from-the-back-eternalized-by-six-virtual-corneas-provisionally-reflected-by-six-realmirrors-stereoscopic-work.

Irigaray does not have a clear distinction between hysteria and pathology. She believes that
hysteria may or may not be pathological even though Western Culture has established it as
pathological. She finds the ambiguity in hysteria's pathology relating to the fact that hysteria has
“both a reserve power and a paralyzed power” (138). A power that is repressed but also very
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ready to strike out and be productive as opposed to imitative, it thus is not only mimetic but
generative. However, this repressed hysteria she states:
… speaks in the mode of a paralyzed gestural faculty, of an impossible and also a
forbidden speech ... It speaks as symptoms of an “it can't speak to or about itself' ... And
the drama of hysteria is that it is inserted schizotically between that gestural system, that
desire paralyzed and enclosed within its body, and a language that it has learned in the
family, in school… (136)
Irigaray views hysteria as a neurosis that afflicts all women. She conjectures that women
in patriarchal structures do not have ways of expressing themselves leading to them speaking
through the body and the fits that occur due to hysteria. According to Adrianna Alksnin, Irigaray
believes that, “hysteria is a language of forbidden passion, which manifests itself in energy and
creativity, but still – it strays from male logic too radically, and therefore must remain silent,
immobilized in gestures, enchanted in shriek and seizure. It is the only possible way to rebel”.
(9)
Irigaray posits that feminine jouissance cannot be properly expressed within the
phallogocentric symbolic order and thus the hysteric displays her sexual pleasure through these
seizures and contractions. In “Thinking Life as Relation: An Interview with Luce Irigaray,” she
states:
For me, questioning the patriarchal world has been possible from the discovery of the
fabricated character of my feminine identity. Neither my consciousness nor even my
body had free access to the real. I could not pass from nature to the spiritual because I
was held in a determination of the one and of the other which was foreign to me. The
sensible as well as the intelligible were presented to me and imposed upon me according
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to norms which were not proper to me. Therefore, I had to recover an immediate
perception of the real and at the same time to elaborate a symbolic universe which
corresponded to it. (345)
For Irigaray, this recovery of a connection to the real and the newly elaborated symbolic directly
relates to thinking about the I in terms of the feminine body and fluidity. What then can be said
of the visual and poetic rebellion by the surrealist white male artists and the discussion on the
Caribbean female artist that concludes the chapter?
There is much necessary concern about essentializing the feminine as Butler and others
so brilliantly critique. Furthermore, our cultural moment, with a greater acknowledgement
through discourse of trans, non-binary, and other bodies, furthers the critique of this constructed
notion of the feminine as connected to a fixed body and highlights the need to very carefully
look at any form of essentializing. However, these critiques are not fully in opposition to
Irigaray's thoughts as it relates to discourse. Although at times it may be helpful to pit the
different views against the other, one should consider the nuances and connections between these
ideas as well. It is key to look at the importance of what Irigaray is saying in connection to
relationality and difference and although she may be using tropes of femininity her crucial
concern is to use these tropes to move toward a better understanding and appreciation of
relationality and intersubjectivity. If one takes what I would call a method of EmDisEmbodiment
to go into and out of these ideas one can see the ways some of her key thoughts may actually
reinforce their own. And the way her work may complicate and expand the discursive world.
Although there are some necessary critiques of the heteronormativity associated to her work, I
believe the passage below gets at some of the important additions her thinking brings to the
discursive universe; her critique of the constructions of philosophical thoughts as it relates to the
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phallogocentrism of logos and language; and her understanding of what only staying within the
world of Platonic pure forms misses. Irigaray posits:
Whether it is a matter of biology, physics, mathematics, linguistics, logic, psychology,
etc., generally the closed, the finite, the “dead,” the isolated is preferred to the open, the
in-finite, the living, the relation. Sometimes there exists a play of oppositions between
extremes but it is only belatedly, marginally and not without resistances that science has
become interested in “the partly-opened,” in the “permeability of membranes,” in the
theory of “fields,” in the “dynamic of fluids,” in the current programming of discourse, in
the “dialogic,” etc. Now these objectives have more affinity with the feminine universe.
(“Thinking life as relation: an interview with Luce Irigaray”, 347)
At this moment the academic and philosophical fields that are helpful to me in trying to hold
onto antinomies and contradictions within language and through EmDisEmbodiment are
phenomenology, existentialism and psychoanalysis with all of their insights and failures. I see
the strength in these fields as being able to position people theoretically and though there are
criticisms of each field, their circles are open fashioning an endless need for expansion.
However, Irigaray argues that a deadness exists not only in various fields but in academia as a
whole. In an interview with Evelien Geerts and Maud Perrier for the Feminist and Women’s
Studies Association (UK and Ireland) Newsletter, she worries about how we frame the languages
of academia and calls for women to:
… transform academia into a place of dialogues respectful of difference(s). However, if
the language of girls and female adolescents shows a privileging of subject-subject
relations over subject-object relations, this relational quality has to be cultivated as such.
This is not yet the case, and the investigations that I conducted in France and Italy – and
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that other researchers conducted in other countries – prove that sexuate difference
vanishes in the discourses of the teachers, because they have been taught to use a unique
discourse, in the neuter, as a sign of their cultural competence. Without a cultivation of
their intersubjective attitudes, women are not always able to respect the otherness of the
other. And they then enter in a process of subjugation or domination that does not make
them capable of transforming academic culture into a place of sharing in difference. (11)
Through this statement Irigaray approaches EmDisEmbodiment, revealing a keen understanding
of her difference and the need to be relational in the world of theory, an argument I also reinforce
by putting the thoughts of Luce Irigaray, Frantz Fanon, and Jean Luc Nancy in proximate
relationships with each other through subject-subject conceptions.
However, I would like to embody for just a moment by speaking about a classroom
experience as I come back down from the world of theory as we work towards
EmDisEmbodiment. While certain forms of disembodiment are important as we approach
EmDisEmbodiment, embodiment is also key. In one of my classes, I became aware of just how
easily I fall into the trap of constructing my own universe in terms of binaries. While discussing
one of my student's projects in front of the entire class, I referred to a gender non-confirming
student on multiple occasions mistakenly as she. I apologized and started to use they. Here one
sees the need to look at the nuances of the lived experience that will allow a departure from
Irigaray but that still also allows us to see the importance of what she is relaying to us. We need
to find languages that hold onto contradictions through relationality and not a dialectic that
subsumes one into the other. In other words, I need to find a language that does not always
essentialize. A language that is not fixed in truth and in pure forms but understands the split
unstable and changing nature of subjectivity and that realizes that understandings by others of
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different subjectivities could profoundly expand my own. So as Irigaray refers to masculine and
feminine we have to realize the multiplicities in those terms, go beyond those terms, while
simultaneously not make what Irigaray may mean by those terms and her experience within
those terms invisible. The images I am displaying in the background rather than illustrating what
I am saying, I hope at the same time are expanding other interpretations of what I have written
here and perhaps will reveal even more of the blindenesses in my thoughts and ideas.
However, let me return to the academic discourse. Irigaray realizes that the constructed
universe of Western philosophy, especially that related to the Parmenidean line of thought, and
connected to a metaphysical notion of the One, has been built on this foundation of fixity. She
defines metaphysics as “a science capable of organizing material or immediately sensible
realities with logical instruments which removed them from their first nature” (349). She goes on
further to state:
The birth of Western philosophy is accompanied by the constitution of a logos, a
language obeying rules such as those of self-identity, of non-contradiction, etc., which
distinguish it from a simple empirical language. These logical rules have been defined in
order to ensnare the totality of the real in the nets of language, and thus to remove it from
sensible experience, from the ever in-finite contiguity of daily life. (349).
Aspects of this statement resonate with me. I have been taught to set up an introduction, thesis,
supporting evidence and conclusion. It is a good clear format that gets us somewhere. The word
conclusion alone implies permanence a full stop. It takes an astute student and writer to be able
to conclude without fixing their meanings.
But how can I make powerful philosophical, political and art critical statements if I do
not follow this more linear, clear model? Perhaps instead, following Irigaray’s advice concerning
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the dangers within this more teleological flow, I create a flow within these pages that is
somewhat associative. I present a collaging of ideas and theorists that follow not always logically
but based on key associations. Ideas may refute other ideas but they will not completely subsume
them. Similarly, I think in terms of an Irigarayan proximity and prefer fluidity over stable
differentiated forms, I am interested in the notion of ideas in proximate relationship to the other
and the theorists and artists I present to you are hence, also within close but not annihilated
relationships.
As images can give more of a felt experience to the words above, I want to relay another
personal experience. Although this is an academic dissertation I have not been afraid to address
the I as Irigaray, other feminist, and some decolonial scholars argue for the importance of the I in
engaging with and opening up spaces of difference by thinking beyond the ways we consider
logos. A couple years ago, I went to an exhibition at the Guggenheim by the artist Tsang KinWah. Two pieces stood out. In No(thing/Fact) Outside, a site-specific vinyl installation, KinWah collages texts, his own and other artists in the show that meander around the walls, not
dissimilar to what I aim to do here, as quotes flow into my ideas. I remember seeing the work
during one of the most impactful experiences in my graduate program which made me more
connected to this notion of EmDisEmbodiment where I felt the impact of a fellow student’s being
through their theories and ideas, realizing that I can never fully fathom her universal that could
be very different from mine. Her politics, even if not the same as mine, felt as important to their
being. Furthermore, politics, culture, my notion of the other, shifts through fluidity and are never
fixed based on my expectations.
I met many people with very different ideas and political persuasions in the program. The
program’s strength was in its ability to create a space where various perspectives and voices
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would share. I always valued myself on my smarts, my mother stressed that in both my sister and
I. The narcissist in me also felt in my gut I could figure out much that was thrown at me and
perhaps I would figure the problem out even better than many others. Studies in philosophy
however are humbling. Especially this particular experience in my second year of course work
after seeing a brilliant presentation by a fellow student and scholar I highly respected with these
very different ideas and political worldview.
It is hard to fully remember the details but that day I realized that I would never be the
same the day after. We never are the same as time progresses but this experience made that that
much more prescient. The scholar went to one of the most prestigious Black Colleges in the
States, had much more knowledge and information about Afro-centrism than I, and had a real
handle on Heideggerian thought. A handle that I could never fully connect with. What she
revealed to me that day was how limited my thinking and my final political stance at the time
concerning the subject was. She made me realize that individual politics can never be concerned
with an end point but must think in terms of relation and conversation – waves and traces, the
invisible and the not yet cognized.
On that day in Hegelian terms, my current thesis which was to delve into hybridity by
looking in depth at whiteness and blackness studies and her anti-thesis with a more separatist
framework came together through Absolute Spirit to form a synthesis or is it that the synthesis
led to a formation of Absolute Spirit? I would have to delve further into Hegel which is a
digression I do not intend to make here. However, if I consider this from the vantage point of
Fluid EmDisEmbodied Is then we can understand the limitations of our moment and humble
ourselves to the inability to fully understand the history and experience of the other. We can
tread with caution as we try to interpret the other.
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However, what if through these interpretations rather than bettering the other we instead
worked within a dialogue that also tried to listen. But who listens and who speaks?

Fig. 3-12. and Fig. 3-13. Tsang, Kin-Wah, In The End Is The Word. 2016. Six-channel video
installation, with sound. 10 min., 10 sec. Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, New York, The Robert H.
N. Ho Family Foundation Collection.
Fig. 3-14. Tsang, Kin-Wah, No(thing / Fact) Outside, 2016. Vinyl installation. Solomon R.
Guggenheim Museum, New York, The Robert H. N. Ho Family Foundation Collection.

Regardless, two things are forgotten in this Hegelian equation. Firstly, what happens when the
space where these two bodies with very differing ideas meet uses certain historical constructions
to favor one body and their ideas over another? What happens when one person’s ideas get
cancelled out in favor of the others or gets immersed into the others? No one after all should be
silenced.
Irigaray’s ideas concerning the need to protect difference and various bodies and to
protect then the different ways meaning can be generated from different bodies is important for
allowing for the invisible to be revealed and allowing many to not be silenced. Aspects of the
“hysterical” could then flow through the fissures of the Symbolic. Irigaray believes that men
would gain much in not repressing their hysteria – I would add women and theys as well.
Various bodies would then be able to claim this hysteria through their Fluid Is. Irigaray
understands that although the repression of hysteria has expanded men’s economic and societal
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power (obtained by notions of the logos and the metaphysical and what I would add through an
idealization of Plato's pure forms) man has lost their connections to their bodies and thus being
and relating in this world more authentically. However which man is Irigaray speaking of? If one
takes the concept of man in terms of phallocentric man she offers great insight. However, it is
also important to look at the nuances connected to man and how that relates to concepts
connected to the Fluid I. What thus can be said of the black man or as this section focuses on the
surrealistic white man as it relates to the Fluid I.
It is unfortunate that some feminist philosophical theories have referred to “man” without
considering race and other factors related to nuanced views on masculinity. This is not surprising
as much of Euro-continental philosophy makes claims in universal, ontological terms. One then
can miss the fact that black men have historically been feminized and so do not easily fit into
these overarching claims about manhood. One will also miss the key scholarship of Nkiru
Nzegwu who has done research on the Igbo people that questions how women and gender are

Fig. 3-15. Nkiru Nzegwu. www.amherst.edu/system/files/styles/original/private/Nzegwu.jpg.
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produced in a Western context. Her work interrogates Euromodern hegemonic
misrepresentations of the scope of Eurocentric forms of knowledge that privilege representation
and what one sees that is the different biological organs for the sole use of constructing gender.
(Gordon 2019) One can also miss Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyèwùmí’s work in The Invention of Women that
one can argue enables the reader to begin to envision the potentialities of a post-gendered world.

Fig. 3-16. Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyèwùmí’s. www.trouw.nl/nieuws/we-gaan-dood-aan-westerseoverheersing~b7e450e0/?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F

Furthermore, by taking only an ontological view one can also miss the anxieties that many white
men share with each other concerning their masculinities or one could use the term popularized
by Raewyn Connell of their hegemonic masculinities.32

Fig. 3-17. Raewyn Connell. othersociologist.com/tag/raewyn-connell/
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Fig. 3-18. Jacqueline Rose. www.irishtimes.com/culture/books/jacqueline-rose-s-fascinating-insightsinto-the-distortions-of-motherhood-1.3484321

Jacqueline Rose with her psychoanalytic approach explores these nuances of masculinity
as it relates to the anxieties of the white man. She also looks at the issues inherent with moves
that only focus on the feminine body. In Sexuality in the Field of Vision, she refers back to
Jacques Lacan's Encore, which she translated, and relays some of these white male anxieties that
she highlights in Lacan's work, “In relation to the man, woman comes to stand for both
difference and loss: ‘On the one hand, the woman becomes, or is produced, precisely as what he
is not, that is, sexual difference, and on the other, as what he has to renounce, that is,
jouissance.’” Rose recognizes the othering of woman and how this othering is used to support
[white, my addition] man's33 symbolic place. She further understands how the hysteric who is
also associated with woman, the feminine, and otherness is used as this support. The man is
believed to be not a hysteric and therefore does not possess all the negative connotations related
to hysteria. Rose further states, “The object a34, cause of desire and support of male fantasy, gets
transposed onto the image of the woman as Other who then acts as its guarantee. The absolute
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'Otherness' of the woman, therefore, serves to secure for the man his own self-knowledge and
truth.” (74).

Fig. 3-19. Man Ray. Marcel Duchamp as Rrose Sélavy. c. 1920-1921. Gelatin silver print.

Rose's use of psychoanalysis along with feminism allows for a recognition of the parts
the subjected and subjector play in societal structures, the slippage between those terms and the
relationship between such Is. Rose's work struggles with the tension of psychoanalysis'
suspension between “too little and too much of the subject” (22) arguing:
… that the importance of psychoanalysis is precisely the way that it throws into crisis the
dichotomy on which the appeal to the reality of the event (amongst others) clearly rests.
Perhaps for women it is of particular importance that we find a language which allows us
to recognise our part in intolerable structures — but in a way which renders us neither the
pure victims nor the sole agents of our distress. (14)
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When one EmDisEmbodies theoretically, they use a psychoanalytic lens along with
phenomenology and existentialism to consider the universal Is in more nuanced ways including
the anxieties, struggles and successes of those Is. I see EmDisEmbodiment as useful in looking at
the Surrealist and the ways they want to possess as well as celebrate this otherness of woman and
their fascination with characteristics associated with the feminine including hysteria and
convulsive beauty. I turn now to Salvador Dali and his power through his connections to
hysteria.

Fig. 3-20. Hewitt, Charles. Dali on the Beach. 1955.

Salvador Dali is reported by his biographers to have suffered from hysteria and did not
repress it during childhood. His hysterical fits as a child, would include bouts where he would
throw himself down flights of stairs. However, he states that he was cured of this hysteria when
he met the love of his life Gala and she told him she wanted him to kill her. It has been said that
Dali told a longtime friend he hated being touched and was incapable of having sexual
relationships with anyone including Gala. Dali’s father showed him nude photos of people with
advanced venereal diseases when he was a child, so he associated sex with putrefaction. He also
developed a huge fear of castration and a phobia toward female genitalia. According to Ian
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Gibson, an Irish-born biographer of Dalí, “Dalí always boasted: ‘I'm impotent, you've got to be
impotent to be a great painter.’”35 Dali further revealed in his autobiography that he liked
masturbating in front of a mirror, and being a voyeur on the periphery while he watched others
having sex. His early paintings like Voyeur of 1921 and The Great Masturbator of 1929

Fig. 3-21. Dali, Salvador. Voyeur. 1921.

further reinforce this and his previous claims. Could this sexual repression of Dali relate to his
own hysteria? Is his paradoxical use of the academic highly representational style that confused
meaning when used to paint non-representational objects and human hybrids also relate to the
excitement as well as anxieties related to his connections with hysteria? Did his contradictory
repression of sexuality along with his connection to eroticism and the “feminine” allow Dali to
reveal the fluidity of the objects and subjects around him?
David Lomas’s, The Haunted Self: Surrealism, Psychoanalysis, Subjectivity, provides
insight into Dali and the surrealists paradoxical excitement and anxieties with the reclamation of
the “feminine.” In contrast to trajectories that show the Western white male's connection to the
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stable Cartesian I, Lomas reveals how Dali and the surrealists’ exploration of dreams and the
unconscious reveal them rejecting the unified self and embracing while grappling with the
haunted otherness and instability within the self. Salvador Dali’s work with the mind/body split,
the abjected hysterical feminine, sexuality, and his paranoiac-critical method are important
examples.
Through these and other methods, the surrealist dared to imagine the marvelous as Robin
D.G. Kelley states in his book Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination. Kelley
illuminates the affinity between black life and surrealism, which he defines as “… a living,
mutable, creative vision of a world where love, play, human dignity, an end to poverty and want,
and imagination are the pillars of freedom” (158). In a longer quote Kelley highlights the
Chicago Surrealist Group’s definition of Surrealism:
Surrealism is the exaltation of freedom, revolt, imagination and love... [It] is above all a
revolutionary movement. Its basic aim is to lessen and eventually to completely resolve
the contradiction between everyday life and our wildest dreams. By definition subversive,
surrealist thought and action are intended not only to discredit and destroy the forces of
repression, but also to emancipate desire and supply it with new poetic weapons…
Beginning with the abolition of imaginative slavery, it advances to the creation of a free
society in which everyone will be a poet—a society in which everyone will be able to
develop his or her potentialities fully and freely. (158)
Kelley sees people’s ability to enter the Marvelous through, “plunging into the depths of the
unconscious and lessening “the contradiction between everyday life and our wildest dreams”
(158). Kelley understands Surrealism’s ability to permeate and subvert our repressive
epistemologies and ways of being in the world where it becomes instead an “adventure of the
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mind” Franklin Rosemont’s phrase from André Breton—What Is Surrealism? Selected Writings:.
Unlike Charles Gaines who in chapter one wanted to move away from the Creative imagination,
surrealism according to Kelley, “…offers a vision of freedom far deeper and more expansive
than any of the movements discussed thus far. It is a movement that invites dreaming, urges us to
improvise and invent, and recognizes the imagination as our most powerful weapon” (158). He
sees Surrealism as not only an artistic movement or a revolution of the mind that stays dormant,
but a revolution that is able to bring new lives into existence (158).
Although Kelley acknowledges that Surrealism arose from the West, he sees it as a
powerful revolutionary tool, offering a radical vision that is, a “conspiracy against the West”
(159) where Surrealists looked outside Western influences to turn to the work and ideas of the
“primitives” including ideas and art from the Third World. It is important to rethink notions of
the “primitive”, for Suzanne and Aimé Césaire were anything but primitive in the denigrated
understanding of the word as backwards. Kelley focuses in on the ways Surrealism, was strongly
anti-colonial pointing to Martinican students Etienne Léro, René Menil, J. M. Monnerot, Pierre
Yoyotte, his sister Simone Yoyotte, and others that were living in Paris, who published a first
issue of a journal they called Légitime Défense (Self-Defense). These students would declare
their allegiance to surrealism and communist revolution, critiquing the French-speaking black
bourgeoisie. They looked to black American writers like Langston Hughes and Claude McKay,
and published poetry and automatic writing by several members of the group. They further
denounced racism and affirmed their African past and its diaspora. J. M. Monnerot made a major
contribution to Surrealism’s theoretical development critiquing the “civilized mentality” and
Pierre Yoyotte wrote on the importance of surrealism for the struggle against fascism (166).
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Surrealism's explorations of the primitive, hysteria, the irrational, and anti-colonialism
are key moments within a revolutionary consciousness along with their interest in Négritude.
Négritude and its relations to Surrealism are not always discussed. Négritude was a movement
developed by writers and politicians of the African diaspora during the 1930s. These intellectuals
and creatives disavowed colonialism, and argued for the importance of a Pan-African racial
identity among people of African descent worldwide. Kelley reveals the connections between
Breton and compatriots such as the Césaires. Breton met both Suzanne Césaire,

Fig. 3-22. Suzanne Césaire. globalsocialtheory.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Suzanne-cesaire.jpg

and Aimé Césaire, key proponents of Négritude. Suzanne based her understanding of Négritude
on a hybridized state of being. Jen Westmoreland Bouchard in RECONFIGURATIONS: A
Journal for Poetics & Poetry / Literature & Culture states:
Since hybridity is inherent in the Surrealist state (somewhere between waking and
sleeping), Surrealism was essential to the theoretical formation of [Suzanne Césaire’s]
Négritude perspective. Her recognition and avowal of the Martinican subject as a hybrid
entity allowed her to transcend the fixed binary structure of the time: whites-blacks,
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Europeans-Africans, civilized-savages. Moreover, her adherence to a hybrid definition of
the Martinican subject was based on the complex history of the island.
Bouchard continues:
Through the analytical mode of Surrealism, Suzanne Césaire began the enormous task of
uncovering the history of the Martinican and unearthing his identity as a means of
colonial resistance. These important steps laid the foundation for the next generation of
revolutionary writers, such as Fanon, Glissant, and the creators of Créolité, to carry on
the struggle toward identity location and liberation.
However, even though Césaire's ideas are key to thinking about such writers as Frantz Fanon and
Édouard Glissant and our better understanding in the States and elsewhere of the need to look
towards the scholarship of the Global South, many except for a few, mainly women scholars,
have ignored the very important work and historical contributions of Suzanne Césaire. Marina
Magloire in, “Witchcrafts of Color: Suzanne Césaire, Mayotte Capécia, and the Shapeshifting
Doudou in Vichy Martinique,” argues that this denial of Césaire and writers such as Mayotte
Capécia is connected to, “the lens of the doudou, a colonial-era trope that positions West Indian
women of color as the teachers and enforcers of West Indian alienation through their doomed
romantic entanglements with white French colonialists” (108). Maglioire further states, “Despite
the obvious racist and imperialist pitfalls of the doudou trope, West Indian male intellectuals’
aversion to it—and their flight in the opposite direction owes as much to misogynist fears about
emasculation as it does to antiracism and anti-imperialism” (108). She further critiques Lafcadio
Hearn, and his opinions of Martinican colonial society in his 1890 travelogue Two Years in the
French West Indies. Maglioire shows how the intersection of racism and misogyny in the
Caribbean has a deep anxiety concerning:
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… landscape that focused on its beauty, its fecundity, and its passive sexual availability
to colonial rapine. The islands themselves, with their fruits and flowers, their gentle,
caressing breezes and wanton temperatures, are an analogue to the platonic ideal of the
mixed-race woman in colonial literature. All gentleness and compliance, all yielding flesh
and sweet sighs, all soft obeisance to her colonial lover without ever a demand for
reciprocity or a thought of resentment. The doudou becomes both the cause of
colonialism (she must be possessed) and its justification (she wants to be possessed).
(109)
Maglioire further highlights the binary set up by Hearn of the Martinican men who “navigated
slavery through feats of arms”, while Martinican women “navigated slavery by oﬀering
themselves up as sexual playthings” (110-111). She believes that this binary has laid the
groundwork for seeing the Martinican woman as not just apolitical but antirevolutionary:
Choosing comfort over resistance, complicity over revolution, the woman of color of
Hearn’s imaginary is the perfect colonial subject, bred to be beautiful, pleasant, and
obliging—like a scentless flower, a seedless fruit, the carefully crafted hybrid of
generations of sexual abuse. (111)
This view of the female as passive and complicit was not only seen in some Caribbean
male intellectuals, some of the European male Surrealists who viewed the female as an object of
desire and as a passive subject they could consume, sexually and otherwise created work and
writings that strongly revealed their anxieties associated with woman. As Rachel Grew points out
in “A Wizard / Witch’s Duel: Gender Power Struggles and the Occult in Surrealism”,
“Surrealists did have a progressive attitude towards women’s rights, calling for their social and
sexual liberation. Despite this however, male Surrealists still tended to divide women into two
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restrictive categories: the femme enfant, who was innocent of her sexual attraction and acted as a
muse for the male artist, and the femme fatale, who was the highly sexual, provocative,
castrating woman”
(https://figshare.com/articles/chapter/A_wizard_witch_s_duel_gender_power_struggles_and_the
_occult_in_surrealism/9335972/1). With these two boxes some of the males in the movement
then tried to contain artists like Remedios Varo, Leonora Carrington, Leonor Fini, and Claude
Cahun, who some would argue was non-binary or a precursor to non-binary before culturally the
term became prevalent. These female artists and the revolution of their minds could not be
contained and thus greatly connected to the Fluid I and EmDisEmbodiment. In fact, as true
hysterics, in this more nuanced understanding of the word, they and their male hysterical
compatriots were connecting to ways of seeing that nuanced visual, written, spiritual languages
and ways of being.
In Remedios Varo: Letters, Dreams and Other Writings, one gets a sense of her thinking
and writing which is described By Zack Hatfield as, “delicate and assiduously unhinged, both
giddy with the possibilities of the impossible and curiously prim—outlandish, but just right. In
Varo’s work, the clashing forces of magic and science deliquesce: witchcraft, chemistry,
fairytales, anthropology, mathematical formulas, astronomy, Freudian psychoanalysis—all is
grist for the imagination” he continues, “[a]s with her paintings, Varo’s writing is a wily
escapism, flouting the ordinary to bring us closer to the everyday”
(https://brooklynrail.org/2019/02/art_books/Remedios-VarosLetters-Dreams-Other-Writings).
Varo revealed to us the power within the everyday, a domestic scene in her paintings became an
event for cosmic influence, eroticism, the surreal, and that below the surface. The non-normative
and esoteric seeps through to the real for Varo. As Hatfield further states:
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In her writing, souls leap from cats to quartz rocks, only to be freed by bolts of lightning.
Erotic dreams are achievable with the right ingredients, which involve two fake
mustaches, a whalebone corset, a mirror, and garlic. There’s a scientific parody written in
the voice of “Hälikcio von Fuhrängschmidt” about Homo rodans, a ludicrous, ratdescended precursor to Homo sapiens, as well as an unfinished theater piece. A handful
of meticulous descriptions (some automatic) suggest that writing served as a way for
Varo to ideate paintings.
Varo herself stated that her process of writing was like sketching. Varo by shifting the process of
writing to a more open process of artmaking, connects and introduces associative and mystical
elements to representation. As Rada Georgieva argues in “Esotericism and Spirituality: the
Magical Art of Remedios Varo”, Varo counters Breton’s detached thoughts on the powerful seer
by creating androgynous, nuanced figures directly connected to nature and I would add the
erotic. Georgieva also argues that Varo aims to attain a more conscious spiritually awakened I to
contrast “the mechanization of humankind” (https://medium.com/art-direct/esotericism-andspirituality-the-magical-art-of-remedios-varo-b35accda63f0) where she solidifies a sense of self
that counters the Surrealists men’s depictions of woman as an object of desire. Activities
connected to the feminine like weaving, embroidery and cooking are connected to the occult, the
supernatural, the transcendental, and mystical exemplified in works such as the Weaver of
Verona.
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Fig. 3-23. Varo, Remedios. The Weaver of Verona. 1956. medium.com/art-direct/esotericism-andspirituality-the-magical-art-of-remedios-varo-b35accda63f0

Suzanne Césaire was also no object of desire and was not a passive nor complicit muse
but rather an anti-revolutionary, laying the foundation on creolization and much contemporary
thought. She staunchly opposed the Vichy occupation of Martinique. Even at a young age
Césaire provoked the colonial administrators by refusing to sing the mandatory national hymn in
her secondary school classroom. She founded the dissident journal Tropiques in 1941 with her
husband Aimé Césaire a key proponent along with Suzanne of Négritude. Suzanne more so than
Aimé saw the revolutionary potential of Surrealism. She along with Aimé were friendly with and
respected Andre Breton who they met during his exile in Martinique. Suzanne Césaire's
surrealism has supernatural elements where according to Maglioire “the surrealist and marvelous
realities of night grapple with the mundane realities of a colonial daytime” (122). Magliore
compares and distinguishes Césaire's surrealism from Breton's in the following passage:
Much like Breton, she conceives of surrealism as “an activity that gives itself the goal of
systematically exploring and expressing, so as to neutralize them, the forbidden zones of
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the human spirit”. However, the forbidden zones of her spirit are found, thinly veiled,
beneath the camouflage of her own skin rather than deep beneath the skin of dreams. For
Césaire, the surrealist project of piercing the veil of the real becomes one of piercing the
veil of landscape, which in the Antillean context serves as the substitute for the interiority
of all Antilleans. It is not simply a matter of blasting these images of man and nature
apart. For Césaire, the beauty of the Martinican psyche is that it is so hopelessly
entangled with the landscape and seasons. (122)
While Remedios Varo turned to mysticism and animal-human hybrid connections, Césaire
turned to nature. Annette K. Joseph-Gabriel shows how in, “Malaise d’une civilization,” Césaire
defines the Martinican as “an homme-plante (a plant human or a plant man) … one who does not
seek to dominate nature but rather allows himself to be possessed, moved along by the force of
life. The Martinican as homme-plante rejects the impulse to conquer and dominate and refuses
the violent, destructive impulse that fueled the war machine of the 1940s”. (5-6)

Fig. 3-24. Aimé Césaire. bostonreview.net/colin-dayan-out-of-defeat-aime-cesaire

was seen as one of the founding fathers of Negritude a movement that celebrated African
heritage. In an interview with René Depestres at the Cultural Congress of Havana in 1967, Aimé
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Césaire would also speak to how important surrealism was to him. He discusses the use of the
same authors that influenced the surrealist poets, viewing surrealism in an interview with Rene
Depestre as “a weapon that exploded the French language”
(https://politicaleducation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Interview-with-Aime-Cesaire.pdf).
For Césaire, surrealism allowed him to connect to deep unconscious forces that led him back to
Africa. In the interview he states, “it’s true that superficially we are French, we bear the marks of
French customs; we have been branded by Cartesian philosophy, by French rhetoric; but if we
break with all that, if we plumb the depths, then what we will find is fundamentally black”.
(https://politicaleducation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Interview-with-Aime-Cesaire.pdf).

Fig. 3-25. Lam, Wifredo, The Jungle (La Jungla). 1943.

Césaire believes that underlying the social being is “a profound being, over whom all sorts of
ancestral layers and alluviums had been deposited” and uses surrealism's drive to connect to the
unconscious and the imagination to help uncover that profoundly ancestral being.
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Negritude and anti-colonialism deeply influenced the surrealist movement. The
Surrealists condemned the manifestations as well as the psychology behind European
imperialism. Some of the last manifestoes by the Parisian Surrealist group supported Algerian
and Vietnamese anti-colonial fights. Critiques of anti-colonialism started as far back as 1919
within Surrealism. André Breton was key in defining surrealism's anti-colonialist approach and
looked to Césaire and Afro-Cuban artist Wilfredo Lam in their ability to extend Surrealism
beyond what it could be as an isolated and insular European movement.
Breton writes in his book, Martinique: Snake Charmer, about his stay while in
Martinique during World War II, “And it is a black man who is the one guiding us today into the
unexplored, seeming to play as he goes, throwing ignition switches that lead us forward from
spark to spark” (88). He follows with, “And it is a black man who… not only for blacks but for
all humankind, expresses all the questions, all the anguish, all the hopes and all the ecstasy and
who becomes more and more crucial as the supreme example of dignity” (88). He found
important Aimé Césaire and Wifredo Lam's appeal to uncovering the fundamentally black. Lam
was also interested in automatism a key technique used to move beyond conscious or rational
thought. He was introduced by Pablo Picasso to Joan Miró who both used this technique to work
to generate forms in their paintings from the subconscious and without the artist's control.

Fig. 3-26. Miro, Joan. Fissure 12. 1969.
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In Black, Brown, & Beige: Surrealist Writings from Africa and the Diaspora, a speech to young
Haitians by Andre Breton is highlighted where he states:
It is therefore no accident, but a sign of the times, that the greatest impulses towards new
paths for Surrealism have been furnished during the war that just ended, by my greatest
friend of ‘color’—Aimé Césaire in poetry and Wifredo Lam in painting—and that I find
myself at this moment among you in Haiti in preference to any other place in the world.
(203)
Prior to that, while Breton is taking refuge in Haiti and during an interview with the Haitian poet
René Bélance, he makes clear that:
Surrealism is allied with people of color, first because it has sided with them against all
forms of imperialism and white brigandage, as is well demonstrated by the public
manifestos against the Moroccan War, against the colonial exhibition [in Paris], and so
forth, and, secondly, because of the profound affinities between Surrealism and ‘primitive
thought.’36 (iii)
Thus, Breton was not concerned with thought and manifestoes that were insular and
remained inward. He wanted to inspire political action and helped incite the successful Haitian
insurgency against the U.S.-backed dictator Lescot. Breton's revolutionary speech in 1945 in the
Rex theatre in Port-au-Prince got him dispelled from the island by Lescot. Breton wanted
Haitians to revolt and for the island to serve as a role model for the rest of the world. In another
speech, “Evolution of the concept of freedom through romanticism”, he explores the concept of
freedom as something concrete and attainable through the breakdown of false contradictions and
oppositions between dream and reality, the political and the imaginary, and art and life. Haitian
poet and activist Paul Laraque who created the revolutionary Haitian journal La Ruche had a
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high regard for Breton and surrealist scholar Pierre Mabille, stating in Refusal of the Shadow,
“With tears in their eyes, the young people of my generation watched heavy-hearted the
departure of two men of great combustion: the two most eminent minds ever to have lit up the
blue haze of French intellectual embers in the life of a country of the Caribbean or Latin
America” (233). What Laraque identified was the ways Breton and Mabille helped to be a
catalysis for the revolutionary desire of the young Haitians. They deconstructed while also
expanding what could be seen as real.
According to D. Scot Miller’s Afrosurreal manifesto, he sees Afro-surrealism as deeply
indebted to the theories of Suzanne Césaire, while Afro-futurism focuses on science, technology
and science fiction to speculate on the possibilities for blackness in the future, Afro-surrealism is
about the present. (https://muse.jhu.edu/article/525948/pdf). Kelley sees the Marvelous also as a
reclamation of the real and a deconstruction of the present. He also looks to make a further
distinction between the contemporary aesthetic movements of Afro-surrealism and Afrofuturism, for he sees the later as connecting to a certain new age mentality a more critical read
than Shantay Robinson who sees it as looking, “beyond our lived experiences, and incorporates
non-Western cosmologies to critique present-day predicaments of black people. And it
reconsiders historical events like slavery”
(www.blackartinamerica.com/index.php/2018/11/01/the-afro-in-contemporary-black-art/).
However Kelley sees Afro-surrealism as “committed to the real, to the now, and to action”
(https://openspace.sfmoma.org/2017/05/a-converstion-with-robin-d-g-kelley/). Afrosurrealism
for Kelley is about “Right Now” and a transformation of the present through:
A revolution in thinking. A feeling of being able to see every single plane of life as its
lived, and that those planes are both Surreal, the dream-state, and the landscape of the
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other side of Earth. We can’t even think globally without imagining the life that we can’t
see. That’s fundamental. The distinction is really one of struggle. One of being part of
society and another of being a part of society in motion.
(https://openspace.sfmoma.org/2017/05/a-converstion-with-robin-d-g-kelley/).
In considering why the European surrealists were so set on delving more deeply into the
primitive, Kelley wants us to filter out for a moment the critique of Surrealism’s flirtation with
what was called the primitive to consider Western Civilization and how:
It emerges as Modern as can be, but is the best example of Barbarism you’ve ever seen.
You speak the best French, you read the books, and are enjoying all the benefits of
Modernity, but you’re looking all around you and realize that these people, the people
who look like you, are the truly Barbaric.
The victims of that Barbarism are the people of Morocco, the people of Nigeria,
the people of Namibia. The modern tools of oppression, repression and violence are
being directed at those other folks. But some of these folks are not Barbaric. They have
more knowledge of the flora and fauna of their island than scientists have. These people
don’t seem to be fighting wars all the time. They invented agriculture. Call it romantic,
but that observation turned the world upside down. That kind of romantic celebration was
because these people were able to retain something of a semblance of culture, community
and psychological balance that the West had lost to Modernity. The problem is that that
same Modernity was created together in the same place and time and that’s an error in
analysis, an error in understanding scope, but as a political gesture it was a tool that was
available to them at that time and a place to beat back against Western Civilization.
(https://openspace.sfmoma.org/2017/05/a-converstion-with-robin-d-g-kelley/)
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Kelley wants us also to understand the importance of Suzanne Césaire to Afrosurrealism, in her quest for “the Marvelous” and in her emphasizing:
[o]ur islands seen from above, take on their true dimension as seashells. And as for the
hummingbird-women, tropical flower-women, the women of four races and dozens of
bloodlines, they are there no longer. Neither the heliconia, nor the frangipani, nor the
flame tree, nor the palm trees in the moonlight, nor the sunsets unlike any in the world...
Yet they are there. (https://iandeleonarts.tumblr.com/post/101641966737/thegreat-camouflage).

Fig. 3-27. Baez, Firelei. Bloodlines.2017.
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This last statement speaks to the fact that women were not fully invisible but rather forgotten by
society. This visibility of the invisible or a reclaiming of the invisible is key to Afro-surrealism.
As Kelley elucidates, “There is ‘The Marvelous,’ and on the other side of the coin is ‘The
Invisible.’” (https://openspace.sfmoma.org/2016/10/afrosurreal-the-marvelous-and-theinvisible/). Kelley appreciates the invisible beyond what is overlooked due to oppressive States,
and thus beyond Social Death. Keeley highlights the ubiquitous but unseen character, Rhinehart
The Runner in Ralph Ellison’s, Invisible Man, a contradictory character with a bad reputation
that is a drug-dealer, a pimp, and a preacher, “[t]he power of Rhinehart is that the more he is
unseen/ignored/snubbed, the greater his maneuverability and, thus, his influence… In all
mythology, invisibility is an asset. To be invisible is to wield influence without anyone being
aware the agent. How is this not a virtue?” (https://openspace.sfmoma.org/2016/10/afrosurrealthe-marvelous-and-the-invisible/).
Perhaps the best definition of Afro-surrealism is given by Shantay Robinson a concise
essay where she states,
The term “Afro-surreal” was coined by Amiri Baraka in 1974, and used with permission by
D. Scot Miller to write The Afrosurrealist Manifesto in 2009. In The Afrosurrealist
Manifesto, Miller asserts, Afrosurreal “presupposes that beyond this visible world, there is
an invisible world striving to manifest…,” that “Afrosurrealists restore the cult of the past,”
that Afrosurrealists use excess as the only legitimate means of subversion, and
hybridization as a form of disobedience,” that “Afrosurrealism rejects the quiet servitude
that characterizes existing roles for African Americans…” While Afrosurrealist visual art
can be many things, the thing that rings true about this particular aesthetic in artworks is
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that the artists who are creating art depicting their lived realities, are subverting and
rejecting norms and creating alternative identities to participate in the present. In “The
Electrical Scent of Damas: Negritude, The Harlem Renaissance, and the Afrosurreal,”
Miller writes “For the Afrosurrealists, the focus has been set at the ‘here and now’ of
contemporary Black arts and situations in the Americas, Antilles, and beyond, searching
for the nuanced ‘scent’ of those current manifestations.”… While European Surrealist were
interested in their unconscious and dreams, Afrosurrealists are manipulating their lived
realities. (https://www.blackartinamerica.com/index.php/2018/11/01/the-afro-incontemporary-black-art/)
There is something intriguing about the Afrosurrealists and their belief in the power within the
invisibility of the present that can affect the Right Now. The ability to be constantly negotiating
and self-aware of the authenticity of one’s own and others multiple perspectives is key to an
EmDisEmbodied I, including being aware of what is outside their purvey of meaning, invisible to
their meaning without the need to only set that area outside as anti towards their realm. The
Afrosurrealists indicate ways to not only be comfortable with the other but the in between,
unstable and fluid status of the self.
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Fig. 3-28. Manet, Édouard. Olympia. 1863. Oil on canvas, Musée d’Orsay, Paris.

Fig. 3-29. Morimura, Yasumasa. Portrait (Futago), 1988. Image via modernart2013
(www.widewalls.ch/magazine/edouard-manet-olympia)
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Fig. 3-30. Russell, Oneika. Olympia Variations. 2016.

In an interview with artist Oneika Russell in July of 2021, although she does not directly
define herself as Afrosurrealist, she speaks of wanting to tell the story of the Caribbean from
what is not there and from that which is unsaid, where her art objects reveal underlying stories.
In Olympia Variations, unlike others who focus on Olympia, Russell focuses on the invisibility
of Laure the maid. She sees her work as having a deep connection to spirituality and understands
herself as performing the role of a medium for a story with her artwork as a conduit. Russell
wants her work to connect to others from beyond the space of the gallery. She takes inspiration
from artists such as – Belkin Ayons and Kara Walker and Afro-Christian ideas and Mysticism
from the Caribbean intuitive artists who are spiritual leaders including Kapo, Albert Artwell and
Everald Brown.
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Russell recently discovered the esoteric language of tarot. Pamela Covan Smith, who
lived in Jamaica and was able to survive as an artist and a woman of color in the late 1800s to
early 1900s, created the most popular deck of tarot cards used today. Russell has made her own
deck with 11 question cards and 42 image cards. She currently has started to do tarot readings to
further connect to the spiritual and to bring her artwork beyond the gallery space. I just recently
got my second tarot reading in my life from Russell which was amazingly accurate. It reinforced
for me what the worlds of the spiritual can provide, beyond the academic, political, and the space
of the gallery. I would like to conclude with a selection of images that I believe elucidate this
spiritual dimension, with a connection to the supernatural and/or the power within the invisible
that Russell and the hysterics have been so powerfully able to tie into. A power that moved me to
tears on the receipt of the below by Russell for my collection and that made me also realize the
power within an EmDisEmbodied Fluid I.

Fig. 3-31. Russell, Oneika. Untitled. In Author’s Collection.
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Fig. 3-32. Dali, Salvador. The Invisible Sleeping Woman, Horse, Lion (Dormeuse cheval lion
invisibles). 1930. Oil on canvas. Musée National d'Art Moderne, Centre Pompidou, Paris.
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Fig. 3-33. Dali, Salvador. Velázquez: Las meninas. 1974. Gouache on lithograph.

Fig. 3-34. Marshall, Kerry James. "Untitled," 2009. Acrylic on PVC panel. Yale University Art Gallery,
New Haven, Conn.
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Fig. 3-35. Marshall, Kerry James. Untitled (Painter). 2008. Acrylic on PVC Panel.
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Fig. 3-36. Varo, Remedios. Aurora (Espías Internacionales). 1962. Oil on Masonic Board.
www.wikiart.org/en/remedios-varo/aurora-1962
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Fig. 3-37. Varo, Remedios. The Call. 1961. Oil on Masonic Board.
www.wikiart.org/en/remedios-varo/the-call
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Fig. 3-38. Mutu, Wangechi. Mountain of prayer. 2014. Collage painting on vinyl.
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Fig. 3-39. Mutu, Wangechi. Even. 2014.
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Fig. 3-40. Mutu, Wangechi. Beneath lies the Power. 2014. Collage painting on vinyl. www.victoriamiro.com/artists/9-wangechi-mutu/works/artworks19656/
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Fig. 3-41. Mutu, Wangechi. The screamer island dreamer. 2014.All images courtesy the artist and
Victoria Miro, London.
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Fig. 3-42. Ayón, Belkis. La cena (The Supper). 1991. Collograph. Tate Americas Foundation.

Fig. 3-43. Russell, Oneika. Ambassador of the New World. 2016. Video still/ installation detail.
www.oneikarussell.net/2016/10/ambassador-of-new-world-video-still.html
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Fig. 3-44. Russell, Oneika. Metamorphosis. 2018. Video.
www.oneikarussell.net/2018/05/metamorphosis-2018.html

Fig. 3-45. Baez, Firelei. Crewel. 2013.
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Fig. 3-46. Baez, Firelei. Bloodlines

Fig. 3-47. Bernard, Lourdes. Untitled
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Fig. 3-48. American artist Georgia O'Keeffe poses outdoors beside an easel with a canvas from her series,
'Pelvis Series Red With Yellow,' Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1960. (Tony Vaccaro/Getty Images)
Read more: https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/why-are-georgia-okeeffes-paintings-breakingout-pimples-180971518/#BHWx6tqjq57iFyGp.99
Give the gift of Smithsonian magazine for only $12! http://bit.ly/1cGUiGv
Follow us: @SmithsonianMag on Twitter
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Fig. 3-49. American artist Georgia O'Keeffe poses outdoors beside an easel with a canvas from her series,
'Pelvis Series Red With Yellow,' Albuquerque, New Mexico, 1960. (Tony Vaccaro/Getty Images)
Read more: https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/why-are-georgia-okeeffes-paintings-breakingout-pimples-180971518/#BHWx6tqjq57iFyGp.99
Give the gift of Smithsonian magazine for only $12! http://bit.ly/1cGUiGv
Follow us: @SmithsonianMag on Twitter
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Fig. 3-50. O’Keefe, Georgia. Music Pink and Blue II. 1918. Oil on canvas. Whitney Museum of
American Art, New York; gift of Emily Fisher Landau in honor of Tom Armstrong.
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Fig. 3-51. O’Keefe, Georgia. The Mountain, New Mexico, 1931. Oil on canvas. Whitney Museum of
American Art, New York.
www.cleveland.com/entertainment/2018/10/cleveland_musuem_of_art_announ.html
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CHAPTER FOUR :
I + I: the EmDisEmbodied Universal-Particular I
Some years ago, I taught a class and assigned my students to do videos concerning an
issue on campus. One group took on what was referred to as “The Racism Problem” in an article
that will remain unnamed. A diversity initiative on internalized racism, that was an effort to
bring black, white and other students of color together, completely broke down. The students of
color felt the need to have a ‘safe space’ in which to share before they felt they could meet with
the white students (white people are colorful as well but I am using terms based on their
historical constructions). A student leader at an ideologically conservative center, objected to the
fact that the discussions were going to be separate before the groups came together. The differing
opinions resulted in arguments and protests where emotions were high. The final talks to bring
the students together never took place.
Why did some of the students of color feel the need to exclude white students in their
initial conversation? Would their language have to change in the presence of white students?
Would the students of color feel they would have to explain words, reveal the norms, defend
their positions and thus not be as open? Why did some of the white students want to be at that
first meeting? What did it mean to them to be excluded from that ‘safe space’? The differing
opinions revealed that while some perceived the space for their voices as a neutral ground, others
saw a need to reconfigure the space to make it safer in order to express themselves to be heard.
Also, while some wanted to let go of all essentialisms or labels i.e. “white students vs. students
of color”, others found the need for strategic essentialisms that would help protect their
subjectivities from what they saw as a constructed “universal” normativity.
In this chapter, I will further explore what I am referring to as the EmDisEmbodied
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Universal-Particular I. I am taking the term Universal-Particular from the thoughts of Frantz
Fanon a key theorist within Continental Philosophy. Fanon brought attention to his life
experience as he theorized, making it clear that “universal” theories expounded upon by other
theorists may apply to some but not others. Through his self-analysis and psychoanalytic,
phenomenological, and existential approach, Fanon showed the lack within continental
philosophy of different kinds of voices. While Irigaray exposed this lack for certain forms of
white womanhood, Fanon would reveal that the various theories were relating only to certain Is
and could not explain his situation as a black man. Fanon saw certain methodologies also at fault
and states, “[o]ntology—once it is finally admitted as leaving existence by the wayside—does
not permit us to understand the being of the black man” (82). Fanon’s thought; his deep
involvement in anti-colonialism through his writing and activism; his work as a psychiatrist
helping those in Algeria fighting for independence; and his involvement in the Algerian National
Liberation Front, were a few of the reasons he is one of the precursors for the decolonial
pedagogies and epistemologies of today.
Fanon by being self-conscious and self-reflective was able to put forth an understanding
of the I that was different from what was being said before. Words such as being and non-being
took on completely different meanings from Jean Paul Sartre’s or others uses. They were not
focusing on the zone of non-being in the way Fanon could and did. In Black Skin, White Masks,
Fanon states, “[t]here is a zone of nonbeing, an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an incline
stripped bare of every essential from which a genuine new departure can emerge. In most cases,
the black man cannot take advantage of this descent into a veritable hell” (Location 83). For,
Fanon the word “non-being” had multiple meanings and revealed the uncertainties embedded in
language.
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As addressed in the first chapter, Rosalind Krauss highlights the notion of shifting
indexes that further emphasizes the instability and shifting nature of the I. In “Notes on the
Index: Seventies Art in America”, Krauss highlights Roman Jakobson’s work in linguistics to
show how the word “I” shifts between those who use it.
The shifter is Jakobson's term for that category of linguistic sign which is “filled with
signification” only because it is “empty.” The word 'this' is such a sign, waiting each time
it is invoked for its referent to be supplied. “This chair,” “this table,” or “this . .” and we
point to something lying on the desk. “Not that, this,” we say. The personal pronouns ‘I’
and ‘you’ are also shifters. As we speak to one another, both of us using ‘I’ and ‘you’, the
referents of those words keep changing places across the space of our conversation. I am
the referent of ‘I’ only when I am the one who is speaking. When it is your turn, it
belongs to you. (69)
However, in addition to these shifters, many words shift their meaning because of the language
games we play that Ludwig Wittgenstein brings our attention to, where the same word can mean
something completely different within the context it is used and how it is expressed. What Fanon
brings our attention to is that a further shifting can occur dependent on who is saying the word.
Thus, the words surrounding the word, the emotive quality to how it is stated, and the person
who utters the word can shift what then is meant by the word. In the example I started with, the
students of color felt safer within the language games of other fellow students of color, they
revealed that different language games can be played depending on who is in the room receiving
and giving the communication.
In a similar fashion Fanon and Irigaray call for new language games to be played within
continental philosophy. While Irigaray argues for the need for women to speak her difference
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and thus to move away from being subsumed or countered by man while still remaining
cognizant and respectful of the proximity of the other, Fanon wanted us to be more aware of the
way words like “non-being” shifts. For the white male theorists, non-being was distant and
abstract. It was a place to start afresh and by connecting to this zone one connected to the other
that was disparaged, made invisible, and set apart as less than or more intensely as subhuman and
thus in a state of non-being. Fanon in his experience as being othered, was already existing in his
zone of non-being, he was in a “veritable hell”. So, while white male theorists could use this
sphere as a way to take on new worldviews, Fanon in an initial read of this quote felt that there
was no way to find that departure through non-being as this was no departure for Fanon, he
already existed in this state.
To read another interpretation though of Fanon’s hell we need to look more deeply at the
word veritable that Fanon uses in his term “veritable hell”. One sees that it derives from the Latin
word veritas, the goddess of truth in Roman mythology and Aletheia in Greek mythology.
(https://thewordcounter.com/meaning-of-veritas/) Aletheia as the myth goes was elusive as she
hid in the bottom of a holy well. While the myth of Aletheia has her in a well, Fanon exists in his
hell. The philosopher Martin Heidegger argues for aiming to attain Aletheia which is the ability
to approach finding truth through his notion of “unconcealment” or an uncovering. I see
EmDisEmbodiment as a form of unconcealment, but an unconcealment that occurs differently for
different bodies. My term attempts universality but embedded within it is the notion that the very
term is unstable when uttered, and made even more so because of the binary thinking embedded
within language. EmDisEmbodiment may be referring more to embodiment for some but
disembodiment for others and the embodiment and disembodiment may play off and with both
transcendence and immanence. A white male theorist with his body already equated with a false
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sense of universality and disembodiment could connect more to the universal by thinking of this
body in terms of an embodied being with its impacts on others, while bodies that continue to be
subjugated may need to at times move more towards notions of disembodiment away from
cultural constraints and thus their consciousnesses shifts into aspects of flight beyond culture
through double consciousness or as Fanon refers to it, towards a third consciousness.
Within this third consciousness, Fanon lives in a space where he is keenly self-aware of
himself as he also realizes he is in a world of the other that does not recognize or integrate him
and an other that makes him invisible, “Jean-Paul Sartre forgets that the black man suffers in his
body quite differently from the white man” (24). In Fanon’s description of getting a match to
light a cigarette he slows down the process to reveal his self-reflection and uncertainties about
his own being:
In the white world, the man of color encounters difficulties in elaborating his body
schema. The image of one’s body is solely negating. It’s an image in the third person. All
around the body reigns an atmosphere of certain uncertainty. I know that if I want to
smoke, I shall have to stretch out my right arm and grab the pack of cigarettes … As for
the matches, they are in the left drawer, and I shall have to move back a little … A slow
construction of myself as a body in a spatial and temporal world— such seems to be the
schema. It is not imposed on me; it is rather a definitive structuring of myself and the
world— definitive because it creates a genuine dialectic between my body and the world.
(90)
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Fig. 4-1. Montalván Cuellar, Andrés. Untitled. 2015. “conversationXchange: The Universal Black Body”.

However, does the use of the word veritable here suggest a keen awareness of a form of
truth beyond the limited construction of the body through the systems like racism and
colonialism that Fanon brings our attention to? In illuminating his different conception of nonbeing, Fanon refers to a third-person consciousness where one rises above the cultural constraints
on the body and the realization that the restrictions tied to the body were nonsensical. These
restrictions could not come close to explaining his body and because of this he connects more
fully to another consciousness beyond the cultural real. Fanon moved beyond thinking of the
human in strictly biological and ontogenic ways that tied them to a certain intrinsic or essential
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being to instead consider deeply the sociogenic ways that actually would allow for other
understandings of the body paradoxically beyond the social. Although what gets highlighted
when thinking about the sociogenic is the very important social determinants on the I, at the
same time by disconnecting the social body from the self, seeing where it is not an intrinsic
determinant of the self, Fanon could delve deeply into the ridiculousness of racial constructions
on his body that led to much pain and suffering.
Fanon further differentiates his struggle as different than the white man’s when he refers
to the Oedipus complex. This theory by Freud, placed on all including woman with
modifications such as the Electra complex, Fanon views as, “far from being a black complex”
(130) and wonders about the civilized white man’s, “irrational nostalgia for the extraordinary
times of sexual licentiousness, orgies, unpunished rapes, and unrepressed incest” (142). Fanon
summarizes his struggles below with seeing then how symbolizations from the white man affect
him as a black man:
Since I realize that the black man is the symbol of sin, I start hating the black man. But I
realize that I am a black man. I have two ways of escaping the problem. Either I ask
people not to pay attention to the color of my skin; or else, on the contrary, I want people
to notice it. I then try to esteem what is bad— since, without thinking, I admitted that the
black man was the color of evil. In order to put an end to this neurotic situation where I
am forced to choose an unhealthy, conflictual solution, nurtured with fantasies, that is
antagonistic— inhuman, in short— there is but one answer: skim over this absurd drama
that others have staged around me; rule out these two elements that are equally
unacceptable; and through the particular, reach out for the universal. (174)
Fanon shows here the need to embrace his third consciousness in a way that uses his particular
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existence to reach out towards a universal that is well aware of that particularity and is keenly
aware of the struggles needed for the sociogenic body to see ways towards the universal. I argue
that Fanon is speaking towards a Universal-Particular EmDisEmbodied I.
Fanon reveals the ways the universal and universal statements have to consider the body
they emanate from. Universal statements can then only ever be a Universal-Particular. As
Jordan Rodriguez states at UC Berkeley in an independent study with Ramon Grosfoguel
“Fanon’s Zone of Being and Zone of Non-Being”:
This myth of a concealed non-situated “Ego” is called the “ego-politics of knowledge.”
Speaking from the egopolitics of knowledge has allowed Western philosophy and
sciences to produce a myth about “a Truthful universal knowledge that covers up, that is,
conceals who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic
location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks.”
Grosfoguel argues that Western philosophy and sciences have been able to produce this
myth by delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subject that
speaks. (2)
Rodriguez further recognizes the shift from God as the foundation of knowledge to a certain
form of Man in Modern times that is promoted as having a universal truth beyond space and time
becoming situated within the mind of Western man.
“I think, therefore I am” is the foundation of modern western sciences. This dualism of
mind and body and between mind and nature allowed Descartes to claim “non-situated,
universal, God-eyed view knowledge.” Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez
has called this “the point zero” which is the point of view that assumes no point of view.
It is the point of view that hides and conceals itself as being beyond a particular point of
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view, or simply stated the point of view that represents itself as being without a point of
view. Grosfoguel argues that “it is this ‘god’s eye view’ that always hides its local ad
(sic) particular perspective under an abstract universalism.” Importantly, this has allowed
Western man to represent his knowledge as the only one capable of achieving a universal
consciousness, and to dismiss non-Western knowledges as particularistic. We see the
dismissal of non-Western knowledges at large in the canon of thought of Westernized
universities still to this day. (3)
This situating of superior knowledge has also been a situating of superior and inferior people.
However, in present day academia, inspired by theorists like Frantz Fanon, Lewis Gordon, Luce
Irigaray, Jacques Derrida and others discussed, much is being done to counteract universal
epistemological knowledge and the ways this knowledge has made certain people and their
epistemologies invisible.
One then may ask, why hold onto the concept of a universal within the UniversalParticular? I do think it is a necessary step to understanding our limits in reaching said universal
and it is something that one should attempt to reach through relation with other UniversalParticulars or as I refer to later Absolute-Fragments, a modification on Luc Nancy’s thoughts
within Sense of the World. The term Universal-Particular tells a particular story that is as
important as the story of white male theorists who may relate more to being Absolute-Fragments.
They have been seen as the absolute for many centuries and have now been placed in a cultural
moment that has them questioning and deconstructing that absoluteness. Universal-Particulars
have a different present-day journey and it is important for our cultural moment to understand
the universality within these very particular journeys without then thinking this is a new
universal for all. There is much to the story of the word “universal” that brings back many
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connotations that we need to access. The phrase Black Lives Matter speaks to a universal that
black lives should have that they did not have as citizens within the history of the United States.
This is why the differences in language raised at the start of the chapter is so key.
Discussions and conversations surrounding race in the United States have been intrinsically
fraught. It takes astute students to figure out how to navigate these racial discussions and to help
foster situations for these discussions to take place. These conversations may seem contradictory,
irrational, illogical, and emotional and thus outside of our normative academic languages. The
ability to understand or attempt to understand beyond the self is key. Words mean many different
things to different positionalities and there are also different relationships to this universal
epistemology of the past. Relationships to notions of one universal that institutes an ideal Human
are shifting and changing where some are apprehensive, some excited, some both, as new
multiple epistemologies are being highlighted that recognize plural forms of knowledge
productions by and about humans including those that were once seen by those in power as subhuman. As Rodriguez continues to illuminate in their paper, Grosfoguel’s argues for a:
… pluri-versity not a uni-versity. In a uni-versity, it is one epistemology that defines for
the rest “the questions and answers to produce a colonial, universal social sciences and
humanities.”[27] A pluriversity would, on the other hand, allow for epistemic diversity
that is “institutionally incorporated into necessary inter-epistemic dialogues in order to
produce a decolonial, pluriversal social science.”[28] However, this incorporation of new
epistemologies which have been subalternized and silenced by Eurocentric epistemology
would confront the power relations which arrived in the Americas through European
colonial expansion and which are within the current capitalist/patriarchal Westerncentric/Christiancentric modern/colonial world system.
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Walter Mignolo sees a key component and power behind the modern/colonial state as a need to
promote the state as belonging to one ethnicity. Decoloniality then for Mignolo starts with a
delinking of the state from being solely owned by this one ethnicity. For Mignolo one has to
think in terms of pluralities and plural ethnicities. (https://vimeo.com/218425833). Mignolo also
calls for a delinking of the “colonial matrix of power” which includes linkages amongst
authority, the economy, nature, the rationalizations of racism, misogyny, homophobia and the
like, where only a very particular knowledge from white, heterosexual males is legitimized.
Rodriguez reveals in the above quote how Grosfoguel’s understands this standard for the state as
mirrored in our universities and how it then affects our epistemologies. Grosfoguel instead wants
us to embrace:
… “transmodernity” which is a concept developed by Argentine philosopher of liberation
Enrique Dussel. Transmodernity would be a call to move beyond modernity, and in a
“utopian, transmodern world there exist as many proposals for the liberation of ‘women’
and ‘democracy’ as there are epistemologies in the world.” So what Grosfoguel is calling
for is epistemic diversity rather than what has been historically for the last 500 years been
one hegemonic epistemology dominating discourses for the world. Epistemic diversity
would open the door to critiques of Eurocentrism and transmodernity in which we can
decolonize the global power relations of the capitalist/patriarchal Westerncentric/Christian-centric modern/colonial world system.
Jane Gordon further expands on modes for nuancing our knowledges in, “Creolizing as the
Transdisciplinary Alternative to Intellectual Legitimacy on the Model of the “Normal Scientific”
Community” where similarly to Irigaray, Gordon wants to break down old traditions related to
academic language, thinking, and prior linguistic models. However, Gordon’s approach aims to
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do this by:
… demonstrating that the multilinguistic, multiracial, and multinational region out of
which they came was prototypical rather than exceptional. As with the languages
themselves, the concept of creolization, when used by creative writers and social theorists
alike, offered a more rigorous descriptive account of the outcomes of the larger
transnational and transoceanic processes that ushered in European modernity. (1)
Gordon looks to the Caribbean and to creole languages to provide a model for multiple forms of
epistemologies where one thinks no longer in terms of one tree of knowledge, one golden grail
but instead is aware of the multiple paths to understanding.
To creolize social scientific and theoretical approaches then is to break with an identityoriented understanding of disciplines and methods in which one and one’s work can only
emerge as meaningful by being isomorphic with pre-existing conceptions of what a
scholarly designation would indicate one must do. Just as creolization cannot and does
not prioritize “cultural maintenance” or “cultural preservation,” if used as an approach to
scholarship, its aim is instead guided by another telos: that of contributing to the
construction of an inhabitable social world or one in which people can live together as
human beings on terms that are neither degrading nor dehumanizing. In so doing, one
cannot but grapple with how to think among multiple registers in conversations that do
not all partake of the same conventions. Treating our unavoidable epistemological
limitations as sites of openness, we restore ourselves as value-giving subjects with
meaning-making capacities, which in turn require engagement with the plurality of
intellectual heritages or a teleologically open approach to the symbolic world (Cornell
and Panfilio 2010; Gordon 2006). (6)
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While both Gordon and Mignolo argue for a move away from the body and identity politics
when looking towards transmodernity, I am arguing for a nuancing in how we represent and
relate to the body and identity. I follow Gordon’s lead in her critique of the “normal scientific”
where she highlights the way scholarship can transcend disciplinary boundaries by not trying to
please disciplinary experts that privilege scientific approaches. I instead prefer to use my passion
as an artist-philosopher to delve more deeply into how artists are breaking down these ostracized
identities to signal new forms of connections to a transmodernity that further signal forms of
EmDisEmbodiment. This nuancing of the body and identity considers Gordon’s thoughts on
creolization as it relates to becoming, where similarly to Édouard Glissant’s later work, Gordon
wants to point our attention to creolization as a process and not créolité as an end point:
[h]owever, this response that I am advocating should be associated more with
creolization and creolizing than with the creolité and hybridity movements since creolité
writers often prize particular moments of mixture over and against what would otherwise
remain an ongoing, open-ended process of emergence and can do so in ways that
problematically frame the movement away from both European whiteness and African
and urban blackness as a teleological ideal. (3)
This open-ended process of creolization is expressed perhaps most viscerally through
contemporary artists of today that complicate beliefs about the pure body and consider
creolization through notions of plural consciousnesses and voices.
For this chapter I will like to spend some time exploring the EmDisEmbodied UniversalParticular I, through double-consciousness and double-voicedness. Fanon’s conception of a third
consciousness is directly tied to W.E.B. Du Bois’ “double-consciousness”. I will show how
concepts behind this term and Mikhael Bakhtin’s “double-voicedness”, can be used to
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understand psychological aspects at play in the artwork of Kara Walker, Christian Boltanski and
William Kentridge. These artist-philosophers, by breaking apart and throwing into question the
Cartesian subject, investigate and confuse binaries and neat separations surrounding race, such as
master/slave, oppressor/oppressed, white/black, Afrikaner/black, Jew/antisemite and
“normal”/Nazi and thus approach Universal-Particular and Absolute-Fragmented
EmDisEmbodied Is. However, I will also argue that these reexaminations are done in different
ways to attack not only the Cartesian, fixed and pure subject that is the Cartesian, Formal,
Rational, Platonic subject from the first chapter, but also to address different areas of the very
complex and messy racial equation. The work of these artists more viscerally reveal aspects of
the term EmDisEmbodiment and its philosophical and psychological ways of pushing the
boundaries, spaces and languages around race to create new spaces that allow for deeper
conversations about race across race.37 Confusing racial visual and written languages, the artists
break down strict dichotomies between self/other and compel us to confront “the other” and what
I will refer to as the other within.
Kara Walker’s silhouettes deal with racial repression and slavery in the United States;
Christian Boltanski explores anti-Semitism in France; and William Kentridge looks at apartheid
in South Africa. By exploring their work one can see elements of EmDisEmbodiment in how
Walker’s work reveals the veil of W.E.B. DuBois’ “double-consciousness” and Mikhail
Bakhtin’s notion of double-voicedness through the dialogic; Boltanski’s exposes a derivative of
Du Bois’ uniquely American Negro “double-consciousness” experience; and Kentridge’s shows
the relationships between double-voicedness and double vision. Dorothy Hales’ work connecting
Bakhtin’s double-voicedness with double-consciousness without conflating the two will be very
helpful in looking further at these terms. An exploration of the two-person exhibition “Double
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Vision” that paired Kentridge’s work with the prints of Albrecht Dürer will be very revealing as
it will show the new kinds of subjectivities behind Kentridge’s and Walker’s work, ones that
move away from the Cartesian and one-point perspective driven subjectivity of Dürer.
I will further demonstrate how Walker, Boltanski and Kentridge’s use of the universal
symbol of the shadow confuses CFRP subjectivity, the subject/other dichotomy and also
confronts and compels the viewer to tackle the repression of the other within, allowing one then
to move closer to EmDisEmbodiment. The shadow is an appropriate visual symbol as it
paradoxically suggests an in between state of fixity and ethereality. It also directly relates to both
space and time as the context from the outside (the sun and time) affects the shadow’s movement
in space. The shadow also fully enters in to the space and time of the other. This is an excellent
corollary to seeing subjectivity in terms of the chronotope, a Bakhtinian term that uncovers how
time and space directly implicate subjectivity within discourse and an explanation for the
contingency of the word “non-being”.
I will conclude by contending that one has to look at the subject/other from the
perspective of the psychological power dynamics at play in order to move towards the
intersubjective that can then alter the changing “apparatus” including apparatuses that are now
grappling with multiple epistemologies. Through the psychological, one can discover and work
to accept the contradictions and antinomies within the self and thus make the necessary steps to
also accept on equal footing “others” with their own contradictions. A brief look at Jacques
Derrida’s important work on the ways external and cultural forces such as discourse, language
and what Agamben refers to as “the apparatus” demarcate the self, will be key. I will further my
conclusion with a brief look at how the work from these artist/philosophers connect in interesting
ways to Michael Monahan’s ideas concerning the emergence of a “creolizing subjectivity”;
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which connects in important ways to Jane Gordon’s approach to creolizing through
transdisciplinary approaches within the political sciences. These forms of creolizing can also be
used to move away from the Western political and philosophical tradition of a “politics of
purity” that held that true social justice is a future without race. In Monahan’s mind and what
these artists do in their work is explore identity through a politics of difference and not one of
sameness; a politics of difference that not only shows the very different subjectivities at play
within the polyphonic but also the paradoxes within those subjectivities.

“DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS” AND “DOUBLE-VOICEDNESS”
To begin the discussion, it is important to take a closer look at the terms doubleconsciousness and double-voicedness and the differences between the two. In The Souls of Black
Folk, W.E.B. Du Bois begins to define what he sees as the unique situation of American Negroes
whose voices have been disregarded, and histories made invisible. Du Bois states, in a muchcited passage on race relations in America that the American Negro lives with:
… a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at
one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness, —
an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being
torn asunder (2).
Within this condition of two-ness Du Bois looks out from behind a veil that shuts him out from
what he refers to as “their world” and leaves him no desire to in his words, “tear down that veil,
to creep through; I held all beyond it in common contempt, and lived above it in a region of blue
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sky and great wandering shadows” (2). Du Bois continues by describing how he escapes this
contemptuous view and for him the “sky was bluest” when he is able to beat his white mates in
“their world” at their examinations and foot-races. However, this kind of escape produces its
own kinds of constrictions within these “wandering shadows” through his establishment of “The
Talented Tenth” - the ten percent of African Americans who he felt would advance the race.
With this “Talented Tenth”, he not only creates a hierarchy, detaching this elite group and
himself from the world around him but he creates a standard that they must follow. A standard
based and derived from “their world”, the world of the white majority; one using a monological
and one-point perspective of a Cartesian subject that has certain rules attached to Being.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s concepts such as Double-voicedness and heteroglossia and the
resulting dialogic that he argues for, critiques and disarms this monological point of view and
standard. In looking at the form of the novel, especially The Brothers Karamazov from Russian
novelist Dostoevsky, he shows the many voices and languages at play within the different
characters of the novel and also the two-ness or contradictory natures of those voices. Bakhtin
states about Dostoevsky:
Where others saw a single thought, he was able to find and feel out two thoughts, a
bifurcation; where others saw a single quality, he discovered in it the presence of a
second and contradictory quality. Everything that seemed simple became, in his world,
complex and multi-structured. In every voice he could hear two contending voices, in
every expression a crack, and the readiness to go over immediately to another
contradictory expression… (Problems 30)
By analyzing The Brothers Karamazov, Bakhtin demonstrates the power of the novel and
language in determining our Beings. He shows how literary language is stratified arguing that
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Dostoevsky has created a polyphonic novel, where various voices get equal credence in the text.
Bakhtin begins to open the subject up to accept the contradictory natures and fluidity of our
Beings as becomings and the impact of others on those becomings. As Hale conveys in her essay
“Bakhtin in African American Theory”, “the unequal power relations between author and
character are mediated, and thus transformed; language manifests two different subjectivities‘two voices, two meanings, and two expressions’–and even allows them a new relation to each
other, a dynamic unity that preserves individual identity while promoting not just inter-subjective
relation but, more powerfully, inter-subjective communion” (457).
While one can see the potentialities in the opening up of subjectivities through language,
there are also problematics at play when one tries to make this opening universal, by not
considering double-voicedness through the lens of double-consciousness and thus the negative
impact of seeing oneself through the eyes of others and how this can result in limiting Being. In
Hale’s exploration of double-voicedness and double consciousness she argues against conflating
the two terms. She believes that by “glossing double consciousness as double voice, theorists
thus attempt to transform the Du Boisian crisis of subaltern invisibility into a Bakhtinian triumph
of self-articulation” (448). A triumph that happens when Bakhtin talks about the peasant within
language. She worries that this glossing disregards the differences at play between the Du
Boisian and Bakhtinian subaltern. Differences that I will diagram below based on Hale’s essay:
Du Bois’ American Negro
Divided identity as negative

Bakhtin’s Peasant
Divided identity as positive

Experience of internal division (457)

Manifestation of Double Identity (457)

Voice “lurking beneath the veil of social
objectification” (455)

Voice incorporated into language “liberates
individual agency” (455)

Consciousness as non-linguistic (447) silent

Voice as literary technique or linguistic identity
(447)
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Socially constructed consciousness that makes
him blind to himself lacking true selfconsciousness

Social Identity as literary formalism or “social
formalism” (447) that allows for a new kind of
openness

Crisis of Subaltern invisibility (448)

Triumph of Self Articulation (448)

Aims to define the world in relation to himself
his “higher individualism” (453)

Aims to become a voice surrounded by many
voices.

Identity thwarted by language

Identity can be fully visible in language

Tries to achieve voice

Chooses orientation within language

Subjectivity determined by consciousness

Subjectivity determined by language

Is veiled by the other, made invisible by the
other. Seeks visibility by becoming his best
truer self.

The novelist can and the peasant aspires to a
“godlike ability to represent the self through the
other, to occupy but not violate the autonomy
of the other” (458)

Social identity as ascribed by language no
agency in the manifestation through language.
The agency is when one separates from
language.
Cannot find truer self in discourse prefers to
absent himself from his social identity through
transcendence Du Bois’ “bluer skies”

Can manifest himself through language but at
the same time be more than language

Protecting bodies from hostile space and hostile
language

Putting bodies within language for selfarticulation

Aims for a unified self, the “better and truer
self” (459).

Aims to know self through an “oscillation”
between self and other (DI, 322)

“Novelist can absent his own social identity
from discourse long enough to represent
discourses that are not his own” (458)

Fig. 4-2. Table: Du Bois’ American Negro & Bakhtin’s Peasant

Hale further worries that both:
The Bakhtinian “heteroglot” novelist, like the silent Du Boisian African American, is
defined by a negative capability: his self-consciousness about the social identities
contained in language allows him to be more than the social languages that define
him-but that greater identity, formulated through the activity of distanciation,
possesses no positive content of its own. (448)
Hale breaks down the formulation of the Du Boisian Negro to show how reading double
consciousness as double voice may allow the African American to express himself/herself, but in
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doing so the particularities of what it means to be an African American identity becomes empty.
Hale sees dangers in not seeing the different relationship of the American Negro to language
than that of the Bakhtinian peasant. She ends with a caution to African American literary critics
to not just confirm “the familiar deconstructionist paradox: that knowledge about the truth of
self-division is empowering” (462). She critiques the process of fragmenting African American
identity to the point where it becomes “illegible and perhaps imperceptible” (463).
Whether or not one agrees with Hale’s critique, what her essay illuminates are the
relationships between double-consciousness, double-voicedness, language and discourse and the
different relationships to language and voice of those in more or less privileged positions. In
speaking of the novelist, she shows how by entering the voices of the other he can “be a benign
colonist who, by operating within discourse, leaves its native form intact” (459). By making use
of language to suit his ends and being able to speak “‘through’ another’s language” he is not
‘confined by any one language’” (459). Thus, the Bakhtinian novelist tries to escape the subject
position through the other while the Du Boisian American Negro tries to reclaim it through a
more unified and truer self. As Hale shows, Du Bois believes that “consciousness is the ideal site
of identity. In his account, the catastrophe of hegemonic power relations is that they violate the
inner sanctum of consciousness” (460). Is this then why attaining a subject position does not
scare the American Negro? Does he intrinsically realize that he is more than his point of view
and thus his subject position does not scare him? Nor would a unified, Cartesian subject scare
him since he has never felt this unified self. And what can be said of the novelist that has had his
body limited by the fallacy of the unified Cartesian self? A Cartesian self that has not only been
used to limit the self and others but to cast the other aside when defining the self yet another
form of limitation.
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“DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS” AND DOUBLE-VOICEDNESS IN KARA WALKER’S WORK
Kara Walker envisions a new subjectivity to free herself from elitists constrictions by
creating her own shadows. Shadows that exists within the messiness of History and are not above
it like Du Bois’ within his “region of blue sky and great wandering shadows” (2). Although
historically much is done by W.E.B. Du Bois’ and his Talented Tenth elite group to change the
trajectory of African American subjectivity, Walker critiques this elitism and uses cut out
silhouettes to create shadowy forms that confront the viewer with the atrocities of American
slavery. These shadows are unconnected to Du Bois’ blue skies and much removed from the
need to show the “best” of the race in countering the white imagination. Instead Walker’s
shadows place the onus on the white, black or other viewers of her pieces. Her work calls for a
movement away from Du Bois’ relation of idealism to art and away from a Black Aesthetics that
restricts artists to a certain kind of artwork that elevates the race thus creating their own
stereotypes by in turn essentializing blackness. Her series “Do You Like Creme in Your Coffee
and Chocolate in Your Milk?” of 1997 reveal this rejection of this essentializing and is a direct
response to criticisms of her work by key artists of the Black Arts Movement including Betye
Saar, Howardena Pindell and others.
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Fig. 4-3. Walker, Kara. “Do You Like Creme in Your Coffee and Chocolate in Your Milk?”, 1997,
watercolor, colored pencil, and graphite on paper, 11 5/8 x 8 3/16 in., Collection Walker Art Center,
Minneapolis, Justin Smith Purchase Fund, 1998

In this series she presents an imaginative conversation with this older generation of artist;
the trace before her, exorcising that trace. Through the use of the dialogic, Walker argues against
the prescriptions set up by this generation’s belief of what art should be and represent, by making
art seem more like a scientific than artistic discourse. An argument against the rationality of
science that limits knowledge that Jane Gordon also highlights in the previous discussion. When
the experts in a field, determine the field, it limits said field. Walker has an inner dialogue with
these critics much like the characters of the polyphonic novelist who have their own inner
dialogues. We could use Bakhtin’s description of scientific activity in The Dialogical
Imagination as a corollary to this disagreement and a support to Walker’s critique. One sees a
clear bridge between the two activities if one where to substitute “The Black Aesthetic” with
scientific activity in the following quote:
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In scientific activity [The Black Aesthetic] one must, of course, deal with another's
discourse-the words of predecessors, the judgments of critics, majority opinion and so
forth; one must deal with various forms for transmitting and interpreting another's wordstruggle with an authoritative discourse, overcoming influences, polemics, references,
quotations and so forth-but all this remains a mere operational necessity and does not
affect the subject matter itself of the science, [art] into whose composition the speaker
and his discourse do not, of course, enter. (351)
Walker’s subjectivity enters her discourse as she fully reveals the veil of doubleconsciousness, implicating everyone, herself included, in the negative projections we create of
the other. Her alter ego the “‘Emancipated Negress’ according to Thomas McEvilley, ‘…is a
contradiction in terms… if you were emancipated, you wouldn’t call yourself a Negress. Walker
locates herself – as both life and history have located her – within an oxymoron of the racial
issue’ (McEvilley, Kara Walker: My Complement, 61). This oxymoron has been staunchly
criticized as mentioned above. McEvilley states that these black modern artists see Walker as,
“performing acts of black-on-black primitivism. She expresses a kind of self-hatred by
portraying black people as primitive” (McEvilley, 56). But what do we see in Walker’s
silhouettes? Are these representations of black people or rather specters of the other within? I
contest that Walker’s work charges white viewers to confront “the “darky” [and other shadows
and stereotypes] born by the grotesque emanations of whiteness’ projection of blackness” (Storr,
Kara Walker: My Complement, 66) while also tasking black people to consider their own
stereotypes connecting white people to the white devil.
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Walker’s black silhouettes are not representations of black
people but the negative ways whiteness and blackness have
been historically constructed. Perhaps, no better are these
constructions expressed than in the writing of Frantz Fanon in
Black Skin, White Masks, who further explores doubleconsciousness. In a key passage in his text he states:
My body was returned to me spread-eagled,
disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this
white winter’s day. The Negro is an animal, the
Negro is bad, the Negro is wicked, the Negro is
ugly; look, a Negro; the Negro is trembling, the

Fig. 4-4. Walker, Kara. “Do
You Like Creme in Your
Coffee and Chocolate in Your
Milk?”, 1997

Negro is trembling because he’s cold, the small boy is trembling because he’s
afraid of the Negro, the Negro is trembling with cold, the cold that chills the
bones, the lovely little boy is trembling because he thinks the Negro is trembling
with rage, the little white boy runs to his mother’s arms: “Mama, the Negro’s
going to eat me.”
The white man is all around me; up above the sky is tearing at its navel;
the earth crunches under my feet and sings white, white. All this whiteness burns
me to a cinder. (93-94)
Walker lays out before us the most atrocious images that represent this whiteness that is
burning Fanon to a cinder as well as the constructed ugly Negro and the psychical repercussions
of that construction to both the trembling white boy and Fanon. What is interesting in this quote
is that the white boy and Fanon lack some agency surrounding the whiteness in the world around
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them and the constrictions of “What the Negro is”. The white boy (young, helpless, trembling) is
struck with fear while Fanon seems to have no agency as hero or villain in the story but rather a
detached and distant observer of the story unfolding.
Walker reclaims that agency and reveals the gift of “second sight” a key feature of the
American Negro’s double-consciousness existence where according to Dorothy Hale in
describing Du Bois’ work states, “he can see that the white cannot see him; he is behind a veil
that the white mistakes for him. And he can also see that he cannot see himself. There is a special
knowledge granted to the ‘Negro’ by his second sight, then, and it is the knowledge that his true
self is unknown, by both white and black” (“Bakhtin in African American Literary Theory”
450).

Fig. 4-5. Walker, Kara. No mere words can
Adequately reflect the Remorse this Negress
feels at having been Cast into such a lowly state
by her former Masters and so it is with a
Humble heart that she brings about their
physical Ruin and earthly Demise (detail), 1999.
Cut paper on wall, approx. 11 × 65 feet.
Installation view, CCAC Institute, Oakland,
1999.

Fig. 4-6. Boltanksi, Christian. “Prendre la
Parole”, 2005, Installation, Courtesy: Marian
Goodman Gallery, Paris.

In Walker’s, 1999 piece, “No mere words can Adequately reflect the Remorse this
Negress feels at having been Cast into such a lowly state by her former Masters and so it is with
a Humble heart that she brings about their physical Ruin and earthly Demise”, her own shadowy

306
forms place the veil of double consciousness front, center and around the viewer in large scale
installations. Walker also contradictorily uses these cut outs to capture, contain and freeze
negative aspects of blackness (and whiteness) within these silhouetted shapes. By taking control
of the imagery, there is a way Walker is able to confront her own repressions of this history and
its rippling consequences. In some of her images she also more directly suggests this
confrontation and the attempt to break free from the mental repercussions of slavery.

Fig. 4-7. Walker, Kara. Cut, 1998,

Fig. 4-8. Walker, Kara. A Work on Progress,

cut paper on wall, 88 x 54 in,
Collection Donna and Cargill MacMillan

1998, cut paper on wall, 69 x 80 in, Collection
Judie and Howard Ganek

A “DOUBLE CONSCIOUSNESS” DERIVATIVE IN CHRISTIAN BOLTANSKI’S WORK:
French artist Christian Boltanski also connects in interesting ways to what I will refer to as a
double consciousness derivative that sees oneself through the eyes of others and through the
internal conflict experienced by oppressed subjects in society. Similarly to Walker, Boltanski
investigates the individual in relation to the collective memory of history. Boltanski grew up
during post-holocaust Europe. He remembers his Jewish father hiding below the floorboards of
his house to escape persecution and recalls in “The Possible Life of Christian Boltanski”:
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…it was always my mother who told us to say we were Jewish, not my father. He
said the opposite: “Never say that, say you’re French.” It was my mother who
took us to the Jewish Quarter to buy Jewish food. She was much closer to the
Jews than my father was. For him, being Jewish was such a weighted and
dangerous thing that it was better not to talk about it (28)
He further relays a story where his family’s cat peed over at their neighbor’s lawn, “… a
perfectly nice neighbor, whom my parents had known for years. This neighbor came over and
said, “If you don’t kill that cat tonight, I am denouncing you to the police and you’ll be taken
away.” And they had to kill the cat” (20). There was a government law at the time that did not
allow Jews to have pets. Boltanski continues, “This story has always stuck with me … if you
give your neighbor the power to kill you, he’ll kill you. That does not make them mean; it’s just
part of human nature” (20). In “Sans-Souci” Boltanski makes a photo album showing how,
“these nice-looking people became Nazis. We see Christmas trees, music, Babies: they were just
like us. If the monster had been different from us, it would have been easier to deal with. But it
was us” (website, grahamegalleries.com).

Fig. 4-9. Boltanski, Christian. Sans Souci. 2000.
artists' book paper over boards issued without dust-jacket offset-printed glue bound black-and-white.
22 x 29 cm. [16] pp. edition size 2000. unsigned and unnumbered

Boltanski like Walker uses his work to get at the deep, dark aspects of human nature. In his
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installation “Les Ombres” of 2008 he reveals the shadow within, through the use of tiny cut-out
figures that disclose much larger monstrous shadows; shadows that are usually hidden and
repressed in real life. Boltanski in an interview with Irene Borger states, “Carl Jung talked about
the shadow in people—l’ombre—the dark side of our nature. He believed we let other people
live it out for us. That’s what the “other” is. When we refuse to accept that quality in ourselves,
we project it on the others, like the Germans projecting on the Jews”. (Borger)

Fig. 4-10. Boltanski, Christian. from Les Ombres. 2008.

In a previous piece Boltanski used some of the 3000 dirt balls he had created and placed
them on top of white fabric. In neatly trying to roll and contain the dirt into spheres, Boltanski
realizes, through the repetitious act, that none will be perfect. Each dirt ball instead presents us
with the imperfect and particular nature of the human subject; the 3000 uneven dirt balls reveal
the various possibilities and the freedom within the absence of the one universal and perfect
sphere. This motivation is made even more apparent in an interview with Catherine Grenier,
where Boltanski states that his father told him, “‘You have to be dirty in a clean world,’ because
dirt protects. You have to live in a clean world but you yourself have to be dirty so as not to get
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ill” (Grenier, 18). Boltanski suggests that it is this defective nature that makes us human and the
constricting, rational, pure and “clean world” can infringe upon that humanity. Similarly, to
Walker he reveals the shadows and the darker side of humanity and unlike Du Bois’ Talented
Tenth and the Black Arts Movement he embraces the flawed dirtiness of human nature. The
“tape of the world” (2) as Du Bois states, does not measure Boltanski’s subjects in his work
rather the use of shadows and dirt balls suggests what the “tape of the world” cannot measure.

Fig. 4-11. Botlanski, Christian. Dirt.

However Boltanski’s aim is not to just show the dirt of humanity but he also casts a light on
this dirt. In a poem on how to execute a work of art from the book idea he created with Hans Ulrich
Obrist, Boltanski (perhaps thinking back to his childhood experience of his killed cat) writes:
[1] GET YOUR NEIGHBOR’S PHOTO ALBUM [2] GIVE YOUR NEIGHBOR

310
YOURS IN EXCHANGE [3] ENLARGE ALL THE PICTURES TO 8 X 10 [4]
FRAME THEM SOME SIMPLE FASHION AND HANG THEM ON THE
WALLS OF YOUR APARTMENT [5] YOUR NEGHBOR SHOULD DO THE
SAME TO YOUR ALBUM (“do it: the compendium”, 103)
Boltanski not only looks back into himself through his work but forces the viewer who
encounters his piece to think also about their own limitations through the eyes of the other. By
tasking the participator in the imaginative piece above to reconfigure his space with the space of
his neighbor’s, he aspires like the Bakhtin peasant to the novelist’s “godlike ability to represent
the self through the other, to occupy but not violate the autonomy of the other” (458). However,
while Boltanski does somewhat play with this idea of “occupying the other” he uses that
temporary occupation to come back to himself and his own subjectivity and to create possibilities
for that subjectivity that will not infringe on the space of the other, a key component of
EmDisEmbodied Is.
In Boltanski’s recollections and stories about himself he blurs the line between “fact” and
“fiction”. Showing us how memories are neither one nor the other. By complicating how we look
at our memories and Being he in turn complicates our view of the other. In the introduction to
“Christian Boltanski: Lessons of Darkness” Mary Jane Jacob writes:
Boltanski chose a fictionalized existence rather than truth-to-fact because he believed in a
world of signs and conventions there was no way to communicate the really personal…
Moreover, by appropriating mementos of others’ lives and presenting them as if they were
his own, he could both depersonalize and generalize their content, allowing each of us to
share in the remembrances and to see in them our own experiences. (11)
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Fig. 4-12. Kara Walker. The Emancipation
Approximation (Scene #13), edition 7/20, 1999–2000,
screenprint. 44 x 34 in.. Collection of the Jordan
Schnitzer Family Foundation.

Fig. 4-13. Boltanski, Christian.
FIGURE OMBRE (BOUGIE). 1987.
Cut, copper, aluminum structure, wax
and candles. 31 x 5 x 11 cm.

“DOUBLE VOICEDNESS” AND “DOUBLE VISION” IN WILLIAM KENTRIDGE’S WORK.
Similar concepts also appear in William Kentridge’s work. Kentridge grew up during the period
of apartheid in South Africa. However, unlike white classmates and friends he grew up in a
family where apartheid was seen as unnatural and immoral. His work, artist’s books, and
writings address the horrors of apartheid while at the same time looking in depth at white
subjectivity. Through anamorphic drawings, video projections that engulf the viewer, and other
illusionistic techniques he moves us away from the comfort of the single perspective gaze. “I
understood that in the act of making the image one didn’t need to be trapped by the precision and
the notations of an Albertinian single-point perspective”. (William Kentridge in Conversation 12)
He explores the way we construct vision and three-dimensional space through the use of two flat
images. He also investigates how we fragment that space. His animations completely engulf us
and allow the viewer to appreciate the figures from multiple perspectives.
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Fig. 4-14. Kentridge, William. More Sweetly Play the Dance. 2015. Installation view at EYE Film
Museum, Amsterdam. Courtesy of EYE Film Museum, Amsterdam.

Not only does his work reveal his interest in the shadow and the potentialities of the shadow but
they also reveal his interest in the trace. His continuous erased and then redrawn image reveals
the presencing that is so important in the work and theories of Derrida. In his interview with
Angela Breidbach in William Kentridge: Thinking Aloud, he states of thinking of subjects and
objects in space, “in terms of temporality, something leaving a trace of where something was
before in space, rather than trying to evoke a distance around me, or around the figure…” (37).
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Fig. 4-15. Kentridge, William. Felix in Exile. 1994. Film, 35 mm, shown as video, projection, black and
white, and sound (stereo). Collection of the Tate.
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In his important animation Felix in Exile, there is a scene where he shaves, his face gets erased,
and the black African woman Nandi appears in the mirror where the reflection of his face once
was (see above image). Kentridge, like the privileged novelist in Bakhtin’s polyphonic novel
finds the need to disappear, as Kentridge states, “[f]or some reason which my brain knows, but
that I do not know, I erased his face, and allowed a space for her to come in …” (72). Kentridge
then quickly reappears as in a subsequent image Nandi and Kentridge look at each other while he
faces the mirror without anything mediating that look. He does not bring as much attention to the
gaze in this scene and there is a way when looking at this image we as viewer become very much
implicated as the third person who looks. In the last image attention is brought to them looking
and that gaze being mediated through a looking device. In this and other work, Kentridge
directly addresses the gaze of a Cartesian subject looking in disinterest – showing Kentridge’s
obvious interest in deconstructing; his understanding of double-vision within the self and other;
and how that other is intimately related to a trace of the self. Kentridge is also not afraid of being
interrogated by the subject that looks back. A subject that has been oppressed by the symbol of
his own historical subject. This is similar in certain ways to Dali’s paintings in chapter three,
where we as viewer see Dali from the back but Gala his wife, from the front as Dali searches for
her presence.

Fig. 4-16. Salvador Dali, Fundacio Gala-Salvador Dali, Figueres, 2017

www.salvador-dali.org/en/artwork/catalogue-raisonne-paintings/obra/853/dali-seen-from-theback-painting-gala-from-the-back-eternalized-by-six-virtual-corneas-provisionally-reflected-bysix-real-mirrors-stereoscopic-work
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In the catalog for the show “Double Vision” with Kentridge and Albert Durer’s work, one
sees how Kentridge explodes the safety in the position of the Cartesian subject who depends on a
one-point perspective. If one contrasts Kentridge’s collage inspired by Durer’s print that dissects
the female nude through his perspective tricks, one sees some key differences. There is an
absence and uncertainty to Kentridge’s presence who looks with just the head and not his full
fixed being. An uncertainty is present in the gaze and the female form that he is looking at is
abstracted, organic and the opening of her genitalia, that he gazes at, seems to appear as a void
representing the unknowable.

Fig. 4-17. Dürer, Albrecht. Draughtsman Making a Perspective Drawing of a Reclining Woman. ca.
1600. Woodcut Print. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Fig. 4-18. Kentridge, William. Étant Donnés from Untitled. 2007-08.
www.moma.org/collection/works/133467
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CHANGING THE APPARATUS THROUGH UNFIXED SUBJECTIVITIES
Michael Monahan in The Creolizing Subject states:
Part of what it means to be white is to not be nonwhite, and so any serious engagement
with whiteness must take up questions of nonwhiteness, just as thinkers such as DuBois
and Frantz Fanon have taken up questions of the meaning of whiteness in their efforts to
understand blackness. This is not to say that they collapse into each other, or that one is
reducible to the other, or that one is simply the negation of the other. It is rather to say the
meanings of whiteness and nonwhiteness are deeply and inextricably intertwined. (13-14)
Monahan argues for creolizing subjectivities that are not afraid of contradictions, at ease with the
non-pure, the non-unified, the non-single-perspective in contrast to Cartesian subjectivity. Jane
Gordon argues for creolizing our epistemologies; while Grosfoguel would like us to set up Pluriversities. In William Kentridge: Thinking Aloud, in response to a question by Angela Breidbach,
Kentridge states, “[n]o, pure light is terrible. Your eyes are blinded by the sun. You have to
protect yourself, you need a hat and dark sunglasses and you look for some shade. I think that
neither the pure light is something that humans are meant to be confronted with, nor pure
darkness” (96).
Walker, Boltanski and Kentridge use the power of becoming, unfixed subjectivities, the
idea of the non-pure and the world of the aesthetic to address very important issues surrounding
subjectivities. They use the motif of the shadow and reveal how context influences subjectivities,
illuminating the construction of the individual within what Bakhtin would refer to as a
“chronotopic relationship” where, “[t]he individual occurs as a chronotope within the ‘story’ of
human interaction ... the ‘other’ including its various manifestations, therefore including parole,
culture, place, class, race, and gender, participates in the formation of the self.” (Bakhtin,
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Murphy, EcoFeminism, 45) This self as defined by the other is also a key feature of the Du
Boisian African-American self where his double-consciousness and divided self is in continuous
dialogue as he navigates the world. Although shadows are thought to be universal, Walker’s use
of shadows are very different than Boltanski’s whose is very different than Kentridge’s. Walker
explores perverted desire in her work; Boltanski fear; and Kentridge psychological trauma. All
however call for the viewers of their work to connect to this shadow or this “other” that is a part
of the construction of the self along with a shadow self.
Their work also calls for an owning and a taking responsibility within the subject position.
However, it is a subject position that is unfixed, becoming and conflicted. This owning of one’s
subject position while understanding its instability is a necessary step to help us move beyond
our positions as oppressors (not only of others but of ourselves). Boltanksi, Kentridge, and
Walker are true contemporaries in Agamben’s definition of the word, finding the light within the
darkness by taking on the urgent need to explore this shadow within and by their acceptance of
the conflicted self. They use double consciousness and double-voicedness or derivatives of each,
in various forms, as tools to represent EmDisEmbodied Is which are new kind of subjects,
new kinds of authors, at comfort with the uncertainty of multiple, contingent answers and truths.
However, simultaneously they assert the paradox that these contingent subjectivities have to
some necessary essentialisms at play to construct political ‘truths’. These ‘truths’ are defined by
the artists as not a single truth but an interactive (with the viewer) dialogic truth with no end
point that we need to continuously work on.
In The Expanded Subject: New Perspectives in Photographic Portraiture from Africa,
Sandrine Colard looks at the work of the African photographer Saidou Dicko. She notes how
Dicko conceptually inverts the myth of Plato’s cave where the shadows are seen as revealing the
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subjects’ interiority. Colard relays that Dicko
indicates that he does not actually need to see the
flesh-and-blood person as “the sight of their
corporeal façade might interfere with or obstruct
[the] unveiling” (83) of these inner subjectivities.
Colard further states that, “for those with an intimate
knowledge of the person casting the shadow, there is
something unmistakably recognizable about it when
it belongs to a close friend or relative. It is indeed as
if the shadow constitutes a superior degree of insight
into that person” (84). Giorgio Agamben in his essay
“The Friend” sees friendship as resisting both
representation and conceptualization where, “calling

Fig. 4-19. Dicko, Saidou, Le Petit
Guerrier (The Little Warrior), 2007.
Courtesy of Artco Gallery.

someone “friend” is not the same as calling him “white,” “Italian,” or “hot,” since friendship is
neither a property nor a quality of a subject” (31). For Agamben one is a friend not because you
share something with them but rather because you share the experience of friendship with them.
This harkens back to Derrida’s work through deconstruction where he replaces the letter
‘e’ with ‘a’ in the word differ(e)nce to speak to the possibilities within that word that can then
also realize the possibilities within Being. He defines différance as “neither a word or a concept”
in a similar way a friend cannot be a representation or a conceptualization. Derrida breaks down
the either/or way we construct the world and thus those around us. He creates a trace where
différance represents a continuous process of presencing or deferring rather than to present
something in a similar way that a friend is not something that is presented before us but it is the
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experiences we have as friends that define the friendship that intimately ties both subjects
together in time.
When thinking back on the College scenario I mentioned at the start of the chapter - the
argument should not be about whether or not their needed to be a ‘safe space’ without the white
students but an understanding on the part of the white students as to why a ‘safe space’ was
asked for and an understanding on the part of the students of color as to why the white students
would want to be a part of that ‘safe space’. It is harder to look and try to understand and accept
these differing perspectives from historical constructed selves i.e. white students vs. students of
color. The apparatus of language and more specifically racial language can get in the way, as
inscribed within that language is a play with power and a link, “to certain limits of knowledge
that arise from it and, to an equal degree condition it” (2). However, what if these subjects, these
others were conceived as friends? Would there then be less of a likelihood to feel the need to
define the I through the negation of the non-I? Would there be a better ability to hold both
subjectivities within consciousness. Only by looking at an issue from multiple perspectives, from
multiple Is, only by confronting the other within and attempting to see ourselves, outside
ourselves and through the eyes of the other are we able to start to listen to and understand that
other. The students in the scenario would have to take on the contradictory position of holding
and owning their own historical subject positions while letting go of the negative historical
constructions of those before him/her/they - a difficult task to accomplish when steeped in those
constructions.
In conclusion I would like to share a quote from Mooji, a Rastafari introduced to me by
Oneika Russell, the artist I interviewed in chapter three. In his quote for the day on September
3rd, 2021, he states:
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When you come
with an open mind,
you notice and enter easily
the flowing streams of grace.
If you cling to your projections,
you will be oblivious to this.
In the same way that
you cannot think two thoughts
at the same time,
you cannot see the real
if you are intent on
fulfilling your projections.
From the beginning of time,
we have been perceiving
what we are conceiving
and not what truly Is.
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CHAPTER FIVE :
I AND I > WE: DECOLONIZING: RASTAFARI AND I
In the previous chapter we explored I + I and I ended with a brief discussion of Derrida’s
word différance. There is no doubt that EmDisEmbodiment gets some of its inspiration from
Derridean ideas and différance. On reading Derrida’s Margins of Philosophy, I remember
thinking to myself how cool to be able to within theory, to be creative in a similar fashion as in
the arts, by creating a word. Many have labelled me in the past as, “a visual person” so it felt
only right then to create a word that I could perform through this writing. A word that people did
not know and that could have different meanings based on who utters it, the context it is said,
and the words that surround it. A deferred meaning that could contradictorily also shift in time.
The creation of the word is one way I find, besides artmaking and curating, to remove myself
from the constrictions of verbal and written language. Constrictions that state embodiment is not
disembodiment and that there are fixed meanings for the word embodiment and disembodiment
that everyone within the language game with me here agree upon.
Derrida through différance was able to highlight the necessary deferral of words, as a
word’s final meaning was forever postponed through a chain of signifiers. Words that differ, for
example embodiment and disembodiment do not have absolute meanings but instead draw their
meanings from the relationship between the two terms and the different ways they have and will
be uttered. In a similar fashion bodies, subjects, citizens in time are relational beings. Their
meanings come from their relationships with others. These meanings are not historically fixed
but also constantly deferred. Derrida shows in Margins of Philosophy how continental
philosophy needs to constantly defer its own meaning and needs also to address its
phallocentricism and I would add its Euro-centrism and heteronormativity. Derrida’s
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deconstruction was a step towards questioning and breaking down unquestioned truth claims
from the “ego-politics of knowledge” (Grosfoguel). Derrida also critiqued a “metaphysics of
presence”, where there is an underlying belief that we can find universal truth beyond our
constrictions including those constructed through language. Derrida wants to critique those
underlying presences we assume come before our constructions. A project I fully understand
since much of those underlying presences, those truths were tied to a particular ego-politic that
we need to move beyond.
As I decolonize my I, I have to also explore what is on the margins of my underlying
presences that could also be connected to certain ego-politics. Rastafari is a key point of
reference, as through my colonial upbringing Rastafari was culturally marginalized, ostracized,
feared, and disparaged. As cultural margins are now becoming centered, this chapter lays bare a
reclamation of Rastafari. My first experience reconnecting with Rastafari in adulthood was when
I collaborated on a video art piece with a Rasta I met in Kingston, Jamaica in 2008, who will
remain unnamed. More recently my research here allowed me access to interviews with Ras
Yannick and Ras Tony where we could discuss the Rastafari “I and I” locution, which is
considered one methodology used to “Chant down Babylon.”38 In this chapter I would like to
delve more deeply into decolonizing my I through Rastafari and look further at notions such as
Babylon, I and I and how these and other Rastafari ideas are expressed through contemporary
artwork.
Babylon for Rastafari can refer to Rome, Jamaica and its colonialist thoughts and ideas,
as well as capitalistic or other oppressive systems that have resulted from those ideas. “Chanting
Down” involves a contradictory battle between letting things in while simultaneously keeping
things out as Rastafari define themselves through a process of de-colonization—an active way of
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attempting to look back at and embrace Afrocentric ideas and ways of being while
simultaneously holding on to tenets from Judeo-Christianity or creolization. “I and I” is a phrase
that reveals the Rastafari’s formulation of being in terms of agency and spirituality. The
nominative, subjective, and more active “I and I” is substituted for the more passive, objective,
and divisive “you and me” or the more spatially separate “you and I.” Thus “I and I” uncovers
the Rastafari conception of themselves and others as liberatory and communal subjects that are
surviving and existing in time as opposed to objects that are consumed and apperceived in space.
I will argue that Rastafari ways of transforming language with terms such as “I and I” and
the ideas that result from these terms can be used to complicate debates surrounding the concept
of difference. I will further argue that many contemporary artists and poets have been creating
what I will refer to as I-and-I EmDisEmbodied spaces that allow for people to connect with each
other in deeply empathic ways that are understanding but do not presume to know what the other
thinks or feels. By exploring the visual artwork of Lourdes Bernard, Renee Green, Adrian Piper,
and Zachary Fabri; the poetry of Mutabaruka; and the music and lyrics of Bob Marley, I will
show how each in her or his own way articulates and embodies the need for strong, socially
responsible polls within the self/other duality—strong “Is” within the “Wes.” These are poles that
break out of what is known in philosophy as Hegel’s dialectics of recognition, where selfconsciousness is achieved through a struggle for recognition that makes one a Lord and another a
Bondsman, by instead presenting active, complex, spiritually present, and temporal rather than
spatial beings. These EmDisEmbodied Is are in constant processes of becoming and are
creatively engaged with their social worlds, inviting the viewer into their work to have “I and I”
rather than “you and me” moments when relating to the other.

324
Introduction to the “I And I”
Lewis Gordon in an email exchange with the author, states that the ambiguous phrase “I and I”
has both social as well as “solipsistic and egoistic” connotations. This social aspect suggests
communal, spiritual, and political implications to the phrase “I and I.” For the religious Rasta39
the second I can refer to I’s relationship to God as well as the other person that is being
addressed. Rastafari then draw an immediate connection between that ‘other’ and God or Being
where “I and I” can generally refer to the communal relationship between I (self), I (other) and I
(God). However, one should not mistake this communal relationship as a move by Rastafari to
subsume the other within the self—an unfortunate consequence of colonialism as explored
briefly below.
A second point Gordon makes is that “I and I” can be read as analogical, thus somewhat
detached and metaphysical (as you need distance to refer to yourself) or dialogical through this
connection between self and other. It is these ambiguities within the phrase and connection to
EmDisEmbodiment, that generate the power within “I and I.” A power that I argue also creates
spaces for active and socially responsible subjects that connect more fully with each other, move
away from objectifying the other, and are able to value the others’ different perspectives,
experiences, and histories.
Theoretical debates concerning difference will show how practice, lived experience, and
creative spaces should be deeply considered when addressing philosophical issues. These lived
experiences reveal the limits and have created aspects of the khora—the zone that Jacques
Derrida sees as beyond the text; neither this nor that; right nor wrong; black nor white; you nor
me. The lens of Africana existential phenomenology by such thinkers as Lewis Gordon and
Paget Henry will shed light on the need to combat the limitations of Western Philosophy and the
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ways it fails to examine the khora and thus difference, using concepts such as “the universal”
connected to a certain ego-politics that is used to divide beings and ignore the complexities of
difference. They also explore the importance of existence; the various histories of selves and
others; and how these histories can complicate and enrich philosophical discussions. Questioning
the constructs “European” and “African”, Gordon and Henry unveil ways Western philosophy
has separated the European supposedly universal “we” or Being40 from a them, the African and
many various others that are at times made invisible, ahistorical, or denigrated through this
process of presumed universalizing. They examine this lived experience of being and investigate
Rastafari philosophy that prioritizes that lived experience.
The post-colonial work of Achille Mbembe, Homi Bhabha, and V.Y. Mudimbe will also
be useful through their investigation of post-colonialism and colonialism as well as how those
modes have affected identity. Other theorists that will be explored include Frantz Fanon and his
existential and psychoanalytical interrogation of himself as a colonial subject, Linda Alcoff’s use
of hermeneutics and phenomenology in her investigation of identity, and Derrida’s work
uncovering the limits that language imposes on our beings; the way we use language through
difference to construct either/or notions of the world; and further ideas connected to différance
and chiasmus. These theorists reveal in different ways just how much of the other is marked
within the self and vice versa. Their ideas and debates surrounding identity along with an
exploration into the lived experience of Rastafari and the work of contemporary artists within the
United States all expand our theoretical languages and epistemologies to better connect to each
other and the changing dynamics of our “I and Is” in history and time.
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An Exploration of Rastafari
Let us begin with an exploration of Rastafari. Critics have unsuccessfully tried to pigeonhole it
with terms such as “cult,” “religion,” and “escapist movement.” However, based on my research
and interviews with Ras Yannick and Ras Tony from Jamaica there are a variety of Rastafari,
some more doctrine based, while others are more as Ras Yannick states, “free-form.”41 Ras
Yannick considers himself an agnostic philosopher. His academic pursuits involve connecting
Rastafari to the existentialist philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre and Søren Kierkegaard. Both Sartre
and Kierkegaard believed that philosophy should be done by active, feeling, and living human
beings and not those that prioritize thinking as the main “act” for philosophizing and being. Their
work moves away from the Cartesian subject’s mind/body split within Western philosophy.
Under Cartesianism, the mind is a separate substance from the body. The former is immaterial
and eternal; the latter is material, mechanical, and decays.
Ras Yannick also sees the need to search for influences outside of Western philosophy
and mentions noted Rastafari poet Mutabaruka with his strong objection to Rastafari being
labeled as a religion. Mutabaruka instead views Rastafari as an experience that can be different
for various Rastas. In our interview we discussed these more free-form strands of Rastafari as
relating to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s lines of flight—in terms of a body existing in
space with no beginning or end but instead full of possibilities within this middle constant state
of flux. Ras Yannick sees this flight as a flight for self-discovery, a rediscovery or relearning of
things African, believing that in looking back to Africa, Rastafari can discover more communal
forms of Being.
In the introduction to The Rastafari Reader: Chanting Down Babylon, Nathaniel Samuel
Murrell states: “This African-centered ideology is a form of ‘conscientizing’ that draws attention
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to the distortions of African history in the various forms of literature, which try to obscure the
continent’s contribution to the origin of Western civilization” (5). Murrell further states that

Fig. 5-1. Tuff Gong, cover art for Uprising by the artist Bob Marley & The Wailers, 1980

Rasta, “defines and authenticates one’s existence as a matter of primary concern and then names
oneself and one’s world in relation to that mode of consciousness” (5). Murrell refers to Joseph
Owens’s summary of doctrine-based Rastafarian theology’s key ideas being: “[1] ‘God is in man
and man is in god’ … ; [2] ‘the sacramentality of nature’ … [means] we are called to protect the
environment by conserving energy, reducing pollution, and eating natural foods; [3] God is Haile
Selassie I, the Ethiopian Emperor from 1930–1974, who was assassinated in 1975;
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Fig. 5-2. Haile Selassie I, 1930-74.

and [4] the power of ‘the spoken word [is] a manifestation of divine presence’” (5–6). In
Murrell’s introduction to Chanting Down Babylon, he points to William David Spencer’s chapter
“Chanting Change around the World through Rasta Ridim and Art,” seeing how it shows how
Rasta’s chants are “a proclamation of beauty, assurances of divine love and justice, and
encouragement for self-reliance in the face of the reality of dwelling within Babylon’s repressive
structures” (Murrell. 14–15). David Spencer explores the different contributions that Rastafari’s
creative expressions have made globally stating that:
Rastas have chosen the nonviolent over the violent approach to bring down Babylon. The
arts have become key “weapons” in that strategy… Through music, visual art, drama,
poetry ... Rastas have promoted, globally, their message against “Babylon,” the
oppressive sociopolitical system. (267)
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Rastafari and Language
Rastafari prioritizing of arts, poetry, music, chanting and other forms of expression reveal the
concerns they have with Western civilization’s use of binary thinking and language. Rastafari
manipulate English to move away from these either/or-but-not-both constructions. Leonard E.
Barett states, in The Rastafarians, “Rastafarian speech is almost devoid of subject-object
opposition as well as without verbs” (143). He adds:
… binary oppositions are overcome in the process of identity with other sufferers in the
society. The Rastafarian, when meeting a stranger… tests the ‘vibration’ of the person. If
that vibration is positive, it does not matter if one is a member of the movement or not; he
or she will be immediately addressed in conversation as “I and I.” (144)
Mutabaruka, well known as one of Jamaica’s influential dub poets, actors, and wellknown radio personalities, draws from the oral traditions of Caribbean poetry to conscientize and
break down these binaries within English. Dedbas Roy in “Poetry as Instrument: Reading
Selected Poems of Mutabaruka,” reveals how liberatory struggles against colonization affected
Mutaburuka:
the colonizers systematically glorified their culture and dwarfed the culture of the
colonized Caribbeans … Mutabaruka became a Rasta in his teens in an attempt to,
‘deconstruct’ the power structure of English grammar and structures which are
metonymic of the hegemonic controls exercised by the British on Black peoples
throughout Caribbean and African history. The Rastafarians have made several attempts
to liberate the language from within. (Roy, 171–172)
Mutabaruka uses African-Caribbean oral art and prioritizes it over a European literary tradition
that names orality as “[a]nthropological discourse,” “primitive,” and “traditional” (Roy, 173). In
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his piece “Dis Poem” he detaches himself as author from the space. The poem makes many
references to time—the continuous, and repetitious are key aspects in contrast to the tendency of
the English language to fix things in space. The very use of “Dis” instead of “This” in the title
implies this movement away from fixed notions of placing and naming. “Dis” is usually used
with “yah” where “dis yah” means “this here” connecting the notion of placing in space with that
of experiencing in time. Key stanzas in the poem also display the use of the present participle
and Mutabaruka’s privileging of time over space:

Fig. 5-3. Mutabaruka performing

dis poem shall speak of time
time unlimited time undefined
…dis poem is vexed about apartheid racism fascism
…dis poem is revoltin against 1st world 2nd world
3rd world division man made decision
... dis poem is a rebirth of a peopl
arizin awaking understandin
… dis poem shall survive u me it shall linger in history
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in your mind
in time forever
… dis poem has no poet
dis poem is just a part of the story
his-story her-story our-story the story still untold
… dis poem is watchin u tryin to make sense from dis poem
dis poem is messin up your brains
makin u want to stop listenin to dis poem
but u shall not stop listenin to dis poem
u need to know what will be said next in dis poem
dis poem shall disappoint u
because
dis poem is to be continued in your mind in your mind
in your mind your mind. (lines 7–8,13, 16–17, 32–33, 36–38, 41–43, 56–64 )
What is apparent in “Dis Poem” is that even though Mutabaruku states “dis poem has no poet”
the poem takes on its own being. A being however, that in a departure from much theoretical
‘universal’ language, is an existence that is just “part of the story” a poem that is existing in time
by “revoltin,” “watchin,” “messin up,” and “listenin.” Mutabaruku also ends with a chant “in
your mind in your mind…” echoing the creative power of “Dis Poem” and how it continues on
within this communal relationship amongst self, other, other, other....
Jacques Derrida’s Deconstructive Approach
In a similar transformation of language, Derrida’s work, that perhaps signals back to Thomas
Aquinas’s thoughts that western thinking lacks energeia (potentialities) because of language
constraints, replaces the letter ‘e’ with ‘a’ in the word differ(e)nce to speak to the possibilities
within that word that can then allow us to open up our beings and allow connections with other
beings. “A” in French also relates to the present participle revealing Derrida’s, similarly to
Mutabaruka’s, keen interest in prioritizing time and movement in language. Deconstructing
language he attempts to break down the spatial ways we use English to divide. Derrida through
his play with linguistics and language tries to reveal this structure of concealment, 42 and also
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move us away from binary modes of thought. Through différance he calls for “a kind of insistent
intensification of its play” (Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, 3), a continuous process of
presencing or deferring rather than to present something. Furthermore, through the concept of
“the trace” Derrida reveals just how much the presence of the other is within the self or in
Rastafari terminology how much of I (self) is in I (other). Because the meaning of an I (self)
contains a trace of an I (other). One cannot, for example, bring up the concept woman without
bringing up the concept man; Rastafari without bringing up the concept colonizer; and European
without bringing up African and vice versa.
According to Richard Kearney in Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers,
“Derrida contrives to dismantle our preconceived notions of identity and expose us to the
challenge of hitherto suppressed or concealed ‘otherness’—the other side of experience, which
has been ignored in order to preserve the illusion of truth as a perfectly self-contained and selfsufficient presence” (106). Derrida looks further at this concealed “otherness” in such essays as
“Tympan” in Margins of Philosophy, where he explores the phallogocentrism of western
philosophy and its aversion to difference: “It may be about this multiplicity that philosophy,
being situated, inscribed, and included within it, has never been able to reason” (27). Lewis
Gordon and Paget Henry further illustrate this concealed “otherness” as it relates to race and
ethnicity as discussed below.
Derrida also explores key concepts such as Aufhebung and chiasmus. Aufhebung is a
German word used repeatedly by Hegel that calls on thought where two contradictory elements
are held together, uplifting while also canceling out the other but without completely destroying
the other. Chiasmus is a term Derrida explores through his method of deconstruction that
involves a use of doubling in language to break out of the hierarchical and create different
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meanings. He laments the use of his ideas related to these terms toward, according to Kearney,
“nihilism, an orgy of non-sense, a relapse into the free play of the arbitrary” (124). In an
interview with Kearney he further states:
But to distance oneself thus from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or
complicate our common assumptions about it, does not amount to saying that there is
nothing beyond language…I regret that I have been misinterpreted in this way,
particularly in the United States, but also in France. People who wish to avoid
questioning and discussion present deconstruction as a sort of gratuitous chess game with
a combination of signs (combinatoire de signifiants), closed up in language as in a cave.
This misinterpretation is not just a simplification; it is symptomatic of certain political
and institutional interests— interests which must also be deconstructed in their turn. I
totally refuse the label of nihilism which has been ascribed to me by my American
colleagues. Deconstruction is not an enclosure in nothingness, but an openness towards
the other. (Ibid)
Perhaps it could be argued that Derrida would be much happier with bridging a connection
between Rastafari communities and his ideas related to deconstruction, Aufhebung and chiasmus
rather than these nihilistic deconstructionist strains of his critiques. It will, however, take a
different project to do that; instead it will be useful to look at the work of Linda Alcoff, one such
critic of Derrida, as her exploration of “visible identities” directly relates to “I and I.”
Linda Alcoff’s Visible Identities and Feminist Phenomenological Approach
In Visible Identities: Race, Gender and the Self, Alcoff argues that anti-identity theorists like
Butler, Derrida, Foucault, and Sartre articulate only “Hegel’s longing for a self of pure negation
rather than his more mature acceptance of the Other within the self” (89). She strongly objects
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against calls for anti-identity and nothingness within the philosophical and political theoretical
worlds. Instead she offers a phenomenological and hermeneutic understanding of identities
existing in time and upholds the need to make identities more visible. Alcoff is not interested in
ahistorical truths about identity. She is more interested in: “How are racial and gendered
identities operating here, now? … How do they relate to subjectivity, lived experience, and what
a given individual can see and know? And what are the implications of a fuller understanding of
these identities on political practice” (27)?
Alcoff spends some time looking at philosophical debates concerning rationality.
Similarly, to universality, as mentioned previously, it has been used to disregard identities and
thus the other. These debates avoid cultural difference seeing rationality, universality and reason
as having only “formal rather than substantive content” (69). They believe that cultural identity
is actually an impediment to rationality setting up a binary – rationality/cultural identity where
cultural traditions are looked down upon as a “prison house” (75). However, Alcoff argues for
hybridity and a certain form of the post-colonial that instead of seeing identities as “prison
houses” considers that “change does not happen through a complete disengagement from all
value commitments and framing assumptions but through the ability to imagine life under the
terms of more than one set” (75). A process colonial and post-colonial subjects go through on a
daily basis in seeing themselves paradoxically as both insiders and outsiders in their
colonial/post-colonial worlds.
Alcoff also explores the inner/outer ontology where we believe that our “thoughts,
beliefs, and feelings are ‘inside’’ while objects we might consider and deliberate over are
‘outside’” (70). This world as only an extension of our existence leads to further beliefs related
to conquest and mastery of self over other and self over world. She produces a critique of the
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Cartesian self that “is more like Adam in the Garden of Eden, naming the animals according to
his own preference, than like Job bewailing his fate until he comes to accept its moral
validity…” (71).
Alcoff believes that anti-identity claims are another way to ignore or subsume the other
and instead aims to complicate debates concerning identity though her discussion. She advances
that by looking at visible identities and embracing difference and multiplicities that rather than
leading to judging or essentializing others, it actually makes us better appreciate that we are more
alike than believed. She counters the anti-identity claims that “identities pose prima facie
constraints on individuals” (67) wondering why then they would be constructed and why
systematically oppressed groups would want to hold onto their identities. She compares and
contrasts gender identities with racialized ones and looks specifically at Latino identity as it
relates to the politics of hybridity.
Calling for the importance of I, Alcoff highlights a quote by Alexandre Kojève
concerning Hegel’s ideas: “The very being of this I will be becoming, and the universal form of
this being will not be space, but time. . .. Thus, this I will be its own product” (qtd. in Alcoff, 58).
These ideas of being and time along with hybrid, paradoxical, identities with agency, connect in
interesting ways to the discussion above on Rastafari, language, and “I and I.” In a similar vein,
Lewis Gordon and Paget Henry’s explorations into Africana Existential Phenomenology and
Rastafari also reveal the complicated non-essentialist ways in which identities are constructed.

Lewis Gordon And Paget Henry’s Africana Existential Phenomenological Approaches
The Africana existential phenomenological approach relates directly to this idea of being in time
and concentrates on looking at the epistemological ways we have separated and constructed our
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identities. Lewis Gordon elucidates the false separation created in much of Western Philosophy
between Europe and Africa. Gordon states: “The human world is not, in my view, reducible to a
single element but is instead capable of multiple elements manifested in complex, interweaving
relationships of meaning.” In an Introduction to Africana Philosophy, while discussing the falsity
of the term “ancient European philosophy,” Gordon states, there was “no such thing. There was
properly ‘ancient Athenian,’ ‘ancient Ionian,’ ‘ancient Macedonian,’ or ‘ancient Roman,’ … etc..
There was ancient Chinese and Indian philosophy, but there was no reason to regard them as
Asian. Similarly, there was ‘ancient Egyptian/Kamitic,’ ‘Axumitic,’ and ‘’Nubian’ thought.” He
continues, “ . . . the love of wisdom seems to have a history fraught with racial and ethnic
allegiance” (15). Gordon speaks to the fact that colonialism and racism impose binaries to
prevent dialectical interaction. This leads to “the demand for universally separate terms. In South
Africa, this was called apartheid; in the USA, it was Jim Crow. The grammar of such societies
demands such separation.” He further states that “Since the separation is presumed just,
transgressing it becomes a violation of right.” The other commits “the crime of appearing”
(Gordon, “Black Aesthetics, Black Value” 4).
In Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, Gordon offers a critique of subjects embodying bad
faith. He sees political problematics at play and a tendency toward a subsumption of others when
one denies having a point of view and asserts one’s being as the being of the world; in bad faith,
one rejects displeasing truths and accepts pleasing falsehoods. Gordon argues these subjects
attempt to deny human reality and freedom, and are moving away from their responsibilities as
social beings. He also sees it as a rejection of humanity and a disregarding of difference and
humans in the flesh. He rejects notions of disembodied consciousness as well as authenticity
discourses, seeing these as elevating abstract humanity over real people with flesh and blood. He
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instead calls for “critical good faith,” which he argues requires a regard for accountability
through intersubjectivity, an I who thinks in terms of “I and I” in contrast to a racist, who
positions himself as self-justified while asking another human being to justify his right to
exist. Symmetry is already broken down in a situation that demands symmetry. The racist
thus elevates himself—or at least humanity—above the human to the level of God and
the Other below humanity. In effect, he says to the Other, “The problem with you is that
you are not I. Show me that you have a quality that has an equivalence relation with me.”
(Gordon, “Racism as a Form of Bad Faith,” 3)
Gordon thus sees this as another form of desiring mastery. A hegemonic push away from
humanity, in other words, the racist imagines he becomes God while also devaluing the other by
trying to take away their human status.
In “Africana Phenomenology: Its Philosophical Implications,” Paget Henry states that “in
its classic formulations by Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Husserl, European phenomenology was
seen as the self-reflective practice that disclosed the latent movements of a universal reason,
which was also the prime constituting force operating within the core of the European subject”
(2). Henry highlights how Husserl saw “the development of European phenomenology [as] tied
to the question of whether or not ‘European humanity bears within itself an absolute idea, rather
than being merely an empirical anthropological type like “China” or “India”’” (2). According to
Henry:
The positivistic reduction European humanity and the racist reduction of African
humanity are opposite sides of the coin of modern Western capitalism. The racist
caricature of “the Negro” is a creation of the “underside” of this mechanized capitalism, a
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part of its irrational shadow that it cannot affirm but must project onto others that it
perceives as its opposite. (4)
The global/”universal” power of this racist caricature resulting from the forces of
colonialism are presented within Frantz Fanon’s key books such as The Wretched of the Earth
and Black Skin, White Masks. In these texts he explores the double consciousness43 that results
from the colonial subject’s experience, the “wretched of the earth” that seem to live as nameless
objects in the world—objects rather than subjects with agency:
Black citizens are fixed as dyes in the personae of stereotypes whose persecutory force
creates a sense of social death; or they are vaporized into a more general “climate of
opinion” where the racialized person is seen as a threat, an infection, a symptom of social
decline: “overdetermined from without . . . dissected under white eyes . . . I am fixed . . .
and my long antennae pick up the catch phrases strewn over the surface of things. . . .”
(Black Skin, White Masks)
Henry sees the Rastafari as possessing what he calls a “potentiating second sight” (Henry,
8) becoming subjects with agency that combat these colonialist distortions of their beings by the
outside environment. They rebuild self and world “within the creative codes of African
discourses and symbols [and use this] … alternative space to see through and critique the
imposed ‘negro’ stereotype” (8). Through this distancing they displace the stereotype and
produce liberatory communities of resistance that are no longer seeing subjectivity in terms of
objects to be perceived and placed in space. The Rastafari, unlike Frantz Fanon’s colonial
wretches who are constantly subjected to the dehumanizing effects of colonization, re-claim their
subjectivity, reclaim there Is. They create communities outside of the Anti-black world within
the Caribbean and throughout the world.
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However, what Henry is able to glean from Lewis Gordon’s text What Fanon Said is that
rather than falling into the error of putting double consciousness of the colonized/Rastafari
potentiating second sight in a dialectical opposition to each other, there are connections to be
made. This potentiating second sight can be seen as a double consciousness with agency. There
is a certain form of power gleaned through double consciousness when knowing that the outside
world’s view and stereotypes connected to that view are false. With this knowledge one is also
able to see more clearly the false and oppressive systematic constructions of the world around
us—more easily able to deconstruct as also covered in the previous chapter. Henry quotes
Gordon below:
Lewis Gordon captures well the ironic dimensions of potentiated second sight when he notes
that it emerges in the subject who has become aware of the lived contradiction of this
deception, and who like Fanon is therefore able to announce “the absence of his interiority
from the point of view of his interiority” (1995a:33). It is from the reflective immediacy of
the decaying carcass of “the negro” that the critiques of potentiated second sight derive their
ethical/moral power, pinpoint accuracy, and razor-sharp quality. (9)

Achille Mbembe, Homi Bhabha’s and V. Y. Mudime Postcolonial Approaches
Achille Mbembe in “African Modes of Self Writing,” presents a much more critical reading of
Fanon’s work. Mbembe is against making these connections between historically colonized
modes of thinking and our new post-colonial situation. Taking an ahistorical and ontological
approach, he argues against the prioritizing of Fanon’s struggles and what he sees as the
narrative presented through the historic effects of colonization:
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Finally, there is the idea of historical degradation: slavery, colonization, and apartheid are
supposed to have plunged the African subject not only into humiliation, debasement, and
nameless suffering but also into a zone of nonbeing and social death characterized by the
denial of dignity, heavy psychic damage, and the torment of exile. These three
fundamental elements of slavery, colonization, and apartheid are said to serve as a
unifying center of Africans’ desire to know themselves, to recapture their destiny
(sovereignty), and to belong to themselves in the world (autonomy). (241–242)
He sees this as following the model of Jewish reflection on the phenomena of suffering, where
our cultural forms like theology, literature, film, music, political philosophy, and psychoanalysis
use, what he considers, certain models of victimization and historicist thinking that then continue
the narrative which leads to a “dead end” (240). He criticizes these narratives that claim to
universalize and speak in the name of Africa in its entirety.
Under the guise of “speaking in one’s own voice,” then, the figure of the “native” is
reiterated. Boundaries are demarcated between the native and the nonnative Other; and
on the basis of these boundaries, distinctions can then be made between the authentic and
the inauthentic. As such, politics required the total surrender of the individual to a utopian
future and to the hope of a collective resurrection that, in turn, required the destruction of
everything that stood opposed to it. Embedded within this conception of politics as pain
and sacrifice was an entrenched belief in the redemptive function of violence. As an
offering of one’s life on the public altar of the revolution... (251)
He worries about the need to strongly identify with essentialized identities that separate bodies in
space by making the construct “Africa” the land of black people and further critiques movements
like Afrocentrism and Negritude44 in which he sees a certain form of violence implicit in these
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modes of essentializing. A violence that for Mbembe depredates the spirit of the self as it
searches for a uniqueness that comes from the very stereotypes created by the colonizer and
invests fully in the constructed notions of race. He sees these movements as a form of
disconnecting from the world into a world without Others holding onto “rhetoric” and a
“neurosis of victimization [that] fosters a mode of thought that is at once xenophobic, racist,
negative, and circular” (252).
With these thoughts he would then perhaps be critical of the Afrocentrism and other
tenets within a movement such as Rastafari. However, although Mbembe makes some very
interesting and thought-provoking points he skirts away from the complexities of identities in
practice such as Rastafari by making a blanket critique of Afrocentrism. Perhaps the more
dogmatic strands of Rastafari could definitely take heed of Mbembe’s warnings as well as
Rastafari who follow misogynist ways of being.
However, there is a way that although Mbembe is critical of essentializing he in turn
essentializes and in his theoretical language universalizes the identities he critiques. Rastafari
and other identities involved in processes of conscientizing as practiced (as opposed to theorized)
are much more complex than the imagined identities that anti-identity theorists like Mbembe
critique. As Ras Yannick and Ras Tony reveal there are various Rastafari and even in the
religious communities they have no fully centralized authorities. Although Rastafari have elders
as role models, they are apprehensive about any prominent leadership. As Mutabaruka states
earlier, Rastas’ identities are based on their unique experiences and once one brings in being and
human experience into the equation then it becomes much more nebulous and harder to pin down
than “universal” essentialized identities. In reaching back to “Africa” many intrinsically know
that this is also a nation that has been constructed. In this reaching back Rastas also
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simultaneously re-construct through hybridizing their modes of being with both “African” and
Judeo-Christian references. However, there is still plenty to be gleaned from Mbembe’s
statements including his critique to not confine African imaginations of the self and the world:
within a conception of identity as geography—in other words, of time as space. From that
conflation has resulted a massive indictment of the twin notions of universalism and
cosmopolitanism, and in their place a celebration of nationalism— which advocates
wrongly for a politics either along the lines of a recovery of an essential but lost nature—
the liberation of an essence—or as a sacrificial process. (271–272)
Bhabha’s conceptualization of identity as hybrid and existing within a ‘third space,” also
questions these essentialized nationalisms that seek back to an original essence. He sees all forms
of culture as continually in processes of hybridity. He calls for a thinking that is more temporal
than spatial. A thinking that creates temporal “third spaces” that are full of possibilities within
time as opposed to spatial thinking that creates fixity and division:
For me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from
which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the “third space” which enables other
positions to emerge. This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up
new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood
through received wisdom (“The Third Space: Interview with Homi Bhabha,” 211).
Within this “third space” Bhabha sees how the contingent and the liminal become the
means for framing identities (The Location of Culture, 179). He calls for an exploration “outside
the sentence”: “I want to preserve, at all times, that menacing sense in which the non-sentence is
contiguous with the sentence, near but different, not simply its anarchic disruption” (182).
Perhaps connected to Derrida’s thoughts on the limits of the text and the phallogocentrism that is
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present within these limits. Bhabha quotes Derrida at the beginning and ends his chapter “The
Postcolonial and The Postmodern: The question of agency” with:
The dehistoricized authority of “Man and his doubles” produces, in the same historical
period, those forces of normalization and naturalization that create a modern Western
disciplinary society. The invisible power that is invested in this dehistoricized figure of
Man is gained at the cost of those “others”—women, natives, the colonized, the
indentured and enslaved—who, at the same time but in other spaces, were becoming the
peoples without a history. (196)
In The Invention Of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge, V.Y.
Mudimbe discloses how these “people without a history” like the African, “have become not
only the Other who is everyone else except me, but rather the key which, in its abnormal
differences, specifies the identity of the Same” (12). Mudimbe shows how the constructed
notions of “Africa” and “Africans”:
formed part of the series of oppositions and of the levels of classification of humans
demanded by the logic of the chain of being and the stages of progress and social
development. Explorers just brought new proofs which could explicate “African
inferiority.” Since Africans could produce nothing of value; the technique of Yoruba
statuary must have come from Egyptians; Benin art must be a Portuguese creation; the
architectural achievement of Zimbabwe was due to Arab technicians; and Hausa and
Buganda statecraft were inventions of white invaders. (13)
Mudimbe finds that the discipline “anthropology,” quoting Robert Rotberg is used to
distance and separate, “savagery from civilization on the diachronic—line of progress” (qtd. in
Mudimbe 15). Mudimbe further critiques epistemes, like the one surrounding anthropology that
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gives it “its status as a discourse and its significance as a discipline” and the epistemological
position that quoting Margaret Hodgen:
reduces and neutralizes all differences into the sameness signified by the white norm,
which, let us keep in mind, is more religious history than a simple cultural tradition. In
concrete language this reference meant a “biblical solution to the problem of cultural
differences [which] was regarded by most men as the best that reason and faith could
propose” that is, the same origin for all human beings, followed by geographical
diffusion and racial and cultural diversification. And it was believed that the Bible
stipulated that the African could only be the slave of his brethren. (9)
Mudimbe shows how what may seem like neutral “universal” forms of discourse are directly
connected to a systematic epistemological move to denigrate the “other” and thus justify
colonialism, capitalism and other systematic ways of oppressing said “other/s.”

EMDISEMBODIED I AND I ART MOMENTS:
The artists discussed below create spaces for EmDisEmbodied “I and I” moments in the viewer
that allow I (self) to move away from these systematic epistemological moves and to appreciate
the I worlds of the other. In other words, these artistic spaces promote embodied, active, present,
and engaged viewers that are aware of how much their Is (plural I) are connected to the Is of the
other thus connecting to Rastafari tenets of de-colonizing one’s mind and raising one’s racial
consciousness. According to Nathaniel Samuel Murrell, Barry Chevannes argues that Rastafari
were very effective in raising consciousness, “exorcising the demons of creole racism … and
forging social and political change in Jamaica” (Chanting Down Babylon 11).
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Emdisembodied I and I Moment—Lourdes Bernard: The ‘Universal’ Jesus
That this process of de-colonization is needed throughout the world is illustrated by the work of
Lourdes Bernard. I interviewed Bernard during her recent residency at El Museo del Barrio.
Bernard states that she is going through her own process of de-colonization.

Fig. 5-4. Bernard, Lourdes, Jesus was a Dominican Refugee 2017, charcoal drawing.

In her drawing, “Jesus Was also a Dominican Refugee,” she looks at the situation of colonized
refugees pushed out of the Dominican Republic to Haiti. In “Forced to Flee Dominican Republic
for Haiti, Migrants Land in Limbo,” The New York Times reports on how 3,000 refugees from
the Dominican Republic left by force because of fear of their neighbors after the government
crackdown on “illegal” migrants. “Now stateless, the refugees exist in the literal and figurative
space between two nations that, along with their island, share a history steeped in hostility.”
Many of these refugees were born in the Dominican Republic and did not speak either of Haiti’s
main languages of French or Creole. This state of statelessness is made even worse with
sanitation conditions that led to a cholera outbreak in the camps. Bernard shows one holding the
image of a white Jesus. The use of the white Jesus is indicative of the fact that many in the
Dominican Republic are Catholics and hold onto this image as their savior. Bernard reveals her
own and others’ conflicts with the still existing forces of colonization. In this EmDisEmbodied “I
and I” moment as I and other viewers see the work, Bernard elevates the Dominican people
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depicted who are now made stateless objects by their governments back to the complex,
conflicted subjects that they are.
This move by the Dominican government, to make part of their population stateless objects,
stems from a 2013 change in their constitution where citizenship requirements were manipulated
in order to expunge existing and new Afro-Haitian influences from their country. The new law
was that a Dominican citizen born after 1929 had to prove that they had one Dominican parent
otherwise their citizenship would be revoked. This new law coupled with the fact that AfroDominicans with Haitian ancestry are fleeing the Dominican Republic because of the racial
hatred by some Dominicans that is sanctioned by the government shows just how powerful the
fear of the “other” is in the Dominican Republic as it is in many places globally.

A QUICK DIGRESSION: SUSAN BUCK-MORSS AND HEGEL’S FEAR OF THE OTHER
The power of this fear of the other has been evident since the days when Hegel was putting forth
his master/bondsman dialectic while he read about the slave revolt in Haiti—the only nation in
the world established as a result of a successful slave revolt. Its establishment, however, has been
fraught with obstacles, including external present-day economic sanctions as well as its own
internal governmental issues. In “Hegel and Haiti” and her subsequent book Hegel, Haiti, and
Universal History, Susan Buck-Morss examines this fear of Haiti and shows paradoxically what
on the surface seems like the different paths between theory and practice in the history of
Western Philosophy. Simultaneously, while theorists like Hegel argued for the movement toward
freedom Buck-Morss states that a
… systematic, highly sophisticated capitalist enslavement of non-Europeans as a labor
force in the colonies—was increasing quantitatively and intensifying qualitatively to the
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point that by the mid-eighteenth century it came to underwrite the entire economic
system of the West, paradoxically facilitating the global spread of the very Enlightenment
ideals that were in such fundamental contradiction to it. (“Hegel and Haiti,” 821)
Although people may want to complicate Buck-Morss’s interpretations of those
Enlightenment ideals, Buck-Morss still brings up important key points. For example, she
elucidates how much Hegel was connected to the news reports about the revolution in the French
colony. For Buck-Morss, the Haitian Revolution was “the crucible, the trial by fire for the ideals
of the French Enlightenment” (837). However, even though there was a strong ideological
connection between these two revolutions it was not acknowledged or fostered. Perhaps this
connection could have made the ideals and impacts from both even stronger. Those connections
are only now being made more clearly through contemporary philosophy that is cognizant of the
links between real life events and theory. In Buck-Morss’s view Hegel’s work allowed
philosophy to “burst out of the confines of academic theory and became a commentary on the
history of the world” (852).
However, unfortunately this “commentary on the history of the world,” with Hegel’s limited
self-reflectivity into his own position racially and ethnically, led him to posit and construct the
notion that “Africa” and “Africans” had no history. Buck-Morss implies that this argument could
have been connected to fears of just how powerful the slave revolt in Haiti was, taking down the
colonizers that had much more advanced weapons.
Buck-Morss’s argument reveals how these “universal” theories can directly connect to the
psychological aspects at play as well as political interests on hand and the “universal” nature of
these theories can contribute to hiding these very paradoxes at play. Buck-Morss concludes by
questioning her need to look at the ideas of a racist whose thoughts helped to justify
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Eurocentrism. She answers her own question by believing this idea of universal history can be
rescued from the uses by white domination. Buck-Morss sees the project of universal freedom as
not something to be disregarded but something to be wrestled with, “redeemed and reconstituted
on a different basis” (865). She calls for larger, interconnected multiple stories to be told so we
can then glean moments of “clarity of thought” and “clarity in action” (865). What I would refer
to as EmDisEmbodied “I and I” moments.

I and I Moment - Renee Cox:Your ‘Universal’ God, My ‘Universal’ God, Yo Mama’s ‘Universal’
God
Renee Cox, a Jamaican-American artist, creates a provocative piece. In “Yo Mama’s Last
Supper” her body is completely bear as she reveals her conflicts with her Catholic upbringing. In
the Caribbean journal ARC, Shantrelle Patrice Lewis a curator, critic and also a past practicing
Catholic who has since converted to African spirituality, states:

Fig. 5-5. Cox, Renee, Yo Mama’s Last Supper 1999, photography.

The racialized, Eurocentric homo-gendered iconography of Catholicism automatically
coerces someone existing outside of that spectrum to naturally experience isolation and
distancing. This is especially probable for a Black girl child who wondered why nowhere
in the Catholic Cathedrals where she genuflected, did she see an image of God in the
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form of sculpture, oil painting, or stain glass window that looked anything remotely like
herself… Cox’s audacious decision to confront both the patriarchy and racism persistent
in both the structure of the Catholic Church and its iconography, was met with major
dissension.
One of the most noted opponents was the then New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who
tried to set “decency standards” in the city to keep similar works from being shown in museums
that received public funds. This aim for “decency” could be seen as another method to distance
oneself from the “Other.” If what the “Other” represents can be seen as indecent then it is easy to
erase this other away.

Adrian Piper: My ‘Universal’ Body, My ‘Universal Flesh’, Appearing as Food for The Spirit
Adrian Piper relays a similar isolation and a feeling of being erased away as she read Immanuel
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781).

Fig. 5-6. Piper, Adrian, Food for The Spirit 1971, private loft performance, silver gelatin print.
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In “Food for the Spirit,” Piper spent the summer alone in her apartment, eating nothing, drinking
only juice and water and practicing yoga. To counter the feeling of disappearing from the world,
Piper read into a tape recorder and photographed her image in the mirror, to ensure her existence.
Kaelen Wilson-Goldie in “Carnal Knowledge: Sex + Philosophy,” writes: “Piper appears to
hover ghostlike between the abstract, intellectual, and immaterial, and the earthy, sensual, and
unabashedly physical” (4). Piper states that her, “purpose is to transform the viewer
psychologically, by presenting him or her with an unavoidable concrete reality that cuts through
the defensive rationalizations by which we insulate ourselves against the facts of our political
responsibility” (Piper, Out of Order, Out of Sight: Selected Writings in Meta-Art, 1968-1992
234). Piper commits, as Gordon states, “the crime of appearing” while reading theory that tries to
disavow her existence she presents the particular as a form of the “universal,” thus complicating
this concept of the “universal.”

ZACHARY FABRI: CLIPPING MY ‘UNIVERSAL’ TETHERS

Fig. 5-7. Fabri, Zachary, Mim Andar Avenida Canadá (I Walk Avenue Canada), performative video,
2010.

351
Zachary Fabri uses a variety of media, including drawings and performances. His work shows
the connection he appreciates of his body with spirituality and nature. In the performative video
“Mim Andar Avenida Canadá (I Walk Avenue Canada),” he reveals the Rastafari tenet of the
responsibility of human beings to take care of the earth as he slowly catches dirt and carefully
places and pats it to the ground. Fabri also creates deeply psychological work maintaining, “I use
my politicized physical body […] but only as the medium of communicating ideas that reach
beyond the political, into a psychological space.” (ny.voltashow.com) A psychological space
perhaps revealing the conflicts of living as a Rastafari and trying to negotiate between the
positives gained by rediscovering a black identity and re-connecting to nature, but the negatives
of negotiating the patriarchy within the more doctrine-based sects of Rastafari. Perhaps those and
other struggles result in “Chanting Black Clouds” where a documentation photograph shows him
running while his dreads attached to black balloons trail behind and “Forget me not, as my tether
is clipped,” where he slowly cuts his dreads as they then fly off into the sky attached to white
balloons.

Fig. 5-8. Fabri, Zachary, Chanting Black Clouds, performative video, 2010.

352

Fig. 5-9. Fabri, Zachary, Forget me Not, as My Tether is Clipped, performative video, 2012.

Fig. 5-10. Fabri, Zachary, Me and Them, 2005 – an unplanned interaction where a tourist joins in the
dancing, mimicking the young girls’ traditional choreography.

Fabri’s piece “Me and Them” Sarah Michelle Rupert describes a third consciousness
EmDisEmbodied experience of watching the piece which identifies a non-EmDisEmbodied I and
I moment that she describes below:
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We watch a handheld camera film a group of young girls in indigenous dress dancing on
a hillside street in Darjeeling. Soon, a Caucasian tourist-type joins in the dancing,
mimicking the young girls’ choreography as best she can. The young girls seem
unmoved, unfazed, neutral. The tourist throws herself into the unfamiliar dance, flailing
her limbs, kicking her crisp white sneakers and smiling ear to ear at the camera and to her
off-screen counterpart.
The humorous yet awkward interaction lasts less than two minutes, until the tourist
eventually tires and walks off screen. Recalling comedic film tropes, personal family
experiences, and the stereotype of the loud American tourist, a sting of collective
embarrassment hits me as I watched, pondering the question posed in the video’s title,
trying to situate myself as a me or a them. It is this exact confrontation and selfevaluation in cultural contexts that Fabri’s work seeks to elicit.
(https://miamirail.org/reviews/zachary-fabri-forget-me-not-as-my-tether-is-clipped/)
Bernard, Cox, Piper, Fabri and Mutabaruka all present complex, socially engaged bodies
with agency, negotiating their interconnected, conflicted stories within. These creatives, by
presenting “particular” bodies with their own “universal” stories, neither conform to displeasing
falsehoods nor pleasing truths but question both. They create EmDisEmbodied “I and I” spaces
for the viewer to be self-reflective as they relate to the work. This powerful “I and I” phrase
originating from Rastafari speaks to the Rastafari notion that we should “reason” with each
other. Reasoning does not pit one theorist/theory against the other but creates spaces for both to
have moments of clarity. The artists presented here, Jamaican, Rastafari or otherwise all work
with thinking of “I and I” as it creatively informs We. They try to pull themselves out of strict
binary constructs and instead have formulated certain ideas that embrace difference, embrace the
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khora, and, as Lewis Gordon reminds us, embrace the phenomenological insight that “everyday
existence is an extraordinary achievement” (“Black Aesthetics, Black Value,” 1).
Terms, such as “Babylon,” are pointed reminders of how the environment affects
different people in different ways. It also reveals the very different battles that people with
various histories and experiences have to fight and the different modes one has to use—going
perhaps at time between those modes. By looking at and valuing the black body the artists move
beyond the oppressive ways and systems we use to create our West and attempt to avoid making
the same or similar mistakes of the Western patriarchal subject. Their work reveals deep
introspection within their particular universals. Some Rastafari are also working on ways to
make sure they don’t get so caught up in chanting down Babylon to then make the same mistakes
of said “Babylon.” Bob Marley warned against this in the lyrics to his song “Coming in from the
Cold” where he brings us back to the you:
It's you - it's you - it's you I'm talkin' to Well, you (it's you) - you (it's you) - you I'm talking to now.
Why do you look so sad and forsaken?
When one door is closed, don't you know another is open?
Would you let the system make you kill your brotherman?
No, no, no, no, no, no! No, Dread, no!
Would you make the system make you kill your brotherman?
(No, Dread, no!)
Would you make the system get on top of your head again?
(No, Dread, no!)
Well, the biggest man you ever did see was - was just a baby.
In this life (in this life),
In this (in this life, oh sweet life) … (lines 7–19)
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CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSION:
I ~ I: the EmDisEmbodied Absolute-Fragmented I, the Sense of the World, Errantry,
Opacity

It means, rather, that there is no longer any assignable signification of “world,” or that the
“world” is subtracting itself, bit by bit, from the entire regime of signification available to
us - except its “cosmic” signification as universe, a term that for us, precisely, no longer
has (or does not yet have) any assured signification, save that of a pure infinite
expansion. (Nancy, The Sense of the World, 5)

Jean-Luc Nancy emphasizes fragmentation within a loss of signification; Irigaray
discloses specularization countered by the proximate and the fluid, and Fanon uncovers
particularization while also questioning through self-awareness to move toward decolonization. I
relate to all these theorists, as at times I feel particularized, at other times specularized,
sometimes fragmented and perhaps also a mix between. On an individual level within our
singularities, we go through the world shifting amongst various definitions that never fully
pinpoint us. In re-reading, The Sense of the World, I spotted a sentence that I thought could help
encapsulate EmDisEmbodiment. Nancy in his chapter on Derrida’s term, différance says of the
word as it relates to being, “[i]t is thus that being is body. Not ‘embodied,’ nor ‘incarnated,’ not
even in a ‘body of its own’: but body, hence possessing its own outside, differing and deferring”
(35). At first glance this seemed the perfect way to cap off my discussion of EmDisEmbodiment
and perhaps at the beginning of this journey with the word I would have ended up within this
constant state of deferring.
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However, unlike différance which according to Derrida in Margins of Philosophy, “is
neither a word nor a concept” (7), EmDisEmbodiment is both word and concept. But it is a
concept that shifts and changes based on who utters it, what words surround it, when, where and
how it is uttered within the various language games that we play. It is connected to unstable Is
but ones that still have presences that they are responsible for. An understanding for me then of
the word is to aid modes of communicating within the political. This is the way I want to utter
EmDisEmbodiment as a shifting word that can provide avenues for hope and change.
In our histories of and existence within colonialism, we have been impacted in very
distinct ways. I argue that as human beings (and I am using humans here to represent all) it is
impossible within our theoretical languages to fully get away from these subject positions in the
present and those from the past, even if they do shift and change. The most cosmical theorist,
will have embedded within their thoughts, motivations, and life experiences, a connection to
their times that influence their particular approaches. I do not argue that this approach to think
otherwise and beyond the self should be disregarded, but rather that there should be an awareness
of possible biases that will present themselves even when trying to bracket those biases away.
Thus, there is a certain need to defer meaning, especially when one considers the
limitations of the I in connection to those biases. However, this deferring should be an aid toward
relation as Derrida, Nancy and Édouard Glissant suggest and not a means to nihilism. We still
have to find shifting answers to the issues of today. The philosophical, the world of the
imaginary, and the space of the artistic and poetic have so much to add to the political lens.
These worlds too can help to find and discover those shifting answers. It has been made too
difficult a task to come up with answers that benefit many instead of a select few. Having
multiple rhizomatic directionalities of approach within our epistemologies that also can
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intermingle and intertwine is vital. We thus need our theoretical spaces to consider a relationality
not only in terms of individuals but also in terms of the intermixing amongst different academic
fields that can help to provide models for these shifting answers. Models that can foster the
beautiful and unexplainable aspects of the self.
Thus, EmDisEmbodiment unlike différance, to reiterate, is a word, it is a concept. But it is
different based on who utters it and connects intimately to our senses of the world. My argument
for EmDisEmbodiment; my decolonizing of the I; my bringing attention to hybridity and
creolization; are all connected to my own experience with blood lines from many geo-locations.
Past notions of metaphysics provide a limited lens for the times we live in. Without allowing for
relation, they cannot come close to understanding the various perspectives of and possibilities for
our multiple stories. Immanuel Kant could never have even fathomed the makeup of my I so how
could he state universals that relate to me. In addition to many of his disturbing statements he
claims:
Among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their
countries… still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or
science or any other praiseworthy quality, even though among the whites some
continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the
world. (West, 2003)
(https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fnhum.2019.00280/full).
Kant with all his brilliance, divided the world into zones where he saw red people in the
Americas, yellow people in Asia, black people in Africa and white people in Europe. Each race
had one color, had one geo-political location, and only one was superior. This simplified
perception of race that got mapped onto our racist notions of nation-states belonging to a
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homogenous ethic group creates a particular story, an epistemology that helps to drive
colonialism forward. However, now we as humans can see our relationality not to one “superior”
or “inferior” color but instead to multiple bloodlines whether it be biologically, spiritually,
relationally or otherwise.

Fig. 6-1. Stephens, Sandra. 2020. Personal ancestry.com breakdown.

In Kantian times, the makeup of I could not have existed. However, with identities in
motion as Glissant appreciates, we are now more aware of multiple openings for thoughts,
multiple shifting concepts, and multiple shifting answers. Some meanings are deferred by some
but yet grasped onto by others. That we live in times that call for different perspectives to be held
and where the invisible can no longer be violently submerged is crucial. Now we have multiple
races holding the respect Kant speaks of, multiple movements, black and other people now
consider many countries their country while others believe we need to disregard borders, while
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yet others see the need for borders to protect from outside oppressive States.
EmDisEmbodiment will be a tool for the now and will be uttered in a certain way by me.
For there are so many Is that I cannot even imagine that will exist and so I will not then presume
to state fixed universals for those to come. Thus, the first mode of approach for the word when it
is uttered is not to encapsulate it in our either/or definitions of the world but to consider it in a
both/and way, of being able to hold on to contradictory concepts simultaneously. It will give a
white man the space to deconstruct whiteness in all its complexities; it will allow a white woman
the possibility to disconnect from specularization; it will provide a black man the ability to
reconstruct a strong but open identity and it will provide me the space to do all three. However,
EmDisEmbodiment cannot do the work of philosophy and the political on its own. Exactly
because it is a word and a concept. Art needs to be present as Art provides that connection to the
Imaginary. The visual and poetic are constantly looking to expand our languages and move
beyond the Symbolic. They connect to the abject, the erotic, and the rhythmic to expand our
meanings. Art provides a model to our verbal and written languages to think of concepts as
changing in time. The artists presented here I argue do this in various ways and through a more
dynamic materialization than what I could ever write about by using the word
EmDisEmbodiment. Images and artists’ ideas are scattered liberally throughout, to add new
layers of meaning.
To highlight a selection, in chapter one John Bramblitt provides us with exciting ways to
consider color emotionally and to be aware of the possible overlaps between and rhythmic
natures of our senses as they interact. Adrian Piper advances her body beyond its “concept” by
mimicking its objecthood and shifting it toward the formal beyond our Symbolic and limited
hierarchical constrictions. Prince comes up with a non-gendered symbolic version of himself
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before the term non-binary even existed. Charles Gaines takes the concept “tree”, making it blur
across its various instances. The formalist men attempt to move beyond their egos and defer, as
in the case of Cezanne and his mountains, the final and “pure” form while Gina Osterloh works
to refuse colonialists simplified versions of race that are not able to properly place her as a
mixed-race Filipino-American. Through her art she suggests ways to shift and determine how
meaning is made. In chapter two Carrie Mae Weems traverses beyond the invisibility of her
body, within a certain episteme, to connect to new concepts of the beautiful and the erotic while
also questioning the natural vs. cultural distinctions of people that are categorized within the
subhuman. Willem de Kooning reframes the abject woman to try to connect to formlessness, that
space beyond meaning. In chapter three Caribbean artists like Oneika Russell and Firelei Báez
disclose the power of visual languages to reveal the hidden and spiritual spaces beyond the
written and verbal and they along with Salvador Dali reveal our fluid natures. The surrealists and
Afro-surrealists express their strong connections to the Imaginary and how the visual can
influence our here and nows. In chapter four Kara Walker, William Kentridge, and Christian
Boltanski reveal other ways of looking and how they impact our multiple consciousnesses and
visions, while in five various artists show how like Rastafari each I can be on the same plane as
the other I. Chapter five also focuses on the term “I = I” and discloses that written, verbal
language, and poetry can be used as Mutabaruku states for, “messin’ up your brains” and
echoing in our minds. Zachary Fabri performs what it means to be from this earth, tethered to it
but yet able to grasp avenues from the imaginary to impact it and survive in it.
Although this was to be a book focused on Nancy, Fanon and Irigaray, (they are still key
players), it however became an assemblage of many different theorists, artists, and
contemporaries. Nancy’s “sense of the world” provided me the inspiration to determine how
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some of the theorists entered this realm. Conversations that I had with friends and colleagues
spontaneously became key components of the chapters. I attempted to go against my own limits
of knowledge by weaving artists, theorists, ideas, that others and Dr. Lewis Gordon presented to
me rather than necessarily having a pre-thought-out plan. It was what I consider a very necessary
playful experiment to continue the process of decolonizing my I. It was similar to the way I
approach creating an artwork. Theorists or artists were mentioned, and if I found them of interest
and could weave them into the tapestry, I did. I want to end by delving further into a few last
theorists within this weave, that when placed in relation to each other will pull together the last
pieces of the puzzle of this story.
Jean-Luc Nancy, complicates notions of the event - the event of being, the event of the
other, the event of the art “object” and aesthetics, and the event of philosophy. Alain Badiou
expands on the event of philosophy in his discussion with Slavoj Žižek in Philosophy in the
Present. In the chapter “Thinking the Event”, Badiou points us to the violent and brutal
encounter between Socrates and Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias, where two kinds of thought,
diametrically opposed to each other, are presented. As Badiou puts it, it is “a relation between
two terms devoid of any relation” (4). While Callicles believes the happy man to be the tyrant
who wins over others through cunning and violence, Socrates feels the happy and true man is
Just. Thus, because there is no foundation that holds their thoughts about man together, instead
of being a philosophical discussion it becomes violent. As Badiou states, “what becomes clear to
any reader of the text is not that one interlocutor will convince the other, but that there will be a
victor and a vanquished… Callicles is defeated. He does not acknowledge defeat, but shuts up
and remains in his corner” (4-5). Badiou believes that this story signals to us the importance of
Philosophy. He continues:
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The sole task of philosophy is to show that we must choose. We must choose between
these two types of thought. We must decide whether we want to be on the side of
Socrates or on the side of Callicles. In this example philosophy confronts thinking as
choice. So that we can say the following: a philosophical situation consists in the moment
when a choice is elucidated. A choice of existence or a choice of thought. (5)
Although I do believe choice is necessary. The choice is not between old notions of a separation
between criticism/idealism; empiricism/rationalism, and between mind/body. For Nancy and
myself this separation between thought, existence, and body does not exists and the event of
philosophy is intimately connected to the event of existence. Nancy has a different formulation
of existentialism than Jean-Paul Sartre, as for Nancy existence and essence are not set up as a
dialectical with existence preceding essence. Furthermore, unlike Sartre, Nancy sees existence
and essence as intimately intertwined where essence is much more nuanced as it becomes an
“essenceless existence,” (139) the “touch of sense itself” (159). Perhaps then Nancy would agree
with the call by Lewis Gordon to embrace the everyday as “extraordinary” (“Black Aesthetics,
Black Value,” 1).
Is of today I argue are embracing the everyday. Some are connecting to the
deconstruction of metaphysics done by such theorists as Nancy and Derrida as they reach out to
the other and the world. As Nancy would state they are “being-towards” (88), where beingtoward for Nancy is not a prescribed notion of the I. Instead the I is a singular-particular and
connected intimately to its transimmanence, (55) where it posits its being but not as an
expression tied up in myths but rather its existence is its “exposition” (55). Nancy wants man to
intimately sense the world and space instead of trying to determine categories and divvy up that
space. Not only would this move us away from colonial knowledges and the degradation of our
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planet but it will also moves us away from the dispossession of the other.
As an artist-philosopher I find the importance of the sense/sensibility of our conflicted
bodies in space, such as the experience of our bodies during the period of slavery in the United
States and the current experience within what are argued to be modes of slavery through mass
incarceration and subhuman conditions for the descendants of those bodies. I further see the
significance of the sense/sensibility of bodies trying to move away from fixed notions of a
calculated, rational, and, controlling Cartesian self. Bodies of the former that have been
tormented, their languages annihilated may then be quite ambivalent about reaching out to a
Symbolic world that has been so limited by discourses. These bodies while steeped in these
oppressive discourses and worlds have also created their own modes of counter-consciousnesses,
knowledges and other worlds away from the discourses of the latter bodies who are trying to rid
themselves of modes of knowledges that tormented such bodies. How do we uncorrupt our
sense/sensibilities that have been corrupted by all our various discourses? How do we appreciate
the antinomies of seeing various universals to question our own universals? How do we go from
self-knowledges and keen analyses but then also not box the other in with those analyses? How
do we use self-knowledges to make us realize the biases against us that we can sense are not the
definitions of our worlds?
These questions challenge me to theorize both from the place of a position that calls for
haptic perception, forcing new thoughts and relations to emerge, and a position that is calling for
a connection to the beyond and what has been invisible from our new and changing discourses.
This is an argument for a radical polyphonic democracy that creates the space for there to be
many different stories and discourses shifting our languages so there can be better
understandings of those stories. Nancy does much in reframing self/other dynamics and
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advancing the use of art in bettering those dynamics. A focus of art on representations of the
body as well as formal elements can further expand conversations regarding sense and
sensibility. Because the United States is a country steeped in racism, sexism, homophobia, ablebodiedness, and the like, our unconcealed sense needs not only to be an acceptance of difference
but a jouissance toward difference. This is not however an argument against not seeing the ways
we may be similar. This is also not an argument against form and some of the key ideas
presented by Nancy in relation to form. There is much to be taken from his thoughts on how our
sensibility toward form can open up different ways of thinking about the world, and different
future ways of being in our worlds.
However, my argument is for being able to hold on to proximate and different ways of
being in the world and being intrigued by the antinomies of the very different universals within
the worlds. How do we sense and enjoy others differences through consciousness, understanding,
sense, and sensibility? And how do we then use Nancy’s ideas to complicate current notions of
representation rather than to simply disregard those notions?
Derrida problematizes and question the familiar dualism and division between the intelligible
and sensible within Western philosophy and I too do not see the separation between sense and
sensibility and consciousness and the understanding so distinctly. Nancy actually shows their
intimate connection and understands where this free play of understanding can also aid sense and
sensibility? While concepts such as haptic perception, the need to want to sense, reach out and
touch the other are of extreme importance. A realization that this still involves a certain form of
externalization is necessary. A consciousness of oneself, outside oneself is a part of touching
through proprioception. This is not dissimilar to the third consciousness that Fanon mentions.
Perhaps this externalization will further allow us to step outside of our own experiences as Fanon
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has, to realize that sense experiences can be very different for each person. The irrational
(sensing/feeling/sensibility) and the rational (understanding/logos) are very different as they have
been historically set up for example for males/females, and blacks/whites.
Nancy, in Sense of the World, would rather be concerned with fragmentary singularities and
absolute relativities in communication with each other. He feels through this notion of the sense
of the world that the world comes to us through relations with others. He feels that it is not the
tension and the knots but the relational process of the tying and untying of the knots that are key.
“How to think the tie as always still to be tied? How, that is, instead of conferring sense on the
presupposed knot, to make the tying of the (k)not into sense itself?” (103). He further argues for
a more primordial return to the ways in which the immanence of the world holds a life of
dynamic and non-subjectivist sense, arguing for the self’s agency in relation to others and this
sense of the world. He sees this agency as a relational moving toward that which has no end and
that which is fragmented, due to its inability to represent the non-subjectivist sense of the world.
A fragmentation that I argue is also now even more so fractal and deserted for the white man
because it is also experienced as a relation to not only the sense of a more unsure and unstable
world but also experienced as a relation to a very different other. The other that as Luce Irigaray
posits allows us to go beyond our comfort zones or as Gordon states moves us away from
pleasing falsehoods towards deeper ways of thinking and being. As Nancy states, “[w]hat makes
up ‘world’ and ‘sense’ can no longer be determined as a given, accomplished, ‘finished’
presence but is intermingled with the coming, the infinity of a coming into presence, or of an evenire” (126). This coming also connects to a new way of being in a world where the I is no
longer at the center of his universe. Nancy also speaks to the indecipherable and incomplete
moment of this coming:
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The coming is infinite: it does not get finished with coming; it is finite: it is offered up in
the instant. But that which takes place “in the instant” – in this distancing of time
“within” itself–is neither the stasis nor the stance of the present instant, but its instability,
the inconclusiveness of its coming –and of the “going” that corresponds to that coming.
The coming into presence of being takes place precisely as nonarrival of presence. (35)
Nancy thus sees this coming as not connected to the myths that we create concerning self,
essence and a stable presence. Not as something in-common or a universal rule of our particular
senses but as numerous singularities from individual “subjects of sense”. (93) Thus, Nancy sees
politics and the arts not as substances that are fully formed but as gestures. A gesture of the tying
but less of a tie that binds/encloses/enchains but rather a tie that reties and makes a network. This
network is not made through consensus or something held in common but rather is a network
that is the very space for communication, “‘each communication is, above all, communication
not of something held in common but of a communicability,’ according to the formula of Giorgio
Agamben. Where, consequently, sense is not what is communicated but that there is
communication” (114).
Nancy is not interested in embracing myths or a renewal of art toward truth or
theologicopolitical justifications. Instead he wants to think in terms of aesthetics as aisthesis:
… insofar as it implies neither transcendence nor immanence. The heterogeneous entelechy
of the sensing/sensed, in the spatializing unity of its contact, implies relationship, in the form
of being-affected-by, and consequently in the form of being-affectable-by, being-liable-to (of
which intellection and intelligible sense are, after all, only modulations or modalizations,
even affections of affect itself). Affectability constitutes the presence of sensible presence,
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not as a pure virtuality, but as a being-in-itself-always-already-touched, touched by the
possibility of being touched. (128)
This affective being influenced by aisthesis connects then to affect theory, haptic perception

Fig. 6-2. Patterson, Ebony. three kings weep, 2018.

Fig. 6-3. Baez, Firelei. “Dementrea”. 2011.
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Fig. 6-4. Marks, Laura. The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses. 2000.
Duke University Press. www.dukeupress.edu/the-skin-of-the-film

and Laura U. Marks’ thoughts about haptic visuality in cinema where:
The Skin of the Film offers a metaphor to emphasize the way film signals through its
materiality, through a contact between perceiver and object represented. It also suggests the
way vision itself can be tactile, as though one were touching a film with one’s eyes…
Finally, to think of film as a skin acknowledges the effect of a work’s circulation among
different audiences, all of which mark it with their presence. The title is meant to suggest
polemically that film (and video) may be thought of as impressionable and conductive, … I
want to emphasize the tactile and contagious quality of cinema … The contingent and
contagious circumstances of intercultural cinema events effect a transformation on its
audience. As hybrids, the works challenge the separateness of cultures and make visible the
colonial and racists power relations that seek to maintain this separation. (xi-xii)
Nancy similarly to Marks, sees a being that does not see the world as a space but “as the
multiple tracing out (frayage) of the singularity of existence” (132). Nancy understands art as ars
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or tekne, “ceaselessly opening the toward-itself as if onto the world” (139). Nancy sees a tekne
whose sense is about enjoyment and suffering, wonder and anxiety as opposed to completion and
verification. A “fragmentary or fractal” tekne whose realm is “essenceless existence” lacking
both “domain and sovereignty” (139) which I further relate to Fred Moten’s call to not be a
single being and his critique of the sovereignty of identity. Nancy appreciates this era of technics
as able to grow in an exponential manner and because it does not produce sovereignty and does
not presuppose an End or universal:
The structure of existing is neither the in-itself nor the for-itself nor their dialectic, but the
toward: neither toward oneself nor toward the other without being, first of all, toward the
world, the toward of being-toward-the-world as constitution of ipseity. Neither toward
happiness nor toward unhappiness without being, first of all, toward the happenstance that
the world is. That which, for itself, depends on nothing is an absolute. That which nothing
completes in itself is a fragment. Being or existence is an absolute fragment. To exist: the
happenstance of an absolute fragment (152).
He finds his own antinomies between universals and singulars, the absolute and relative, the
singular-plural and the transcendent and immanent or what he refers to as “transimmanence” a
being-in-the-world that moves toward the happenstance of the world and its event. Thus, Nancy
would question the project of the formalist in chapter one that privileges the Kantian ahistorical,
aiming toward a teleological divine. Nancy states:
Occidental tragedy will have arrived at its most extreme limit in the heroic ambiguity of
the twilights of the gods: either the (ecstatic?) exposition to the abyss or the appropriation
of the divine in order to recreate, refashion a world … What opens up beyond this point-
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but also at this point of departure-is something else: the world that will point neither to an
abyss without foundation or form nor to a plastic (re)creation. (146)
He sees the abyss as having foundation in the sense of the self rather than this pure form outside
of it or a plastic (re)creation within the Symbolic. He further eschews the creation of Myths
including those that led to our stories of colonialism. The quote above in its reference to the
tragedy of the Occident and Nancy’s other writings also signal the end to colonization and
Western civilization that is tied to an end to Westernization further expounded upon by Walter
Mignolo.
Mignolo, in framing the end to Westernization, emphasizes three important books that
came out around the year 2000 by Francis Fukuyama, Henry Kissinger, and Maja Breznik. He
appreciates the rise of Third World countries by pointing to a conference in 1955 in Bandung,
Indonesia, where delegates from African and Asian countries that had recently gained
independence met to build African and Asian solidarity against world powers that had oppressed
them. The conference was attended by representatives from 29 countries: 23 from Asia and 6
from Africa. They were all opposed to colonialism, and they urged countries to fight for
independence. They demanded the full decolonization and emancipation of Africa and Asia
where there could be peaceful coexistence and economic development. The conference had a
huge psychological impact marking the emergence of Third-World countries on the international
stage. Chaired by Indonesian President Sukarno, he stated:
This is the first intercontinental conference of colored peoples, so called colored peoples,
in the history of mankind. I am proud that my country is your host… This is a new
departure in the history of the world that leaders of Asian and African peoples can meet
together in their own countries to discuss and deliberate of matters under common
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concern. In spite of diversity that exists among its participants let this conference be a
great success. Yes, there is diversity amongst us, who denies it. Small and great nations
are a percentage here with people professing almost every religion under the sun…
Almost every political faith we encounter here … and practically every economic
doctrine has its representative in this hall … But again, what harm is in diversity when
there is unity … this conference is not to oppose each other. It is a conference of
brotherhood. (https://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/dd10d6bf-e14d-40b59ee6-37f978c87a01/c28105d8-8f82-4f57-b077-7e87dfbc7205)
EmDisEmbodiment, can be a key strategy toward decolonization that each subject can
approach in various ways while Nancy – floats and wanders in space, Édouard Glissant connects
to the “now green ball and chains” (204) of rust in the ocean, that bear the trace of the slave ships
coming across the Atlantic. Glissant warns us that, “[n]either in arrowlike nomadism nor in
circular nomadism are roots valid.” (12). Cautioning us then against teleological thoughts that go
like an arrow to the answer and those that circle around themselves in deconstruction. Nancy
calls for not a “search for meaning” but instead for a “wandering labor of sense” (115-116).
Using the sense of the world and body to guide us, as I attempt to do while I write this—as the
world, theorists and artists come to me to inform my thought.
How do I take Nancy’s story of seeing and appreciating all the fragments of being and
Édouard Glissant’s “poetics of relation” with his belief that we all have a right to be opaque,
uncategorized and unclaimed, further? How can these last theorists help with my continued
process of decolonialization? Glissant reminds us of the fact that, “uprooting can work toward
identity, and exile can be seen as beneficial, when these are experienced as a search for the Other
(through circular nomadism) rather than as an expansion of territory (an arrowlike nomadism).
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Totality's imaginary alIows the detours that lead away from anything totalitarian” (18). He asks
us to consider errantry that does not have us proceed from a full rejection of the other and the
past or being frustrated by an unrootedness. He sees where if we at times take on the problems of
the other we put forth avenues to find ourselves. Where Relation can help us see invisibilities
perhaps, “in other parts of the world (and already at work in an underground manner) that will
suddenly open up other avenues and soon help to correct whatever simplifying, ethnocentric
exclusions may have arisen” (21). Glissant warns us against a totalitarian perspective as we
search on and decolonize. He states:
The conquered or visited peoples are thus forced into a long and painful quest after an
identity whose first task will be opposition to the denaturing process introduced by the
conqueror. A tragic variation of a search for identity. For more than two centuries whole
populations have had to assert their identity in opposition to the processes of
identification or annihilation triggered by these invaders. Whereas the Western nation is
first of aIl an "opposite," for colonized people’s identity will be primarily "opposed to" that is, a limitation from the beginning. Decolonization will have done its real work when
it goes beyond this limit. (17)
He continues:
Errant, he challenges and discards the universal-this generalizing edict that summarized
the world as something obvious and transparent, claiming for it one presupposed sense
and one destiny. He plunges into the opacities of that part of the world to which he has
access. Generalization is totalitarian: from the world it chooses one side of the reports,
one set of ideas, which it sets apart from others and tries to impose by exporting as a

373
model. The thinking of errantry conceives of totality but willingly renounces any claims
to sum it up or to possess it. (20)
In a similar fashion Nelson Maldonado-Torres calls for us to decolonize and to reject
white epistemologies that reinforce a totalitarian colonialist mindset or that thinks in terms of a
fixed totality. Through this rejection he calls for us to realize that not one person can have all the
relevant questions and answers that would lead to decolonization and that it must be done in
relation. In his, “Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality and Decoloniality,” he argues for
decolonial artistic creation and decolonial spirituality that remain open through epistemic,
aesthetic, erotic, and spiritual means, where those decolonizing should be both communicators
and creators. Whereas, Maldonado-Torres states, we can transition from, “isolated self-hating
subjects to decolonizing agents and bridges who serve as connectors between themselves and
many others. It is in this process that true love and understanding—philosophy in the most
abstract but also the most concrete of senses—can flourish” (24). Maldonado-Torres wants us to
reach out to the other and connect in erotic ways to that other as discussed in chapter 1. Thus,
Lorde’s poetic notion of the erotic permeates throughout a new decolonial vision of the other
seen not as an object of satisfaction but as an I within a global political society (Mignolo)
composed of I and Is.
Transgender artist, Lorenza Böttner’s work created without hands uses eroticism and
tactility in their self-portraits to present the nuanced and unstable I within what I have referred to
as an “I and I” formulation for society. Unhinged from our cultural constrictions, Böttner
according to Paul B. Preciado provides us a new way to conceive of visuality in our century.
(https://www.artandeducation.net/announcements/389628/lorenza-bttnerrequiem-for-the-norm)
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Fig. 6-5. Böttner, Lorenza. untitled. 1982. Black and white photograph. Private Collection.
www.artandeducation.net/announcements/389628/lorenza-bttnerrequiem-for-the-norm
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In bringing attention to her work Preciado states:
S/he studied painting at the Kassel School of Art and Design, graduating with a thesis
entitled “Behindert?” in which s/he questioned the category of disability and explored the
genealogy of mouth-and-foot painters. In Kassel, a double process of subjective and
artistic self-construction began. Firstly, Lorenz decided to use the name Lorenza,
affirming an openly transgender feminine position; Lorenza’s drawings and self-portraits
as a woman, feminine clothes designed for armless bodies, and photographic sequences
documenting this process of transformation functioned as performative technologies for
creating an armless-transgender subjectivity (as seen in the Venus de Milo performance,
first enacted in Kassel in 1982, later taken to New York and San Francisco). Secondly, if
medical discourse and modes of representation aim to desexualize and degender the
impaired body, Lorenza’s performance work eroticized the trans-armless body, endowing
it with sexual and political potency.
(https://www.documenta14.de/en/south/25298_lives_and_works_of_lorenza_boettner).

Fig. 6-6. Böttner, Lorenza. Untitled (n. d.), three black-and-white photographs mounted on cardboard.
From “Lives and Works of Lorenza Böttner,” by Paul B. Preciado.
www.documenta14.de/en/south/25298_lives_and_works_of_lorenza_boettner
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I recently watched a documentary on Böttner who at the age of eight was electrocuted
while climbing and had to have his arms amputated. I cried at the end of the documentary when
Böttner leaped from the sky and dived into a pool. Perhaps there was some sentimentality
attached to my emotions but I also realized it was because the sight of her diving had expanded
my world. I had never realized an armless person could dive so beautifully. My presumptions
had expected otherwise. By framing Böttner’s armless body in a limited way, I had not
understood Böttner’s right to opacity. Glissant sees creolization within the Caribbean as a key
model showing us a way to opacity. He sees it as, “not merely an encounter, a shock (in
Segalen's sense), a métissage, but a new and original dimension allowing each person to be there
and elsewhere, rooted and open, lost in the mountains and free beneath the sea, in harmony and
in errantry” (34).

Fig. 6-7. Image capture from Lorenza Böttner,
Portrait of an Artist. 2008. Short Documentary.
Huff & Seed.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sd6bJSSl-sg

Fig. 6-8. Image capture from Lorenza Böttner,
Portrait of an Artist. 2008. Short Documentary.
Huff & Seed.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sd6bJSSl-sg
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I would like to conclude with a brief exploration into the work of Mark Bradford, who in
various ways connects to much that is stated in this chapter including perceptions of sense,
Relation, wandering, and errantry and reveals the dangers to bodies when their rights to opacity
are not protected. His work looks at the body in crisis through mappings. Bradford in “Dead
Hummingbird” maps out the killings and lootings of the Tulsa race riots where white rioters in
1921 massacred the prosperous city of what was referred to as the Black Wall Street. In, “The
Devastation of Black Wall Street”, Kimberly Fain turns to the work of the sociologist Chris M.
Messer to identify the underlying causes. Fain maintains that:
In essence, whites were resentful that blacks
no longer passively accepted second-class
citizenship in their own homeland… Both
politicians and the media falsely framed the
Tulsa riot as an uprising started by lawless
blacks. Tulsa newspapers regularly referred
to the Greenwood district as “Little Africa”
and “n—–town.” African-Americans in the

Fig. 6-9. Bradford, Mark. Dead Hummingbird.
2015. mixed media on canvas.

district were labeled “bad n—–s” who drank booze, took dope, and ran around with guns.
Perhaps as a result of government officials’ stereotyping rhetoric and the media’s biased
reporting, whites and blacks interpreted the racial violence differently. Generally, white
politicians and residents perceived the black community “as predisposed to crime and in need
of social control,” Messer explains. In other words, due to assumptions of black criminality,
whites justified deadly violence on Black Wall Street, because blacks needed to be
subjugated. (https://daily.jstor.org/the-devastation-of-black-wall-street/)
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Fig. 6-10. Bradford, Mark. Finding Barry. 2015. From “Visual Aid. The show isn’t just about AIDS. It’s
about the body and how the body and health can be political.” www.poz.com/blog/the-show-isnt-just-a

Bradford’s “Finding Barry” for the exhibition Scorched Earth at the Hammer Museum in
2015, visualizes the impact of Aids on the United States. In, “The show isn’t just about AIDS.
It’s about the body and how the body and health can be political” by Visual AIDS an interview
with Mark Bradford about the exhibition, Bradford states that “Finding Barry” was inspired by,
“the recent hysteria about the Ebola virus and how familiar that felt to some of the hysteria
around AIDS in the 1980s. 2009 was the year of the statistics I found.” In his visualization of the
body as world, Braford goes on to further describe his interest in maps and other inspirations:
I like the idea of biology being a map, and in thinking about this show I was looking at
cells being infected by the HIV virus. For me that has a lot of social references I find
fascinating. The show isn’t just about AIDS. It’s about the body and how the body and
health can be political. AIDS and Ebola somehow in a social context become much more
than just biology… The discussions, debates and news coverage around the Ebola virus
felt so familiar to me, right down to the idea of banning flights from Africa!
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On March 21, 2020 less than a week after a birthday I was supposed to spend in Jamaica,
she closed her borders. For the first time in my life I was not able to go freely to the place where
I was born and that I had called home. Also, for the first time as a citizen of the United States my
movement was restricted in the similar ways as to when I was a child growing up in Jamaica.

Fig. 6-11. Dowrich-Phillips, Laura. “Lockdown: Caribbean nations shut borders to fight COVID-19.”
March 26, 2020. jamaica.loopnews.com/content/lockdown-caribbean-nations-shut-borders-fight-covid19-2

If Mignolo is correct in his read of the end of Western Civilization, how does Covid
impact this trajectory? Is it still the case that the black and brown populations will be more
massively impacted than whites with viruses, famine, and the like in the future? Will
catastrophes no longer be connected to race? In, “Why has Covid-19 had less of an impact in
Africa?” of August 23rd, 2021 the authors Alex Ezeh, Michael Silverman & Saverio Stranges
wonder why the impact of the pandemic remains markedly lower compared to the Americas,
Europe, and Asia. They look at the younger population in Africa; the deeper connection to nature
and the outdoors; the fact that the older generation tends to be cared for by family; the fact that
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Africa has been having to deal with coronaviruses for a while now; and the fact that there was a
quick and effective public health response across the continent with collaboration between
nations even without massive amounts of vaccine distribution. What will happen when more of
the African population are vaccinated? Some scientists are seeing where those who have gotten
Covid and have gotten vaccinated after the fact could be gaining a "superhuman immunity" or
what immunologist Shane Crotty refers to as a "hybrid immunity." Should Africa then serve as a
model on how to control the virus?

Fig. 6-12. Doucleff, Michaeleen. “New Studies Find Evidence Of 'Superhuman' Immunity To COVID-19
In Some Individuals.” NPR Morning Edition. September 7, 2021.
www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2021/09/07/1033677208/new-studies-find-evidence-of-superhumanimmunity-to-covid-19-in-some-individuals

In February, as a professor, I was one of the first to be eligible to take the Pfizer Covid
vaccine. I now have to consider whether to take a booster shot. Questions enter any choice.
Should I be depriving others of something that the medical professionals are debating whether I
need? Further questions present themselves through Covid: How can we assure equity within the
States in regard to Covid so we do not continue to annihilate our Red and Black populations?
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What are answers that Africa, other countries and nations have found to help combat the virus
that go beyond a vaccine? If we look at the map in Fig. 6-12 of confirmed deaths as of
September 15th 2021 per 100,000 population, China and Japan along with Africa have not been
as impacted as the Western nations. In the case of Asia with massive amounts of tightly knit
populations, is it because of non-reporting, lifestyle, prevention? A global pandemic does much
to reveal new sets of questions that our epistemologies and aesthetics are tasked to help inspire
shifting answers for. These shifting answers are beyond what our colonial knowledges will ever
imagine.

Fig. 6-13. Wikipedia. “COVID-19 pandemic by country and territory.” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID19_pandemic_by_country_and_territory
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NOTES
1 Martin Heidegger shows how the determinations we make about the world including the takenfor-granted determinations are done through processes of concealment. He argues for poetic
processes of unconcealment to move us away from axiomatic mathematical thinking and closer
to a truer more primordial form of Being.
2 The Symbolic is part of the triad within the psychoanalytic theory of Lacan, who distinguishes
it from the Imaginary and the Real. The symbolic is also referred to as the rule of the father
connected to the social world and its discourses. Here I am also using it to refer to Western
philosophy.
3 Many theorists have discussed the remainder, Slavoj Žižek sees it as a "certain remnant …
escaping the circle of subjectivation”, of "subjective appropriation-mediation” (Hegel and
Contemporary Philosophy 396) and argues that the subject is directly related to this leftover.
4 The Real is part of the psychoanalytic theory of Lacan and is the state of nature from which we
have been forever severed by our entrance into the Symbolic, the rule of the father, and
language. Kristeva refers to the khôra as a presignifying state and for Derrida, the khôra defies
attempts at naming or either/or logic. Both see the khôra as allowing us to better approach the
Real.
5 Many of the theorists refer to this concept of touching. Derrida's recent book On Touching will
be key in this regard as he puts his ideas and thoughts in conversation with Jean Luc Nancy's.
6 Strategic essentialism is a phrase introduced and critiqued by Gayatri Spivak in the 1980s and a
major concept in postcolonial theory. Spivak sees it as a tactic that minority groups, nationalities,
ethnic groups use on the basis of shared aspects of identity to represent themselves. While strong
differences exist between members of these groups when engaging in debates they may
temporarily "essentialize" themselves and to bring forward their group identity in a simplified
way to achieve certain goals often for equal rights. Spivak disavows the term, unsatisfied with
the problematic ways in which the term has been deployed in terms of nationalism to
promote essentialism itself. I hear the criticism. Is there a way to theorize without making use of
some form of strategic essentializing?
7 Bricolage is discussed in more depth later in the essay when referring to both Derrida and
Spivak. Spivak sees it as the "re-constellation” of cultural items by taking them away from their
assigned function. Derrida sees it as using the tools at hand. Both want us to deconstruct and be
aware of the tools we use a form I then see of EmDisEmbodiment.
8 Through the concept of the trace, Derrida reveals just how much the presence of the other is
within the self because the meaning of an I (self) contains a trace of an I (other). One cannot, for
example, bring up the concept woman without bringing up the concept man; colonized without
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bringing up the concept colonizer; white without bringing up the concept black; and European
without bringing up African and vice versa.
9 Being with an uppercase B can be seen as "pure” being and has been widely theorized by
Martin Heidegger where he calls for an existence that moves away from the human-centric,
mathematical, logical thinking man and back towards a pre-ontological, primal man. Rather than
understanding Being in terms of the present moment he calls for a recovery of the question of the
meaning of Being one that will then lead to a more authentic way of sensing, feeling, dwelling,
building, and living in the world. The lowercase version refers to everyday lived reality and
things.
10 Double consciousness is a term coined by W.E.B. Dubois in Souls of Black Folk where he
defines what he sees as the situation of American Negroes – a split consciousness where one also
sees themselves through the eyes of the other and has to struggle with the internalization of all
the stereotypes that come along with that view. Frantz Fanon’s key philosophical works,
Wretched of the Earth and Black Skin, White Masks also connect to this term as he deeply
interrogates the situation of the colonial subject and the psychological conflict as the colonized
tries to adapt to the colonial world.
11 Notice the connection here to Piper's quote on abstraction above.
12 Traces in Western philosophy are connected to ideas repressed to fortify the Western
philosophical narrative. One such narrative is the one that I am exploring here of this breakdown
of the Cartesian self.
13 I and I is discussed in a chapter toward the end of the book. It refers to a Rastafarian phrase
that means you and me but combats the separation and spatiality of that phrase.
14 A term that has been popularized by Donna Haraway with her Cyborg manifesto. Haraway
shows how the concept has been used by the Greeks to structure their cities as they conceive the
body politic as an organism within a large cosmic organism. She further elucidates how this body
is connected to the social relationships of production and reproduction and worries that this
union of the political and physiological has been a major source of ancient and modem
justifications of domination based on differences seen as natural, inescapable, and moral.
15 The Imaginary is from Lacan’s three realms of human existence it is deeply rooted in the
mirror stage where you first begin to imagine yourself as an object. This mirror stage is a
representational stage, the first signifying process we have not yet linked to language.
16 Another of the Lacanian realms manifested in language, laws and social structures. These
structures and signs we use help us to carve up the world so we can make sense of things.
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17 Sous rature is a Heideggerean term meaning “under erasure” where words can never quite
fully mean what I need them to mean and where the signifier can never fully represent the
signified.
18 This is reconceptualizing a very clear analogy connected to a red apple and its redness in the
entry on Platonic realism at: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Platonic realism
19 Visuality as it concerns paintings in relation to their cultural context.
20 The word singularity has been widely theorized and used by such theorist as Howard Caygill.
Caygill sees singularity as an I apart from the cultural definitions inscribed on it. In an interview
with IDSVA student Rowynn Dumont he talks about singularities as being beyond attracting and
opposing forces, beyond dualisms, and likens it to the experience of being in a black hole and
thus he views singularities as cosmological.
21 This relates back for me to Heidegger and others thinking on anxiety as it relates to an
expansion of knowledge and a relationship with the other.
22 Heterotopia is “a concept elaborated by philosopher Michel Foucault to describe certain
cultural, institutional and discursive spaces that are somehow ‘other’: disturbing, intense,
incompatible, contradictory or transforming. Heterotopias are worlds within worlds, mirroring
and yet upsetting what is outside”. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heterotopia_(space)
23 Maricia Brennan writes the intriguing, “Painting Gender, Constructing Theory that goes
further into the thoughts and ideas of this group.
24 The “myth of woman” is critiqued by such theorists as Monique Wittig who in “One is Not
Born a Woman” uses a Materialist Feminist approach to assert that lesbians are not women.
Many Black, Chicana and other feminists have also broken apart the neutrality of whiteness that
is presented in such words like “man” and “woman”.
25 Johann Gottlieb Fichte thinks, should retain their own 'sphere of freedom' in which they are
free from outside forces.
26 I talk further about Bad faith in chapter five.
27 When referring to masculine and masculinity here and elsewhere in this chapter I am
explicitly meaning a white heteronormative masculinity as it has been situated historically. This
naming is aware of the changes possible within whiteness and heteronormativity.
28 Ibid.
29https://www.academia.edu/14528757/HYSTERICAL_REALISM_Surrealism_and_female_ins
anity
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30 I have put feminine in quotes as much theory and being today questions the stereotypes
associated with the very word. Moves towards a post-gender world also puts this term in
question.
31 Here and where addresses are made by both Irigaray and Rose below of woman and man I
would like the reader to think in terms of white woman and white man, as black, Asian, Arab,
man/woman etc. bring up many other conversations. Not to mention the conversations that are
brought up when one thinks in terms of trans identity.
32 This is a term than Raewyn Connell develops to speak to toxic masculinities.
33 The French feminist and theorists have been criticized for universalizing man. It could be
both argued that they are reinforcing the structures that set man up as white man; that they are
including black and other minority men; that they are making those men invisible or that they
agree with Sylvia Wynter that in her critique of the story of modern man.
34 A Lacanian term related to the mirror phase where as a child we see ourselves in the mirror
and project an ideal version of ourselves onto this image. The object a is the lack between our
real selves and this ideal self that leads to a desire that we are always trying to make up for.
35 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40653883.
36https://www.csus.edu/indiv/o/obriene/art111/readings/craven%20&%20baackmann%20surreal
ism%20and%20post%20colonial%20latin%20america.pdf
37 I use the word ‘race’ while knowing that it has been proven that there is no basis in genetics
for these separations. These separations have happened due to social constructions evident also
by the fact that Jews are called a race when there can be African, Chinese or Irish Jews.
38 The phrase “Chant Down Babylon” has been used in various ways including as a remix
album, released in 1999, by hip hop and rock artists covering songs by Bob Marley & The
Wailers.
39 I state “religious” because there are also “uptown dreads” and non-religious people who
follow many Rasta principles except for the belief either in a god or, more crucial, the idea that
Haile Selassie is God.
40 Being with an uppercase B can be seen as “pure” being and has been widely theorized by
Martin Heidegger where he calls for an existence that moves away from the human-centric,
mathematical, logical thinking man and back towards a pre-ontological, primal man. Rather than
understanding Being in terms of the present moment he calls for a recovery of the question of the
meaning of Being one that will then lead to a more authentic way of sensing, feeling, dwelling,
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building, and living in the world. The lowercase version refers to everyday lived reality and
things.
41 These primary source interviews were used to enrich information gleaned from texts that have
limitations when describing this relatively new religion (as described by some), pattern (Ras
Tony) or free-form spiritual, intellectual and lifestyle identification (Ras Yannick). The texts will
be used with caution as they are not written by Rastafari and do reveal their biases. For example,
the title, the Rastafarians by Leonard E. Barrett, Sr. is problematic as Rastafari do not like to be
called Rastafarians believing that "Rome" imposed that name on them to seek out ways to define
the Rasta (Tony). Barrett also uses the word cult to describe the movement which many Rastafari
would not ascribe to. On the other hand, in the Rastafari by Barry Chevannes he reveals his
"Barnes bias" due to the fact that his information mainly comes from interviews with "Brother
Barnes” and others interviewed were from Barnes’s network of friends and acquaintances.
However even with the biases both books provide deep insight into Rastafari. I will also draw
quite a bit from The Rastafari Reader: Chanting Down Babylon that has a compilation of
different keenly engaged scholars with the movement a few of whom are Rastafari.
42 Martin Heidegger focused on ways that the structures we use to define ourselves can also
conceal certain things from us. He argues for processes of unconcealment. The poetic is one
method he believes can help us approach what he calls a clearing to then lead to unconcealment.
43 Double consciousness is a term coined by W.E.B. Dubois in Souls of Black Folk where he
defines what he sees as the situation of American Negroes – a split consciousness where one also
sees themselves through the eyes of the other and has to struggle with the internalization of all
the stereotypes that come along with that view. Frantz Fanon’s key philosophical works,
Wretched of the Earth and Black Skin, White Masks also connect to this term as he deeply
interrogates the situation of the colonial subject and the psychological conflict as the colonized
tries to adapt to the colonial world.
44 Negritude is a literary movement, developed by francophone African intellectuals, writers,
and politicians in France during the 1930s, including Martinican poet Aimé Césaire, Léopold
Sédar Senghor (the first President of Senegal), and Léon Damas of French Guiana.
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